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I. INTRODUCTION
BY AND LARGE, Civil Rule 11' has received short shrift from courts and
commentators.2 Indeed, one Ohio appellate court has described the
*Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law; B.S., John Carroll University; M.S.L.S., Case-Western Reserve Univer-
sity; J.D., University of Detroit.
OHIO R. CIV. P. 11. Specific Ohio Civil Rules are hereinafter generally refer-
red to as "Rule."
2 For the views of the principal Ohio commentators, see 4 ANDERSON'S OHIO
CIVIL PRACTICE § 151.23, at 336-37 (Harper 1973); 2 S. JACOBY, OHIO CIVIL PRAC-
TICE § CR 11, at 86-88 (1972); 1 W. KNEPPER, OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE § 2.05(B), at
62-63 (1970); J. MCCORMAC, OHIO CIVIL RULES PRACTICE § 5.08, at 101-02 (1970); 3
W. MILLIGAN, OHIO FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE, Form 11.1, n.1, at 11-2
through 11-4 (1981); 11 WEST'S OHIO PRACTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE FORMS § 7.51, at
123 (Lewis 1973).
See also Browne, Civil Rule 11: The Signature and Signature Block, 9 CAP.
U.L. REV. 291 (1979); Browne, Civil Rule 10(B) and the Three Basic Rules of Form
Applicable to the Drafting of Documents Used in Civil Litigation, 8 CAP. U.L.
REV. 199, 200 (1978); Browne, Ohio Rule 8(C) and Related Rules: Some Notes on
the Pleading of Affirmative Defenses, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 329, 354 n.82, 356-57
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requirements of Rule 11 as being no more than "formal and technical."3
Such expressions are unfortunate because they tend to denigrate the
importance of a rule which imposes grave moral and ethical obligations
upon attorneys and which may serve as the basis for holding losing at-
torneys liable for the costs and expenses of the prevailing party.'
nn.90, 91 (1978); Browne, Civil Rule 1 and the Principle of Primacy-A Guide to
the Resolution of Conflicts Between Statutes and the Civil Rules, 5 OHIO N.L.
REV. 363, 381 n.85 (1978); Browne, The Finality of an Order Granting a Rule 60(B)
Motion for Relief from Judgment: Some Footnotes to GTE Automatic Electric,
Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 13, 119 n.348 (1977); Browne,
Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Comment on Amended Ohio House Bill 531,
25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 151, 208 (1976); Corrigan, A Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure, 43 OHIO BAR 727, 732 (1970); Fuerst, Municipal Court Practice Under
the New Civil Rules, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 537 (1970); Garvey, The Attorney's
Affidavit in Litigation Proceedings, 31 STAN. L. REV. 191, 192 n.5 (1979); Lasher,
The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and Their Effect on Real Property Titles, 4
AKRON L. REV. 47, 89 (1971); Milligan, Rules of Civil Procedure in Domestic Rela-
tions Practice, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 524, 529 (1970).
For an exhaustive study of FED. R. CIV. P. 11, see Risinger, Honesty in
Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Risinger].
I F.O.P. v. Dayton, 35 Ohio App. 2d 196, 301 N.E.2d 269 (2d Dist. 1973). Other
Ohio decisions which touch upon Rule 11 are: Westmoreland v. Valley Homes
Mut. Hous. Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 291, 328 N.E.2d 406 (1975); State ex reL Mill-
ington v. Weir, 60 Ohio App. 2d 348, 397 N.E.2d 770 (10th Dist. 1978); East Ohio
Gas Co. v. Walker, 59 Ohio App. 2d 216, 394 N.E.2d 348 (8th Dist. 1978); Matson v.
Marks, 32 Ohio App. 2d 319, 291 N.E.2d 491 (10th Dist. 1972); Antonopoulos v.
Eisner, 30 Ohio App. 2d 187, 284 N.E.2d 194 (8th Dist. 1972); Simon v. St.
Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. Montgomery
County 1976); Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1976); State v. Buser, 25 Ohio Misc. 179, 265 N.E.2d 332 (C.P.
Wood County 1970); Cotterman v. Fahrig, 28 Ohio Misc. 237, 277 N.E.2d 466 (Ket-
tering Mun. Ct. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 55 Ohio App. 2d 15, 378 N.E.2d 742
(2d Dist. 1972).
' Thus far, the courts have been zealous in protecting the losing attorney
from suits by the prevailing party. See, e.g., Karpanty v. Scheer, No. L-79-092
(6th Dist. Ct. App., filed Nov. 30, 1979), as summarized in 53 OHIO BAR 412 (1980);
Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Zonak, Poulos & Cain, No. 70 AP-123 (10th Dist.
Ct. App., filed Sep. 25, 1979), as summarized in 53 OHIO BAR 494 (1980); Norman v.
Gibson, No. 79 AP-516 (10th Dist. Ct. App., filed Nov. 30, 1978), as summarized in
52 OHIO BAR 120 (1979); W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Manufacturing & Supply Co., 5
Ohio Op. 3d 397 (10th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Burkons v. Rogoff, No. 953,503 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County, filed Dec. 16, 1976), as summarized in 48 CLEV. B.J. 167 (1977).
See also Ready, Countersuing the Lawyer-The Case of the Sore Winner, 1
NEGLIGENCE L. NEWSLETTER No. 4 (Ohio St. B.A. April, 1978). But the pressure is
building, and when the barriers fall, as they must, the spearpoint of the attack
may very well be the ethical and moral obligations enshrined in Civil Rule 11.
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 603 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979), presents
the overture. The court stated:
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides no authority
for awarding attorney's fees against an unsuccessful litigant. The rule
provides that the attorney's signature on a pleading certifies that "to
[Vol. 30:385
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the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay .... For a willful
violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action." The rule says nothing about disciplining a party by
imposing attorney's fees upon him for any act of his lawyer, even if his
lawyer willfully violated Rule 11.
Id at 103 n.2. But will the rule authorize the imposition of attorney's fees on the
lawyer? The affirmative answer that is in the slow process of development is
premised on a two-fold theory: (1) the Code of Professional Responsibility
establishes an attorney's duty not only to his own client, but also to the public at
large and, more particularly, to the client's adversaries; (2) Civil Rule 11 is the
vehicle for enforcing that duty through its provision for imposing sanctions on
the offending attorney.
The first portion of this theory has found some acceptance. See, e.g., Wolfram,
The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in
Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281, 310-14 (1979); W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. &
Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397 (10th Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Although this latter case
did not find any basis for holding the losing attorneys liable for allegedly
frivolous litigation, it did note that
[ain attorney does have an obligation to the public and to his profession
to act honestly, competently, in good faith, and without malice in all of
the activities he undertakes. This duty has been set forth in the Code of
Professional Responsibility adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio and is
enforceable by disciplinary proceedings against the attorney, including
suspension from the practice of law or permanent disbarment.
Id. at 400.
Prior to 1979, however, neither the second portion of the theory nor the
theory as a whole had been as successful. In Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376
(N.D. Iowa 1978), for example, the barrier held fast and the spearpoint was
blunted when the court said: "The court disagrees with this theory. Violation of
the Code of Professional Ethics is not tantamount to a tortious act, particularly
with regard to liability to a non-client. Though Canon 7 does speak of a duty to
the legal system 'to stay within the bounds of the law when representing clients,'
it does not create a private cause of action." Id at 1383.
But 1979 saw the barrier pierced at several points. One of the first thrusts
came in Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), when the court
noted:
The law is clear that attorney's fees may be assessed against the losing
party when action is instituted in malice and bad faith .... Only on such
a showing is an award of attorneys' fees appropriate under Section 9(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... That same yardstick applies
when the equitable power of the court is invoked.
Rule 11, F.R.Civ.P. requires an attorney who signs a pleading to
represent that good ground exists to support the claim. Peter Kiewit
Sons Co. v. Summit Construction Co., 422 F.2d 242, 271 (8th Cir. 1969).
As Judge Gurfein has indicated, the accountability Rule 11 imposes on
counsel merely adds an "ethical responsibility to the conception that a
claim that is baseless should not survive." Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp.
1, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The law of this circuit is that relief under Rule 11 is
discretionary and requires a showing of a claim not simply lacking in
merit, but bordering on frivolity. Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d
1046, 1056 (2d Cir. 1969). Accordingly, the yardstick is the same whether
Rule 11, the equitable power of the court or Section 9(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is relied upon.
Id at 640. To the same effect, see North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale
1981]
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Rule 11 does have some formal and technical requirements, however,
and they may be summarized briefly as an introduction to the subject of
this Article. First, with respect to the signature requirement, Rule 11,
as applied through Rule 7(B)(3), in substance mandates the following:
1. A party who is not represented by counsel of record must per-
sonally sign each pleading, motion or other paper filed in the
course of
a. a civil action, or
b. a special statutory proceeding to which the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure are clearly applicable by their nature.'
2. If a party is represented by counsel of record, each pleading, mo-
tion or other paper filed by that party in the course of
a. a civil action, or
b. a special statutory proceeding to which the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure are clearly applicable by their nature,
must be signed by a designated trial attorney in that attorney's
individual name.'
Second, with respect to the signature block, Rule 11, as supplemented
by a variety of local rules of court, requires the following information be
appended to the signature block:
1. The signature of a party not represented by counsel of record
must be followed by a signature block consisting of the party's
typed or printed name, and his or her address and telephone
number.'
2. The signature of a designated trial attorney must be followed by
a signature block consisting of:
a. the typed or printed name of the attorney;
b. the designation "trial attorney," followed by the name and
party designation of the person on whose behalf the at-
torney appears;
c. the office address of the attorney;
d. the office telephone number of the attorney; and
Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gage v. Wexler, 82 F.R.D. 717, 720 (N.D.
Calif. 1979). Given the number of frivolous cases now flooding the courts, deci-
sions such as these are surely signposts to the future.
' OHIO R. Civ. P. 7(B)(3).
' Browne, Civil Rule 11: The Signature and Signature Block, 9 CAP. U.L. REV.
291 (1979). With respect to special statutory proceedings, see, in general, Browne,
Civil Rule 1 and the Principle of Primacy-A Guide to the Resolution of Con-
flicts Between Statutes and the Civil Rules, 5 OHIO N.L. REV. 363 (1978); in par-
ticular, State, ex rel Millington v. Weir, 60 Ohio App. 2d 348, 397 N.E.2d 770
(10th Dist. 1978).
1 See Browne, Civil Rule 11: The Signature and Signature Block, 9 CAP. U.L.
REV. 291 (1979).
8Id&
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e. the name of the firm of which the attorney is a member
and/or the names of co-counsel or associate counsel if any.9
Why require the signature and signature block? The signature block
is intended to provide the information needed for the implementation of
Rule 5. '0 That rule requires the service of pleadings, motions or other
papers on the attorneys for all parties represented by attorneys, and on
the parties personally if they are not so represented. The signature
block simply provides information with respect to the place where such
service may be made. The signature itself, however, is of greater im-
port, and it is the significance of the signature that we shall discuss in
the following pages.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SIGNATURE
A. The Signature of the Unrepresented Party
As a general rule, the signature of an unrepresented party has no ef-
fect other than to signify that party's assent both to the content of the
document on which it appears, and to the filing of that document."
Unlike the signature of an attorney, the signature of an unrepresented
party is in no sense a certification as to the merits of the matter
presented in the document, and a party may proceed pro se on such a
document even if he cannot find an attorney who will sign the document
and thereby certify that there is good ground to support it.'" Further, a
party may proceed pro se on his own signature even if the attorney who
had been representing that party moves for leave to withdraw as
counsel on the grounds that the party's position is without merit. 3 If the
Id.
10 OHIO R. Civ. P. 5.
Thus, in Huffman v. Nebraska Bureau of Vital Statistics, 320 F. Supp. 154
(D. Neb. 1970), it was said:
One of the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure is that "A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading and state his address." . . . Undoubtedly, one of the justifica-
tions for the quoted provision of Rule 11 is to make certain that the per-
sons who are named as parties are actually in assent to the filing of an
action on their behalf.
Id. at 156. And again, in Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1976), it was
noted that "[iln situations in which a party is not represented by an attorney, the
Rule 11 signature requirement seems designed mainly to assure the court that
the named party is actually in assent to the filing of an action on his behalf." Id.
at 1369 n.7.
" Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
3 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (B), which states:
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission
if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment . . . if: (1) He
knows or it is obvious that his client is bringing the legal action, conduct-
1981]
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attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel is accompanied by a detailed
examination of the merits of his client's case, however, and that ex-
amination reveals a lack of merit in the client's position, the court may
grant the motion to withdraw and deny the client the right to proceed
pro se on his own signature. 4 But this is a rare case, and as a general
rule it may be said that the unrepresented party's signature carries no
significance as to the merits of that party's case.5
As far as the Ohio system is concerned, however, there may be at
least one exception to the general rule that an unrepresented party's
signature is not a certification as to the truth or merit of the material to
which it is appended. Under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure service
has replaced filing as the event which confers official standing on a
document used in civil litigation. As Judge Corrigan puts it:
While Rule 4(B) provides that a copy of the complaint and sum-
mons shall be served on the defendant, Rule 5 requires that a
copy of all subsequent pleadings, motions, and other important
papers be served upon the opposite party. This important
change is that service of papers and not the filing of papers is
the jural act."
To some extent, the same principle has been adopted in the federal
system, and has been criticized as being too imprecise; the exact mo-
ing the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or is otherwise
having steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of harassing or
maliciously injuring any person.
Id. And see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C), which pro-
vides:
If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission
to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal... unless such request
is because: (1) His client: (a) Insists upon presenting a claim or
defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be sup-
ported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law.Id.
4 Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972).
"s The theoretical basis for this conclusion is found in the language of Rule 11.
While that Rule requires the signature of an unrepresented party, or the
signature of at least an attorney of record when a party is represented, it is only
the attorney's signature that is said to be "a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay." Further, it is
only the attorney who is subject to "appropriate action" for a "willful violation of
this rule." Had the Rule meant the certification procedure to apply to both
signatures, it would not have spoken only in terms of "the signature of an at-
torney," nor would it have limited punishment to the attorney's "willful violation
of this rule."
16 Corrigan, A Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 OHIO BAR 727,
731 (1970).
[Vol. 30:385
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ment of filing can be determined by the filing stamp of the clerk of
court, but the exact moment of service is left to guess and to God." The
draftsmen of Ohio Rules were aware of this criticism and attempted to
allay it by requiring a proof of service for every document filed with the
court if that document had to be served under the provisions of Rule
5(A). 8 To be minimally sufficient, this proof of service had to state the
date and manner of service.'9 This, it was thought, would establish the
moment of service with sufficient accuracy and would eliminate the
burdensome task of calling or visiting the courthouse to determine
when a particular document had been filed.2"
To insure compliance with the proof of service requirement, Rule 5(D)
mandates that no paper filed with the court shall be considered until a
proof of service is endorsed thereon or separately filed,2' and to insure
the accuracy of the proof of service, the Rule commands that it "shall be
signed in accordance with Rule 11."22 But the only provision of Rule 11
that is directed to honesty and accuracy is that provision which
stipulates that "[t]he signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is
'" See the comments pro and con as they are summarized in Browne, The
Metaphysics of Motion Practice: When is a Motion "Made"for the Purposes of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 OHIO BAR 925 (1977).
'1 Thus, OHIO R. Civ. P. 5(D) provides:
All papers, after the complaint, required to be served upon a party shall
be filed with the court within three days after service. Papers filed with
the court shall not be considered until proof of service is endorsed
thereon or separately filed. The proof of service shall state the date and
manner of service and shall be signed in accordance with Rule 11.Id.
19 Id
' See Ohio Rules Advisory Committee Staff Note to OHIO R. Civ. P. 5(A), in
which it is said:
Rule 5(A), then, enhances fair notice by requiring that all important
papers subsequent to the original complaint be served on the opposing
party or his attorney and relieves the opposing attorney of the time-
wasting necessity of checking the file in the clerk's office to determine
whether an important paper has been filed.
OHIO R. Civ. P. 5(A), 1971 STAFF NOTE (emphasis added). What is said here of the
act of service is equally true with respect to the time of service; the proof of ser-
vice which must accompany each document filed with the court gives fair notice
of the time of service and eliminates the time-wasting necessity of checking the
file in the clerk's office to determine when an important paper has become an of-
ficial document in the litigation.
" See text of OHIO R. CIV. P. 5(D) as quoted in note 18, supra. See also
Westmoreland v. Valley Homes Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 291, 328 N.E.2d 406 (1975),
in which the rule is applied at least inferentially.
2 OHIO R. Civ. P. 5(D).
19811
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not interposed for delay."23 In the Rule 5(D) "proof of service" context,
however, this provision loses its force if it is read literally and is limited
to the attorney's signature. 4 Therefore, if the "signature" requirement
of Rule 5(D) is to serve its purpose as a guarantor of the accuracy of the
proof of service, the "certificate" provision of Rule 11 which it incor-
porates by reference must be read as being applicable to the signature
of the unrepresented party as well as to the signature of the trial at-
torney. To put it another way, when Rule 5(D) incorporates the provi-
sions of Rule 11 by reference, it incorporates the spirit and intent of
that Rule, and not merely its letter.
The same basic argument can be applied to the "signature require-
ment" applicable to the use of the general denial. In substance, Rule 8(B)
stipulates that a defender may plead a general denial "subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11."' I However, the need for extending the
letter of Rule 11 to cover the unrepresented party is not as great in the
case of a general denial as it is in the case of the proof of service. By the
nature of things, the general denial, as a pleading device, is likely to be
used-and abused-only by those attorneys who were in practice prior
to the effective date of the Ohio Civil Rules;2  as a pleading device, it is
Id. R. 11 (emphasis added).
24 That it does apply to the attorney's signature when the signature is ap-
pended to a proof of service is evident from what is said in East Ohio Gas Co. v.
Walker, 59 Ohio App. 2d 216, 394 N.E.2d 348 (8th Dist. 1978): "In the instant case
the record establishes that the appellee was timely served with the appellant's
motion for a new trial. The proof of service attached to the appellant's motion in
compliance with Civ. R. 5(D) and Civ. R. 11 establishes that the appellant's mo-
tion was served upon the appellee within fourteen days after the entry of the
judgment." Id. at 223, 394 N.E.2d at 352. In other words, the attorney's Rule 11
signature on the Rule 5(D) proof of service is the guaranty of its truthfulness, and
the proof of service may thus be relied upon to establish the date of service. This
same point may be found written between the lines in Westmoreland v. Valley
Homes Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 291, 382 N.E.2d 406 (1975).
2 OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(B). The full text of the applicable portion of the Rule reads
as follows:
Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the averments
of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of
designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the
averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as ex-
pressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its
averments, including averments of the grounds upon which the court's
jurisdiction depends, he may do so by general denial subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
Id.
, The general denial was expressly authorized under the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure; as it was said in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2309.13 (Page 1954) (Repealed
1971): "The answer shall contain (A) A general or specific denial of each material
allegation of the petition controverted by the defendent .... Id. See also OHIO
R. Civ. P. 8(B), 1971 STAFF NOTE, where it is said: "Rule 8(B) supersedes
§ 2309.13(A), R.C., which, along with the specific denial, has unqualifiedly permit-
[Vol. 30:385
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probably unknown to the unrepresented party who has had no legal
training, and is therefore not likely to be used by that party. But if it is
used by an unrepresented party, one can argue that the party's
signature is subject to the "certification" provision of Rule 11 to the
same extent as an attorney's signature would be.
Apart from the Rule 5(D) exception (and possibly a rare Rule 8(B)
general denial exception), the general rule prevails: The unrepresented
party's signature is not an attestation to the truth or merit of the
material to which it is appended; it is no more than an indication that
the unrepresented party consents to the content of the document and to
the filing of the document with the court."
ted a general denial." Id. The general denial, however, was never meant to be
taken literally; rather, it was a formulary used to put the plaintiff on notice that
the defendant demanded strict proof of each and every element of the plaintiff's
case. Under Rules pleading, the formulary function of the general denial has been
replaced by the concept of "honesty in pleading," and if the general denial is now
used, the presumption is that it is intended to be taken literally. Accordingly,
under the Rules, the legitimate occasions for using the general denial are rare in-
deed. As the aforementioned Staff Note goes on to say:
Rule 8(B) provides that a general denial should not be served unless the
pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the averments of the
preceding pleading. Therefore, in light of the fact that a defendant is
seldom in a position to deny in good faith all allegations in a plaintiff's
pleading, defendant under Rule 8(B) should resort to the specific denial
to designated averments or paragraphs in a plaintiff's pleading or state
as to a specific averment that defendant is without knowledge or infor-
mation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment or admit
in whole or in part of truth of a specific averment.
Id. Attorneys who were admitted to practice after the effective date of the Civil
Rules would probably have had this change in philosophy pointed out to them in
law school, but attorneys who were admitted to practice prior to the effective
date of the Civil Rules may not be expressly aware of the change, and are quite
likely to be still using the general denial in its old formulary role.
In any event, Rule 8(B) invokes the "certification" provisions of Rule 11 in
order to emphasize that the "honesty in pleading" philosophy has replaced the
formulary philosophy, and that the general denial is now to be used only when
the defender can, in good faith, deny all of the allegations of the pleading to
which his general denial is directed.
' In addition to the cases cited in note 11, supra, see Ginter v. Southern, 611
F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980), where it was said:
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every
pleading, including the notice of appeal, be signed by the party filing it,
or by that party's attorney. We note that... of the six individuals named
as pro se plaintiffs-appellants in No. 79-1344, only Leonard G. Ginter,
who is not an attorney, signed the complaint, the notice of appeal, and all
other pleadings filed in that case. Under similar circumstances, courts
have dismissed the appeals of those pro se appellants who failed to sign
the notice of appeal. Scarrella v. Midwest Federal Savings and Loan,
536 F.2d 1207, 1209 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885, 97 S.Ct. 237, 50
L.Ed.2d 166 (1976); McKinney v. Debord, 507 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir.
1974). Because of the conclusion we reach in this case, we decline to con-
1981]
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sider whether such a dismissal is appropriate here. However, we urge
the district courts to assure compliance by pro se litigants with the re-
quirements of Rule 11. Only by such compliance may the courts be
assured that the parties named as plaintiffs are actually in accord with
the pleadings filed on their behalf.
Id at 1227-28 n.1. This note not only sums up the significance of the
unrepresented party's signature but also stipulates the normal penalty for the
unrepresented party's noncompliance with Rule 11-dismissal of the action or
the appeal of those unrepresented parties who have failed to individually sign the
appropriate documents. To the same effect, see People ex reL Snead v. Kirkland,
462 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa. 1978): "One purpose of Rule 11 is to assure that per-
sons who are named as plaintiffs in an action actually assent to the filing of the
action on their behalf. Since the present complaint was not signed by either Dar-
ryl or Daniel Snead, the Court will strike the complaint as to them." I& at 917-18.
It may be noted here that while an unrepresented party is not normally sub-
ject to the "certification" provisions of Rule 11 because he is not bound by the
Code of Ethics which governs the conduct of attorneys, he may be made subject
to the "verification" provisions of that Rule if he demonstrates a tendency to
abuse the judicial process. Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 1003 (S.D.
Tex. 1977). Further, a represented party or the represented party's attorney can-
not escape the "certification" provisions of Rule 11 by having the represented
party serve and file documents pro se; when a party is represented by an at-
torney of record, documents filed pro se by that party may be either ignored or
stricken from the files. See Ahmad v. Independent Order of Foresters, 81 F.R.D.
722 (E.D. Pa. 1979):
Since the plaintiffs are represented by an attorney, their pleadings and
other papers must be signed by him, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 7 and
11. In order to further the goal of expeditiously resolving this lawsuit,
we will order that the defendant need not respond to any papers filed
pro se by the plaintiffs so long as they continue to be represented by
counsel.
Id. at 730. In footnote 6 to this passage the court indicated that it would grant the
defendant's motion to strike an affidavit filed pro se by one of the plaintiffs.
Finally, it should be noted here that there are ongoing efforts to extend the
"certification" provision of Rule 11 to the unrepresented party. See, e.g.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (1981), which
provides in part:
Signing of Discovery Requests, Response, and Objections.
Every request for discovery, or response or objection thereto, made by a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one at-
torney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the request,
response, or objection and state his address. The signature of the at-
torney or party constitutes a certification that he has read the request,
response, or objection, and that it is (1) to the best of his knowledge, in-
formation, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry consistent with
these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) interposed in
good faith and not primarily to cause delay or for any other improper
purpose; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive,
given the nature and complexity of the case, the discovery already had
in the case, the amount in controversy, and other values at stake in the
litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be
deemed ineffective.
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B. The Signature of the Trial Attorney
The signature of the trial attorney, on the other hand, is quite dif-
ferent. It has been held that the signature of the attorney is the
equivalent of an affidavit of merit," and is intended to hold that at-
torney to strict accountability for the contents of the document upon
which his signature appears.' In short, Rule ll's requirement that the
attorney sign the document imposes upon that attorney an ethical and
moral obligation not to present documents which contain scandalous or
indecent matter, or matters which are false, frivolous or otherwise
without merit. The substance of these rules provide, when read in pari
materia, the attorney's obligation in positive form:
OHIO CIVIL RULES
7(B)(3) & 11:
The signature of an attorney on a
1. pleading,
2. motion, or
3. other paper
constitutes a certificate by him
1. that he has read the document;
2. that to the best of his
a. knowledge,
b. information, and
c. belief
there is good ground to
support it; and
3. that is not interposed
for delay
FEDERAL CIVIL RULES
7(b)(2) & 11:
The signature of an attorney on a
1. pleading,
2. motion, or
3. other paper
constitutes a certificate by him
1. that he has read the document;
2. that to the best of his
a. knowledge,
b. information, and
c. belief
there is good ground to
support it; and
3. that is not interposed
for delay
"When filed, the signature of plaintiff's attorney thereon, pursuant to Rule
11, F.R.C.P., will be the equivalent of an affidavit of merit." Russo v. Sofia Bros.,
2 F.R.D. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). The same conclusion may be inferred from State
v. Buser, 25 Ohio Misc. 1t9, 265 N.E.2d 332 (C.P. Wood County 1970):
The court has prepared this memorandum of opinion not alone to give
notice to the profession of this case but to alert the profession, in the
light of the facts of this case, to Rule No. 11 of the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure (and particularly the fourth sentence thereof) effective July 1,
1970, which reads: ". . . The signature of an attorney constitutes a cer-
tificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay...."
If we trial judges firmly insist that every member of the Bar observe
and adhere to this requirement in substantial and bona fide compliance,
I must suspect it will make a greater contribution to a generally more
satisfactory administration of justice in Ohio than the rest of the new
rules together.
Id. at 184-85, 205 N.E.2d at 336 (emphasis added by the court).
' "The purpose of the signature of 'at least one attorney of record in his in-
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Local rules of court may supplement these provisions of the rules by
importing additional significance to the attorney's signature."0 Rules
7(B)(3) and 11 themselves establish three obligations which are discussed
in the following sections of this Article.
1. That the Attorney has Read the Document
The first obligation imposed by Rule 11 is that the attorney read the
document upon which his signature appears. This not only prevents an
attorney of record from simply adding his name to documents prepared
by an attorney not of record, or by a party, 31 but is also a necessary
prerequisite to the remaining two obligations: An attorney cannot cer-
tify that there is good ground to support the matters set forth in a docu-
ment, and that those matters are not interposed for delay, unless he has
become familiar with the content of the document through reading it.
The word "read," of course, need not be taken literally. The Rule re-
quires that the attorney be thoroughly familiar with the content of the
document to which his name is appended. Normally, such familiarity is
obtained through reading the document, and the Rule contemplates this
normal process. However, if the attorney can, in good faith, say that he
is thoroughly and completely familiar with the contents of the document
without having actually read it, the spirit of the Rule is satisfied, and
the attorney may sign the document without being foresworn.
2. That There is Good Ground to Support the Document
The second obligation requires the attorney to certify, by way of his
signature, that to the best of the attorney's knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support the matter contained in the docu-
ment on which the attorney's signature appears. Without question, this
is the most important of the three obligations, and the very heart of
Rule 11. As Judge Hitchcock said: "If we trial judges firmly insist that
every member of the Bar observe and adhere to this requirement in
substantial and bona fide compliance, I must suspect it will make a
dividual name' is to hold the attorney of record who signs his individual name to
strict accountability as is provided in Rule 11 .... " United States v. American
Surety Co. of New York, 25 F. Supp. 225, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
30 For example, see Rule 10(A) of the Rules of the Court of Common Pleas,
Hamilton County, Ohio, which states: "In addition to the certificate mentioned in
Civil Rule 11, the signature of the trial attorney, in actions for partition,
foreclosure of mortgages, foreclosure of mechanics' liens, to contest a will, and
other such actions, also constitutes a certificate that all persons having a claim,
interest or lien on the property involved, or in the subject matter of the action,
have been made parties as required by law." HAMILTON COUNTY CT. C.P.R. 10(A).
31 See Browne, Civil Rule 11: The Signature and Signature Block, 9 CAP. U.L.
REV. 291, 295-96, 297-99 (1979).
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greater contribution to a generally more satisfactory administration of
justice in Ohio than the rest of the new rules together."3
There are two aspects to this second obligation. First, the attorney
must possess knowledge and/or information, and second, that knowledge
or information must lead the attorney to the belief that there is good
ground to support the document.
a. Investigation
If the attorney must possess knowledge or information, it follows that
the attorney must acquire it. But how is the attorney to acquire it? May
he simply rely upon the information furnished by the client, or is some
independent investigation required? There is some authority for the
proposition that the attorney may rely upon the client alone,33 but the
rule's requirement that the attorney form a personal "belief" that there
is "good ground" to support the document belies so simple a solution.',
32 State v. Buser, 25 Ohio Misc. 179, 184-85, 265 N.E.2d 332, 336 (C.P. Wood
County 1970). For the balance of the quotation, see note 27 supra.
11 See, e.g., Fuerst, Municipal Court Practice Under the New Civil Rules, 39
U. CIN. L. REV. 535 (1970):
The pleadings need not be verified by the party and the signature of the
attorney is sufficient. This should prove to be a savings in time to the at-
torney who can take the information necessary for a claim on the client's
first visit, obtain his retainer, and immediately file the claim.
Id. at 537. With all due respect to the author of the above comment, this state-
ment is quite misleading. What Judge Fuerst appears to sanction is the very type
of practice which Rule 11 seeks to prevent. When read in context, however, what
Judge Fuerst is saying is that the new signature procedure of the Civil Rules is
an improvement over the old verification procedure of the Code because it re-
quires the client to make only one trip-the first-to the attorney's office; the
necessity of a return trip to verify the pleading is no longer required. Judge
Fuerst should not be understood as saying that Rule 11 relieves the attorney of
the duty of making some independent investigation as to the truth of what the
client tells the attorney.
An additional comment from the same time period is more equivocal with
respect to relying solely on the client's word. Thus, in Milligan, Rules of Civil
Procedure in Domestic Relations Practice, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 524 (1970), we find:
The rule allowing an attorney to sign non-verified complaints constitutes
a significant break with past practice. Some attorneys view this change
with alarm since the emotional domestic relations client is notoriously
unworthy of trust. Others may view the change as a device to save time
which will not endanger the attorney since the rule only requires that he
plead the facts to the best of his knowledge.
Id. at 529. The second of these two views can be understood as authorizing a
signature based solely on the client's information, even if the client "is notorious-
ly unworthy of trust" because of his emotional state. If that is its true import, it
is clearly not in harmony with either the letter or spirit of Rule 11, and the at-
torneys who follow this view may ultimately find that they do so at their peril.
" Thus, in Helfant v. Louisiana & Southern Life Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 53
(E.D.N.Y. 1979):
Under Rule 11, F.R.Civ.P., moreover, an attorney's signature upon
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As noted in Freeman v. Kirby:'
Plaintiff urges that Rule 11 interdicts the filing of a pleading
known to be false, and no more. Such a narrow construction of the
rule finds no support either in the rule itself, the Advisory Com-
mittee Note, or decisional law. In the language of the rule, "The
signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him * * * that
to the best of his kowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support [the pleading] * * *." An affirmative obligation
is thus cast upon the attorney signatory to a pleading that he be
satisfied, in good faith, that there is good ground to support the
claim asserted therein."
Thus, the attorney must take the steps necessary to produce in his mind
a bona fide satisfaction that there is good ground for the document
which he proposes to sign. If the client's story alone produces that
honest satisfaction, all well and good; but if it does not, the attorney is
under an affirmative obligation to inquire further. But how much fur-
ther must the attorney go? Clearly, "good ground" is the key. The at-
torney must have a good faith belief that there is good ground to sup-
port the document; furthermore, that belief must be premised on the at-
torney's knowledge or information. Therefore, before the attorney can
determine what knowledge or information is needed, and the length to
which he must go to acquire it, the attorney must know what is meant
by "good ground."
The thrust of Rule 11 is obvious; it invokes the ethical responsibility
of the attorney as a member of the legal profession. 7 Accordingly, the
the complaint is a certificate that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief there is good ground to support it. This casts upon the
attorney an affirmative obligation that he be satisfied in good faith that
there is good reason to support the claim, see Freeman v. Kirby, 27
F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); see also Crimmons v. American Stock
Exchange, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 270, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), and thus provides
defendants with the attorney's certificate of good faith and a remedy for
willful violation of the rule.
Id. at 56-57. See also Hecht Co. v. Southern Union Co., 474 F. Supp. 1022 (D.N.M.
1979), where the court rather caustically notes:
The defendants either misread the plaintiffs' complaint or failed to con-
sider seriously Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Had the
defendants looked for "good ground to support" their Noerr-Pennington
defense, they could have saved a much overburdened file an additional
volume.
Id. at 1027. To the same effect, but without notable comment, see Shapiro v.
Miami Oil Producers, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 234 (D. Mass. 1979); Bready v. Geist, 83
F.R.D. 432 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Id. at 397.
3 In Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court stated that
Rule 11 requires an attorney who signs a pleading to represent his
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meaning of "good ground" is to be found in the principles enunciated in
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, and more particularly, in
the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules under Canons 2 and 7
which put flesh on those bones of principle. From a review of these Con-
siderations and Rules, it is apparent that the "good ground" necessary
to support a document consists of three elements: the motivation behind
the document, the legal theory underlying the document, and the factual
basis for the document. Before signing a document, the attorney must
have a bona fide belief that the motivation is proper, the theory sound,
and the factual basis true, and this belief must be premised on the at-
torney's personal knowledge, or on the best information the attorney
can obtain. Thus, to the extent necessary to form a bona fide belief, the
attorney must make a personal, tripartite investigation into motivation,
theory and fact.
b. Evaluation of the Document
(1) Evaluation-As to Motivation
The attorney may not accept employment, 8 or must withdraw from
honest belief that there is good ground to support the claims asserted in
the pleading. This merely adds an ethical responsibility to the concep-
tion that a claim that is baseless should not survive.
Id. at 6. And in Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 LITIGATION NEWS, No. 3 (April 1980), the Special Com-
mittee for the Study of Discovery Abuse of the Section of Litigation, American
Bar Association, made the following point:
Third, the subdivision [tie., PRELIMINARY DRAFT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) which was quoted in part in note 27, supra]
recognizes, as does Rule 11, that a willful misuse of the discovery pro-
cess by an attorney is a serious form of professional misconduct and may
warrant professional discipline. This is an important safeguard against
discovery abuse for it will allow, in appropriate cases of willful, flagrant
or repeated abuse of the discovery process, the supplementation of the
present judicial remedies with those available to professional
disciplinary bodies. See, e.g., Code of Professional Responsibility, DR
1-102(A)(5)-(6); 7-106(A), (C) (7); 7-102(A)(2).
Id. at 12.
Although W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397 (10th
Dist. Ct. App. 1976), does not expressly mention Ohio Civil Rule 11, it aptly sum-
marizes the attorney's responsibility under the Rule:
An attorney does have an obligation to the public and to his profession
to act honestly, competently, in good faith, and without malice in all of
the activities he undertakes. This duty has been set forth in the Code of
Professional Responsibility adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio and is
enforceable by disciplinary proceedings against the attorney, including
suspension from the practice of law or permanent disbarment.
Id. at 400.
m As to the attorney's obligation not to accept employment, see ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-30, which states in pertinent part:
Employment should not be accepted by a lawyer ... when he knows or it
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employment, 39 if it is obvious to the attorney that the client is motivated
is obvious that the person seeking to employ him desires to institute or
maintain an action merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously in-
juring another.
Id. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109(A) (1), which
provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if he
knows or it is obvious that such person wishes to: (1) Bring a legal action,
conduct a defense, or assert a position in litigation, or otherwise have
steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously
injuring any person.
Id. ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, DISCUSSION DRAFT (Jan. 30, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as DISCUSSION DRAFT], does not appear to be quite as forceful as the above
quoted provisions from the Code of Professional Responsibility. The DISCUSSION
DRAFT's closest parallel to EC 2-30 and DR 2-109(A)(1) appears to be its Rule 1.15
(b)(1), which states: "(b) A lawyer shall not decline appointment by a court or
other authority to represent a person except for the following reasons or other
good cause: (1) representing the client would be likely to result in violation of the
rules of professional conduct ...... Id
As to the attorney's obligation to withdraw from employment, see ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10, which provides that "[tihe duty
of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his concur-
rent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal pro-
cess and to avoid the infliction of needless harm." Id. This Ethical Consideration
is implemented by ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1)
and DR 2-110(B)(1). As DR 7-102(A)(1) puts it:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit,
assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on
behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
Id. And as it is said in DR 2-110(B) (1):
(B) Mandatory withdrawal. A lawyer representing a client before a
tribunal, with its permission if required by its rules, shall withdraw from
employment, and a lawyer representing a client in other matters shall
withdraw from employment, if: (1) He knows or it is obvious that his
client is bringing the legal action, conducting the defense, or asserting a
position in the litigation, or is otherwise having steps taken for him,
merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.
Id.
Again, it would appear that the DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, of the ABA
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT provides only a pale imitation of the
present Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules. Thus, the DISCUSSION
DRAFT counterpart to EC 7-10 appears to be Rules 3.2 and 3.4. Rule 3.2(a) reads:
"A lawyer shall be fair to other parties and their counsel, accord them their pro-
cedural rights, and fulfill obligations under the procedural law and established
practices of the tribunal." Id. And Rule 3.4 continues: "(a) In preparing and
presenting a case, a lawyer shall respect the interests of third persons, including
witnesses, jurors, and persons incidentally concerned with the proceeding. (b) A
lawyer shall not: ... (2) use a procedure having no substantial purpose other than
to embarass, delay, or burden a third person." Id These basic considerations are
then implemented by Rules 1.3 and 1.16. As it is said in Rule 1.3:
(a) A lawyer shall accept a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
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merely by a desire to harass or maliciously injure another." On the
other hand, the client has a right to seek any lawful objective through
legally permissible means and to present for adjudication any lawful
claim, issue or defense.' Further, every legal action causes harassment
the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued ex-
cept as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).
(b) A lawyer shall not pursue a course of action on behalf of a client in
violation of law or the rules of professional conduct.
(c) The lawyer may decline to pursue a lawful course of action pursuant
to Rule 1.5(B), and, if the client insists upon such course of action, the
lawyer may withdraw from representation subject to the provisions of
Rule 1.16.
Id. And Rule 1.16 provides:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall withdraw from
representing a client if: (1) continuing the representation will result in a
course of conduct by the lawyer that is illegal or inconsistent with the
rules of professional conduct;...
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client if: ... (2) the client persists in a course of conduct
that is illegal or unjust; ...
(c) A lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause
for terminating the representation when ordered to do so by a tribunal.
Id.
40 Determining motivation is not always easy. In the hard case, the attorney
may give the client the benefit of the doubt. Thus, in ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-6, we find:
Whether the proposed action of a lawyer is within the bounds of the law
may be a perplexing question when his client is contemplating a course
of conduct having legal consequences that vary according to the client's
intent, motive, or desires at the time of the action .... In many cases a
lawyer may not be certain as to the state of mind of his client, and in
those situations he should resolve reasonable doubts in favor of his
client.
Id. For the DISCUSSION DRAFT equivalent of this Ethical Consideration, see Rule
1.3(a), as quoted in note 39, supra.
' ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 puts it in the following
terms:
The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which in-
cludes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations. The
professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his membership in a
profession which has the duty of assisting members of the public to
secure and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our govern-
ment of laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to
have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law; to
seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to pre-
sent for adjudication any lawful claim, issue or defense.
Id. In the DISCUSSION DRAFT of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT, Rule 1.5(a) appears to be the relevant provision:
A lawyer shall act diligently in representing a client. A lawyer may take
any action on behalf of a client that is consistent with law and the rules
of professional conduct.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at Rule 1.5(a).
1981]
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LA W REVIEW
or injury to some extent. Therefore, in construing the applicable Ethical
Considerations and Disciplinary Rules, emphasis must be placed on the
words "merely" and "maliciously."
If, after investigation, the attorney determines that the client has a
lawful objective in mind, the attorney must next determine the client's
motivation. If the primary motivation is harassment or injury, and the
lawful objective is merely the occasion for furthering the client's desire
to harass or injure, the attorney may not represent the client; but if the
primary goal of the client is to achieve the lawful objective, and some
harassment or injury is merely a by-product of the client's legitimate
endeavor, representation is permissible. A simple action for trespass,
with nominal damages as the likely award, will illustrate this principle.
Neighbors Smith and Jones are feuding. One day, while hurling
vituperation at one another, Jones comes upon Smith's property. Smith
seizes upon this as an opportunity for "getting" Jones, and seeks to
bring an action for trespass against him. Here, the motivation is clearly
one of harassing Jones, and an attorney would not be warranted in tak-
ing the case.42 But suppose Jones consistently cuts across Smith's lot to
get to his own house. Smith has repeatedly asked Jones not to do so, but
Jones pays no attention. Finally, in exasperation, Smith decides to sue
Jones for trespass. To some extent, the action for trespass is harassing
in nature, but its primary objective is to put an end to Jones' continuing
trespass on Smith's property. Therefore, in the absence of an ongoing
feud between Smith and Jones, representation of Smith is clearly per-
missible.
Adding to the above example the fact that Smith and Jones have been
feuding for years, Smith's motivation is not quite so clear. Is Smith suing
in the hope of stopping the continuing trespass, or is he bringing suit in
order to "get even" with Jones for other reasons arising out of the feud?
Here, the attorney must investigate the motive, and he must evaluate
the product of that investigation to determine whether Smith's motiva-
tion is "merely" to harass or maliciously injure Jones. If, as a result of
the investigation and evaluation, the attorney "knows" that Smith's pur-
pose is to "merely" harass or maliciously injure Jones, or if that conclu-
sion should be "obvious" from the circumstances, the attorney may not
represent Smith;" but if the attorney's investigation does not produce
42 The Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules quoted in notes 38 and
39 supra emphasize that the attorney must know that the motive of the client is
to harass or maliciously injure, or that harassment or malicious injury is the ob-
vious purpose of the client's action. When these Considerations and Rules refer
to that which is "obvious," they are implying constructive knowledge which a
reasonably prudent person would acquire from the circumstances. But this em-
phasis on actual or constructive knowledge does not mean that the attorney can
close his eyes to the facts; he will be held to have seen that which was there to be
seen.
"s See notes 38, 39 and 42 supra and accompanying text.
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actual knowledge of Smith's purpose, or if that purpose is not obvious
from all of the circumstances, the attorney should give Smith the
benefit of the doubt and may undertake the representation."
What is true of the whole is equally true of its parts. Although an ac-
tion may be perfectly proper from the motivational point of view, a par-
ticular document filed in that action may be motivated by a desire to
harass or injure. If the attorney cannot represent the client in an action
motivated merely by the client's desire to harass or maliciously injure,
it follows that the attorney cannot lend his signature to any document
that is so motivated. 5 In short, Rule 11 prohibits an attorney from sign-
ing, serving and filing any document if that document is to be used
maliciously and without probable cause for the purpose of annoying and
embarrassing one's opponent, or when it is not calculated to lead to any
practical result. Or to put it in terms more familiar to the Ohio practi-
tioner, Rule 11 prohibits an attorney from signing, serving and filing
any document that is vexatious in character."
The same prohibition applies to a document that is scurrilous in
character because it contains scandalous 7 or indecent matter. "Scan-
dalous" matter consists of unnecessary" matter of facts criminatory of a
" See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
" See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1), as quoted
in note 39 supra; see also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-25
which, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
Rules of evidence and procedure are designed to lead to just decisions
and are part of the framework of the law. Thus while a lawyer may take
steps in good faith and within the framework of the law to test the
validity of rules, he is not justified in consciously violating such rules
and he should be diligent in his efforts to guard against his unintentional
violation of them. As examples, a lawyer should subscribe to or verify
only those pleadings that he believes are in compliance with applicable
law and rules.
Id. And with respect to the above quoted reference to "applicable law and rules,"
remember that EC-7 states that "[tihe duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to
the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law,
which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations." Id.
(emphasis added).
46 It was stated in Brown v. Lamb, 112 Ohio App. 116, 171 N.E.2d 191 (6th
Dist. 1960), that "[tihe term 'vexatious' as applied to a pleading imports that it is in-
stituted maliciously and without probable cause for the purpose of annoying and
embarrassing one's opponent or when it is not calculated to lead to any practical
result. Black's Law Dictionary, 4 Ed." Id. at 123, 171 N.E.2d at 196. Accordingly,
if a document is introduced into the litigation process "merely for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring any person" (EC 2-30, DR 2-109(A)(1), DR
2-110(B)(1), and DR 7-102(A)(1)), that document is aptly described as "vexatious" in
character.
7 As defined in the text and the following notes, "scandalous" is well within
the ambit of "scurrilous." See, e.g., Ex parte Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Mo. 1976);
Mahurin v. Moss, 313 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
"8 Almost all of the cases discussing scandalous matter emphasize that the
scandalous allegations were not necessary to a statement of claim or defense. On
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party referred to in the document;49 matter casting an excessively
adverse"0 or derogatory51 light on the character of an individual or par-
the other hand, allegations which might otherwise be considered scandalous
under one test or another may escape that categorization if they are arguably
relevant to the statement in the pleading. See, e.g., Pocono Racing Management
Ass'n, Inc. v. Banks, 434 F. Supp. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1977). But "[e]ven relevant por-
tions of a complaint may be stricken where they are scandalous and are set out in
needless detail." Gleason v. Chain Service Restaurant, 300 F. Supp. 1241, 1257
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
' The basic authority for this proposition is Burke v. Mesta Mach. Co., 5
F.R.D. 134 (W.D. Pa. 1946), in which the term "scandalous" is defined as "un-
necessary matter or facts criminatory of a party referred to in the pleading." Id.
at 138. McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 519 (D. Md. 1977), appears to be
the most recent case to accept this definition. Other cases which appear to fall in
this category, but which do not expressly make reference to the "criminatory"
formula of Burke, are the following: Ex parte Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Mo.
1976); Mahurin v. Moss, 313 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Budget Dress Corp. v.
Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 25 F.R.D. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Pollack v.
Aspbury, 14 F.R.D. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
The "adverse light" formulation appears in OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F.
Supp. 540 (M.D. Tex. 1978): "Scandalous matters are those casting an excessively
adverse light on the character of an individual or party." Id. at 550. This defini-
tion was based on a decision in Budget Dress Corp. v. Int'l Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, 25 F.R.D. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), which held scandalous an aver-
ment "with gruesome and evidentiary detail, various conspiracies between plain-
tiff and several elements of the underworld, characterized in these defenses as
'strong arm men' and 'racketeers.' " Id. at 508. If it is profitable to attempt a
distinction between the various shadings of scandalous matter, Budget Dress
Corp. is more aptly placed in the "criminatory" category, and Agran v. Isaacs,
306 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ill. 1969), in which the offending document "set forth
libelous accusations and innuendoes disparaging the character and professional
ethics of two judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, and a judge of the Appellate Court of Illinois ... " id. at 947, is a better can-
didate for the "adverse light" category.
" The "derogatory light" formula appears to find its origin in 5 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1382, at 826 (1969): "'Scan-
dalous' matter is that which improperly casts a derogatory light on someone,
most typically on a party to the action." Id. Gilbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 56
F.R.D. 116 (D.P.R. 1972), adopts this definition and contrasts it with that of Pro-
fessor Moore:
A matter is deemed "scandalous" when it improperly casts a
derogatory light on someone, usually a party to the action. Martin v.
Hunt (D.C. Mass. 1961), 28 F.R.D. 35; Burke v. Mesta Mach. Co., [5 F.R.D.
134 (W.D. Pa. 1946) ]. For Professor Moore, scandalous matter consists of
"any unnecessary allegation which reflects cruelly upon the moral
character of an individual, or states anything in repulsive language
which detracts from the dignity of the court." 2A. Moore's Federal Prac-
tice, Section 12.21, p. 2426, 1968 ed.
Id. at 120 n.7. This "derogatory light" formula is also adopted by Payne v.
Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465 (D.D.C. 1977).
Also, Martin v. Hunt, 28 F.R.D. 35 (D. Mass. 1961), which is cited by both
Gilbert and C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, neither uses the term "derogatory light"
nor indicates the nature of the allegations it found scandalous. The best one can
draw from the Martin case is the following: "A substantial portion of [the peti-
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ty; or matter that is abusive or vituperative52 in nature.53 "Indecent"
matter is the more direct equivalent of the pre-rule "scurrilous" matter,
and may be defined as matter which imports indecency or abuse. It is
synonymous with vile, vulgar, foul or foul-mouthed. 4 The inclusion of
tion] consists of the prolix and verbose series of allegations which concern alleged
conduct of Judges Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr ... and of various allegations as to
certain actions allegedly taken by other judges of this court...." 28 F.R.D. at 35.
We may reasonably assume that these "allegations" to which the decision here
makes reference were not entirely flattering. Indeed, from the plethora of cases
on point, we may say with some confidence that any unflattering remark
touching upon a judge's ability or character will be deemed scandalous. In addi-
tion to Martin, see Theriault v. Silber, 574 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1978); Ex parte
Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Mahurin v. Moss, 313 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D.
Mo. 1970); Agran v. Isaacs, 306 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Pollack v. Aspbury,
14 F.R.D. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
52 The term "scandalous" embraces both the "abusive" and "vituperative."
See Mottaghi-Iravani v. Int'l Commodities Corp., 20 F.R.D. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Walle v. Dallett, 136 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Pollack v. Aspbury, 14 F.R.D.
454 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). To this list might be added Theriault v. Silber, 574 F.2d 197
(5th Cir. 1978), in which "vile and insulting references to the trial judge" caused
the notice of appeal to be stricken as an "abusive document." Id at 197. However,
it is not clear from the short opinion whether the court's FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f)
order striking the notice of appeal was premised on the theory of impertinent
matter or the theory of scandalous matter. The decision makes no reference to
"scandalous matter," but it does characterize the content of the notice of appeal
as "disrespectful and impertinent." Id.
" There does not appear to be any reported Ohio decision interpreting the
word "scandalous" in light of the Civil Rules, but Cantillon v. City of Cincinnati, 2
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 417, 15 Ohio Dec. 387 (Cin. Sup. Ct. 1903), is a pre-rule decision
reasonably close to.the point. Although Cantillon does not provide a definition of
"scandalous," it does hold that an allegation of bias and prejudice against a judge
is scandalous when it is based on a rumor that all attorneys who did not support
that judge for election "were marked for disfavor." As the court put it: "To allege
in an affidavit that a judge is biased or prejudiced against an attorney, and at the
same time to allege that such allegation is founded upon 'rumor,' is not only im-
pertinent but scandalous." Id at 419, 15 Ohio Dec. at 389.
City of South Euclid v. Novy, 7 Ohio Misc. 181, 214 N.E.2d 711 (So. Euclid
Mun. Ct. 1966), adopts the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary definition of
"scandalous" to the effect that it means "1. Giving scandal; scandalizing; also
bringing shame or infamy; as, scandalous actions. 2. Defamatory; libelous; ... "
Id. at 185 n.4, 214 N.E.2d at 714 n.4. Interpreting the word in the light of an or-
dinance prohibiting the disturbance of the peace by the use of scandalous
language, the court accordingly held that "calling another person a 'liar' is scan-
dalous language; and since 'nigger' is a very derogatory reference to a member of
the Negro race, stating that members of a religious faith are worse than 'niggers'
also constitutes 'scandalous' language." Id. at 185, 214 N.E.2d at 714.
In the final analysis, a precise definition of "scandalous" remains elusive.
Perhaps the best that can be said is this: Scandalous matter is that which the
courts call scandalous.
Again, in Brown v. Lamb, 112 Ohio App. 116, 171 N.E.2d 191 (6th Dist.
1960), we find: "'Scurrilous' imports indecency or abuse and is synonymous with
vile, vulgar, foul or foul-mouthed. United States v. Strong, 263 F. 789, 796;
United States v. Ault, 263 F. 800, 810." Id at 123, 117 N.E.2d at 196.
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scurrilous matter in a document is almost always motivated by a desire
to injure maliciously, and it is manifest that an attorney may not ethical-
ly sign a document containing such matter.5 However, since allegations
contained in pleadings and other filings in a court proceeding pertinent
to that proceeding are absolutely privileged,56 a party subjected to scur-
rilous allegations has no recourse outside of the proceeding itself, and if
he is to be protected from abuse, the rules must provide.some device
which may be used in the proceeding. Rules 11 and 12(F)57 provide that
" See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10, which states that
"[tihe duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against
his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the
legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm." I& Rule 3.2(a) of the
DISCUSSION DRAFT of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT puts it
this way: "A lawyer shall be fair to other parties and their counsel, accord them
their procedural rights, and fulfill obligations under the procedural law and
established practices of the tribunal." DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at Rule
3.2(a). Rule 3.4(b)(2) extends this requirement to persons not parties: "(b) A
lawyer shall not: ... (2) use a procedure having no substantial purpose other than
to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person." DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38,
at Rule 3.4(b)(2).
It speaks well of the profession-and it is worthy of note-that almost all of
the decisions dealing with scandalous or indecent matter involve documents filed
pro se by laypersons. See, e.g., Theriault v. Silber, 574 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1978);
Ex parte Tyler, 70 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Mahurin v. Moss, 313 F. Supp. 1263
(E.D. Mo. 1970); Agran v. Isaacs, 306 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Il1. 1969). A notorious ex-
ception is Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465 (D.D.C. 1977), in which the papers in
support of plaintiff's motion to compel discovery repeatedly likened the defen-
dant to a notorious medical practitioner whose alleged malpractice had been
chronicled in a magazine article and insinuated comparisons between the defen-
dant and the alleged malpractitioner in the article. As Judge Sirica said of these
allegations:
By overstepping her limited role, and insinuating comparisons be-
tween defendant Howard and a reputed "Rogue Elephant" type of
health care provider, plaintiff has gone far towards focusing the Court's
attention on matters that are wholly outside the scope of this case.
Whether the article about Dr. Nork is accurate or not, it simply has no
bearing, in the Court's estimation, on any material issue involved in the
present proceeding. Moreover, references to it for the purpose of draw-
ing comparisons with defendant Howard improperly cast him in a
derogatory light. Cf. Wright & Miller, [FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE] § 1382. It belabors the obvious to say that these references
qualify as "indecent" and "scandalous" within the meaning of F.R.Civ.P.
11, and for this reason, they must be stricken.
Id at 468. Incidentally, this is one of the few reported cases that attempts to give
some meaning to the word "indecent" as it appears in the last sentence of FED. R.
Civ. P. 11.
I As it is said in W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397
(10th Dist. Ct. App. 1976), "[pllaintiffs purport to set forth a claim for relief for
libel in connection with the judicial proceedings. Since allegations contained in
pleadings and other filings in a court proceeding pertinent to that proceeding are
absolutely privileged, no action for libel can be maintained." Id. at 402.
5' OHIO R. CIV. P. 12(F).
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device." Although Rule 11 does not expressly state that the attorney's
signature is a certificate by the attorney that the document upon which
I Both Rules are concerned with scandalous matter, but neither is a carbon
copy of the other. In substance they provide as follows:
OHIO CIVIL RULE 11: OHIO CIVIL RULE 12(F):
Similar action may be taken if [Tihe court may order stricken
1. scandalous, or from any pleading any...
2. indecent scandalous matter.
matter is inserted.
In theory, Rule 11 is somewhat broader than Rule 12(F) because its ambit in-
cludes "indecent matter," and "indecent" is not precisely the same as "scan-
dalous." See note 54 supra and accompanying text. As originally drafted,
however, Rule 12(F) would not have been narrower. The text which the Rules Ad-
visory Committee of the Ohio Judicial Conference submitted to the Ohio
Supreme Court read as follows: "[Tihe court may order stricken from any
pleading any insufficient claim or defense or any redundant, immaterial, imperti-
nent, scandalous or otherwise improper matter." See Rules Advisory Committee,
Draft Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 42 OHIO BAR 223, 236 (1969) (emphasis added).
The Staff Note which accompanied this text gave this explanation of the language:
At the end of Rule 12(F), the words "or otherwise improper matter" were
added to make it clear that the subdivision was not limited to the terms
employed in the Federal rule. Thus, for example, language in a pleading
anticipating a defense or constituting an argumentative denial would be
"otherwise improper matter" and could be stricken under subdivision (F).
OHIO R. CIv. P. 12(F), 1970 STAFF NOTE. While this explanation made no specific
reference to "indecent matter," and while it is obvious that the intent of the drafts-
men was not to make Rules 11 and 12(F) parallels by the use of the "otherwise im-
proper matter" clause, it is equally clear that "indecent matter" would have been
well within the scope of "otherwise improper matter," and the effect of the clause
would have been the creation of a parallel between Rule 11 and 12(F) on this par-
ticular point.
On October 13, 1969, it was announced that the Supreme Court had approved
the above-quoted text of Rule 12(F), and would submit the same to the General
Assembly before the January 15, 1970 deadline. See Rules Advisory Committee,
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 42 OHIO BAR 1243, 1246 (1969). From all that ap-
pears in the printed sources, the text proposed by the Rules Advisory Committee
and approved by the Supreme Court was submitted to the General Assembly on
January 13, 1970. See Report, Revisions to Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 42 OHIO
BAR 163 (1970). That source tells us: "The ... rules which appear in ... 42 OHIo BAR
No. 39 (Oct. 13, 1969)... are essentially correct. They are in the form of the rules
filed with the General Assembly and have only minor typographical corrections.
Due to space limitations these corrections will not be printed in The Ohio Bar." Id.
Thus, the original text of Rule 12(F) was intact as of February 9, 1970, when the
above-quoted remark was published.
However, on April 30, 1970, the Supreme Court submitted to the General
Assembly a number of amendments to the proposed Rules. Among these amend-
ments was one which changed the text of Rule 12(F) to the following: "[Tihe court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient claim or defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter." See Report, Amend-
ments to the Ohio Rules of CivilProcedure, 42 OHIO BAR 675, 679 (1970). It was this
text which the General Assembly accepted, and it was also this text which became
effective on July 1, 1970. For the acceptance by the General Assembly, see Cor-
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it appears does not contain any scurrilous matter, it does so by rather
clear implication. Thus, the first protective barrier is the attorney-
signatory's sense of honor as a member of the Bar. Should the attorney-
signatory's sense of honor not be equal to the challenge, Rule 12(F) pro-
vides that scurrilous matter may be stricken from a document on a
court's own motion, or on the motion of any party59 and Rule 11 pro-
vides that an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary ac-
tion if scurrilous matter is inserted in a document signed by that at-
torney.
This reference to Rules 11 and 12(F) raises interesting questions with
respect to the function and application of each rule. First of all, does
Rule 12(F) reach any document other than a pleading? The rule provides
that "the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient
claim or defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scan-
dalous matter.""0 A "pleading" is a device mentioned in Rule 7(A), and
by its nature, is either assertive or responsive. An assertive pleading is
one which states a claim for relief; a responsive pleading is one which
contains a defense to a claim for relief.2 The assertive and responsive
pleadings allowed by Rule 7(A) may be listed as follows:
rigan, A Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 OHIO BAR 727, 738 (1970),
and Report, Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 OHIO BAR SPECIAL RULES ISSUE 19
(June 22, 1970); for the effective date, see OHIO R. Civ. P. 86(A). Unfortunately,
none of the printed sources tell us why the phrase "or otherwise improper" was
dropped. We may speculate that the deletion was motivated by a desire to more
closely conform the Ohio Rule to its Federal counterpart, but we do not know. In
any event, the effect of the deletion is a narrowing of the scope of OHIO R. Civ. P.
12(F).
" As illustrated in note 58 supra, "scandalous" matter is expressly within the
embrace of OHIO R. Civ. P. 12(F). Whether "indecent" matter is also within that
embrace is more doubtful. There is little doubt, however, that if a court were
pressed for a remedy it would construe "indecent" matter as "immaterial" mat-
ter, and strike it under that aspect of Rule 12(F). Because that is so, it is fair to
use "scurrilous" as a bridge-word between Rules 11 and 12(F) to link and il-
lustrate their common area of concern, since the term "scurrilous" clearly em-
braces both scandalous matter and indecent matter.
It has also been suggested that the entire document may be stricken from the
files under the provisions of Civil Rule 11 if it contains scandalous or indecent
matter. Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465 (D.D.C. 1977). But there is some question
whether this is a correct interpretation of Civil Rule 11.
OHIO R. Civ. P. 12(F) (emphasis added).
61 Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp., 40 Ohio St. 2d 61, 320 N.E.2d 658 (1975). See
also OHIO R. Civ. P. 7(A), 1971 STAFF NOTE, which states in pertinent part: "Rule
7(A) names the pleadings which are permitted under the rules." Id.
62 The court-ordered reply to an answer or reply to a third-party answer is an
exception to this general rule. By their nature, either the reply to an answer or
the reply to a third-party answer asserts a defense to a defense.
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ASSERTIVE RESPONSIVE RESPONSIVE
PLEADING: PLEADING: PLEADING:
1. Complaint 1. Answer 1. Reply"
2. Counterclaim 3  2. Reply"
3. Cross-Claim 3. Answer to Cross-
Claim 6
4. Third-Party 4. Third-Party 2. Reply 8
Complaint Answer
Although the "counterclaim" and "cross-claim" are both technically
pleadings because they assert claims for relief, they are not separate pleadings in
the sense that they appear in their own unique document; rather, they physically
appear in the document which contains the responsive pleading to some other
assertive pleading. For example, a counterclaim or cross-claim asserted by a
defendant will normally appear in the document containing the answer to the
complaint. All of this is deduced from OHIO R. CIv. P. 7(A) and 12(A)(2), which
speak in the following terms: "an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer [to the
complaint] contains a cross-claim .... OHIO R. CIV. P. 7(A) (emphasis added). "The
plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer [to the complaint]
within twenty-eight days after service of the answer [to the complaint] .... OHIO
R. Civ. P. 12(A)(2) (emphasis added).
' See note 63 supra.
65 OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(C) tells us: "When a party has mistakenly designated a
defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation." Id.
From this we may deduce that there are occasions when it will be difficult to
determine whether a particular set of averments in a responsive pleading is an
affirmative defense or a counterclaim. To prevent unintended defaults resulting
from the failure to reply to such a set of averments, OHIO R. Civ. P. 7(A)
stipulates that a reply to a counterclaim is required only when the counterclaim
is "denominated as such;" that is, when the set of averments in question bears
the label "counterclaim." In any event, when a responsive pleading is required,
that responsive pleading is properly designated a "reply."
" OHIO R. Civ. P. 7(A) lists the various responsive pleadings as "an answer,"
"a reply," "an answer to a cross-claim," and "a third-party answer." It then con-
cludes with the following sentence: "No other pleading shall be allowed, except
that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer." Id. This
choice of words presents a rather interesting problem: Is the word "answer" as
used in the last sentence of OHIO R. Civ. P. 7(A) limited to the answer to the com-
plaint, or does it also include the answer to a cross-claim?
If "answer" includes "answer to a cross-claim," then Rule 7(A) authorizes four
replies: (1) a reply to the answer to the complaint; (2) a reply to a counterclaim
denominated as such; (3) a reply to the answer to a cross-claim; and (4) a reply to a
third-party answer. Some support for this reading can be found in OHIO R. Civ. P.
7(A), 1971 STAFF NOTE:
In certain special circumstances Rule 7(A) provides for a reply. Thus, if
defendant files a counterclaim (and denominates it as such), then Rule
7(A) provides that plaintiff must file a "reply" to the counterclaim. And
in rare instances, most certainly not the ordinary case, Rule 7(A) pro-
vides that in order to clarify the status of the pleadings the court may in
its discretion order a reply to an answer and a third-party answer.
Id But there are two additional problems with this extract: First, if it is read to
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Obviously, if scurrilous material appears in any of these devices, it may
be stricken either on a party's motion or on the court's own motion. 9
support the proposition that "answer" also means "answer to a cross-claim," then
it ignores the vital distinction between a reply to a counterclaim and a reply to
an answer by putting them on the same level and giving them the same status. (A
reply to a counterclaim serves the same function as an answer to a complaint. For
the function of a court-ordered reply to an answer to the complaint, or to a third-
party answer, see note 67 infra.) It is inconceivable that the Rules Advisory Com-
mittee would have made such a fundamental error. Second, it perpetuates (if it
does not exacerbate) the original puzzle by substituting the phrase "answer and a
third-party answer" for Rule 7(A)'s "answer or a third-party answer."
On the other hand, if "answer" does not include "answer to a cross-claim," then
the court may authorize a reply to an answer to the complaint or a reply to a
third-party answer, but it may not authorize a reply to an answer to a cross-claim
or a reply to a counterclaim. Why two responsive pleadings should be so favored,
and two not, is equally puzzling.
Yet again, if an "answer to a cross-claim" is subsumed under the word
"answer," then the reply to a counterclaim is the only responsive pleading to
which no reply may be directed, and a mystery remains.
Whatever may be the correct solution, the internal evidence strongly suggests
that the draftsmen of the Rule did intend a distinction between the answer to the
complaint and a third-party answer on the one-hand, and a reply to a
counterclaim and an answer to a cross-claim on the other. Accordingly, it may be
concluded, as I have concluded in the text, that the last sentence of Rule 7(A)
authorizes a court-ordered reply to an answer and a third-party answer, but not
to a reply to a counterclaim or an answer to a cross-claim.
6" See note 66 supra. The court-ordered reply authorized by the last sentence
of OHIO R. Civ. P. 7(A) is the lineal descendant of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2309.24
(Page 1954) (repealed 1971), which read: "When an answer contains new matter,
the plaintiff may reply to it, denying generally or specifically each allegation con-
troverted by him. He also may allege, in ordinary and concise language, new mat-
ter, not inconsistent with the petition, constituting an answer to such new mat-
ter." Id. Thus, under the Code, the function of the reply was to put in issue an af-
firmative defense in the answer either by denying the allegations upon which it
was premised (a negative defense to the affirmative defense), or by asserting new
matter which avoided the affirmative defense or abated its assertion (an affir-
mative defense to the affirmative defense). Under the Rules, both functions are
presumed. As OHIO R. CIV. P. 8(D) puts it: "Averments in a pleading to which no
responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or
avoided." Id. Or as the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee Staff Note to Civil Rule
7(A) states, "Rule 7(A) does not 'require' a reply; hence the combination of Rule
7(A) and Rule 8(D) dispenses with the reply, and the affirmative defense of defen-
dant is taken as denied or avoided." OHIO R. Civ. P. 7(A), 1971 STAFF NOTE. Accor-
dingly, under the Rules, the reply serves no useful function other than to clarify
the issues when the claimant wishes to state on the record his affirmative
defense to the defender's affirmative defense. Again, in the language of OHIO R.
CIv. P. 7(A), 1971 STAFF NOTE: "And in rare instances, most certainly not the or-
dinary case, Rule 7(A) provides that in order to clarify the status of the pleadings
the court may in its discretion order a reply to an answer and a third-party
answer." Id
1 See notes 67-68 supra.
69 OHIO R. Civ. P. 12(F) provides that:
Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no
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But what if such material appears in a motion or in an "other paper""
such as an affidavit? A literal reading of Rule 12(F) would leave the scur-
rilous matter in motions or other papers invulnerable to a motion to
strike it.
There are, however, three arguments which subject motions and
other papers to the Rule 12(F) motion to strike. The first is based on a
concept of necessity, and is well stated in McLaughlin v. Copeland:7
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) relates to matters to be
stricken from pleadings. Although affidavits technically do not
constitute pleadings, courts have permitted affidavits to be
challenged by motions to strike because the Federal Rules pro-
vide no other means to contest their sufficiency.... If portions
of an affidavit are inadmissible, the whole affidavit need not be
stricken but only those portions which are deficient."2
The second argument is based on the distinction between form and
substance. Scurrilous matter in a pleading, motion or other paper is a
formal defect, not a substantive one. Ohio Civil Rule 7(B)(3) states: "The
rules applicable to captions, signing, and other matters of form of
pleading apply to all motions and other papers provided for by these
rules."73 Since that portion of Rule 12(F) which deals with the striking of
redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter is a rule ap-
plicable to other matters of form, Rule 12(F) is made applicable to mo-
tions and other papers through the operation of Rule 7(B)(3).
The third argument is based on a combination of inherent power and
analogy. It may be conceded, for sake of argument, that Rule 12(F) ap-
plies only to pleadings.74 Nevertheless, it does provide a basic procedure
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within twenty-eight days after the service of the pleading upon
him or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order
stricken from any pleading any insufficient claim or defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.Id.
70 See OHIO R. Civ. P. 7(B)(3), which divides all documents used in litigation in-
to three mutually exclusivle categories: (1) pleadings; (2) motions; and (3) other
papers.
"' 435 F. Supp. 513 (D. Md. 1977).
72 Id at 519. See also Monroe v. Board of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 641 (D. Conn. 1975).
But see Ernest Seidelman Corp. v. Mollison, 10 F.R.D. 426 (S.D. Ohio 1950), which
rejects the authority of FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f), and relies upon the inherent power of
a court to strike documents, in whole or in part, if they do not comply with Rule
requirements.
" OIo R. Civ. P. 7(B)(3). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2), which is the
corresponding federal rule.
"' As is so often the case with the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, there are as many, if not more, authorities for this proposition as
there are for the proposition that it also applies to motions and other papers. See,
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for striking portions of a document. Quite apart from any express
authority in the rules, courts have inherent power to strike a document
in whole or in part if that document does not comply with the Civil
Rules."5 When the courts exercise this inherent authority to strike out
part of a document, they should do so in a manner that is as consistent
with the rules' procedure as the circumstances will admit. Therefore,
when the courts strike scurrilous material from a motion or other paper,
they should, to the extent possible, follow the rules' procedure for strik-
ing scurrilous matter from a pleading; that is, they should apply Civil
Rule 12(F) by analogy. But if the courts are to follow Rule 12(F) pro-
cedure, is it not sensible to say that a motion to strike scurrilous
material from a motion or other paper is made under the aegis of Rule
12(F)? 8
In sum, then, the first question is answered in the affirmative. Rule
12(F), or at least that portion of it dealing with the striking of redun-
dant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter, is applicable to
documents other than pleadings either through analogy, by necessity, or
through the operation of Rule 7(B)(3).
In the context of scurrilous matter, the second question is this: Does
e.g., Stands Over Bull v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 442 F. Supp. 360 (D. Mont.
1977):
IT]he rule is limited in its application to "pleadings". Rule 12(f),
F.R.Civ.P. "Pleadings" within the meaning of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are those matters set forth in Rule 7(a). The plaintiff in this
instance seeks to strike an affidavit and therefore invokes a procedure
not within the literal meaning of the Rules.
Id. at 368. See also Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1966);
Superior Beverage Co. v. Ohio, 324 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Ernst
Seidelman Corp. v. Mollison, 10 F.R.D. 426 (S.D. Ohio 1950).
15 Ernst Seidelman Corp. v. Mollison, 10 F.R.D. 426 (S.D. Ohio 1950).
7 This argument is suggested in Monroe v. Board of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 641 (D.
Conn. 1975):
A motion to strike asks the court to remove "from any pleading any
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scan-
dalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). A rule 12(f) motion to strike is not
strictly proper in this instance, for the record of the school board's hear-
ing is not a "pleading." The federal rules designate as "pleadings" those
filings as set forth in rule 7(a): a complaint, an answer, a reply to a
courterclaim, an answer to a cross-claim, a third-party complaint, a third-
party answer, and a reply to an answer or a third-party answer if
ordered by the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a) ....
It is, nevertheless, necessary to determine what material may be
used in ruling on the pending motion for partial summary judgment, and
a motion to strike has sometimes been used to call to courts' attention
questions about the admissibility of proffered material in similar cir-
cumstances .... Thus the court accepts the motion as an invitation by
the plaintiff to consider whether the record of Monroe's hearing as sub-
mitted by the defendant may properly be relied upon.
I& at 645.
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Civil Rule 12(F) authorize the striking of the entire document from the
files if it contains scurrilous matter, or does it authorize only the strik-
ing of the scurrilous matter from the document? The Rule states in per-
tinent part that "the court may order stricken from any pleading ....""
Accordingly, a literal reading of the Rule would favor the latter inter-
pretation over the former. But there is ample federal authority for the
proposition that Federal Civil Rule 12(f) may be used to strike the entire
document if it is replete with scurrilous material."8 Therefore, if one
were to rely upon what the federal courts have done rather than upon
what the federal rule says they may do, one could conclude that an en-
tire document can be stricken from the files under the authority of Ohio
Civil Rule 12(F).
Pre-rule Ohio practice recognized two motions to strike. The first was
a motion to strike from a pleading, and was authorized in the following
terms: "If redundant, irrelevant, or scurrilous matter is inserted in a
pleading, it may be stricken out on motion of the party prejudiced
thereby. Obscene words may be stricken from a pleading on the motion
of a party or by the court of its own motion."79 The second was a motion
to strike an entire document from the files: "Motions to strike pleadings
and papers from the files may be made with or without notice, as the court
directs."8 Unlike the former authority governing the motion to strike
from a pleading, this latter authority does not prescribe when the mo-
tion to strike from the files may be used, but the customary usages of
the motion to strike from the files are outlined in Brown v. Lamb: t
[T]his remedy is ordinarily employed to strike pleadings for
failure to comply with previous orders of the court .... This of-
fice of a motion to strike a pleading from the files is to test the
regularity connected with the filing, as when filed after time; to
its form with respect to verification; or for failure to comply
with previous orders of the court. Its office is not to inquire into
the merits of the case .... The motion may also be employed to
strike sham or frivolous pleadings."
The motion to strike from the files was also to be used if an action failed
of commencement. In such a case, the action could not be dismissed,
" OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(F) (emphasis added).
78 See, e.g., Theriault v. Silber, 574 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1978); Ex parte Tyler, 70
F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Argran v. Isaacs, 306 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
Martin v. Hunt, 29 F.R.D. 35 (D. Mass. 1961); Mottaghi-Iravani v. Int'l Com-
modities Corp., 20 F.R.D. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Walle v. Dallett, 136 F. Supp. 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Pollack v. Aspbury, 14 F.R.D. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
71 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2309.33 (Page 1954) (repealed 1971).
80 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2309.70 (Page 1954) (repealed 1971).
8 112 Ohio App. 116, 171 N.E.2d 191 (6th Dist. 1960).
8" Id. at 121, 171 N.E.2d at 194-95.
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since it never came into existence, but the petition was to be stricken
from the files to signify the failure of commencement and the nonex-
istence of the action.'
Each motion to strike served its own function, and the two were not
interchangeable. If a pleader objected to scurrilous matter in a docu-
ment, his remedy was the motion to strike from the document, and not
the motion to strike the document from the files. Even if the document
was replete with offensive matter, the former motion was the remedy of
choice, and the latter motion did not lie:
Section 2309.33, Revised Code, specifically provides that if
redundant, irrelevant or scurrilous matter be inserted in a
pleading, it may be stricken out on motion of the party preju-
diced thereby....
[TIhe remedy is by way of motion to strike from the pleading.
Defendants' counsel contend that the petition is so replete with
evidentiary, redundant and other improper allegations that a
motion to strike [from the pleading] would be as lengthy as the
petition itself and, if granted, would so emasculate the petition
as to leave nothing of substance remaining, and would impose
undue hardship upon the court and counsel. Notwithstanding
this contention, we are of the opinion that the appropriate
remedy is by way of motion to strike [from the pleading] or
possibly by motion to make definite and certain.84
Ohio's pre-rule motion to strike from the pleading has evolved into
Civil Rule 12(F), but the pre-rule motion to strike from the files has no
express rule counterpart; rather, its continued existence as a distinct
83 Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954):
Therefore, it cannot be said that an action was ever deemed to be com-
menced in Lorain county. In other words, notwithstanding the filing of
the petition and the issuance of summons, no case ever matured in
Lorain county to the point where the court had any jurisdiction over the
defendant or had any power to make any order based upon the allega-
tions of the petition so filed. There was no pending case to be "dis-
missed." Although on the Lorain county court docket there appears the
words, "dismissed without prejudice," what that court did was merely to
strike the petition from the files. It is common knowledge that after ser-
vice of summons and even after the filing of an answer a case may be
"dismissed" for want of prosecution. Such would be a genuine dismissal
because such case would be pending and the court would have jurisdic-
tion over it. It seems axiomatic that a nonexistent case can not be
dismissed.
Id. at 383-84, 119 N.E.2d at 288.
", Brown v. Lamb, 112 Ohio App. 116, 120-22, 171 N.E.2d 191, 194-95 (6th Dist.
1960) (emphasis in original).
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remedy is merely shadowed in such rules as Rule 1185 and Rule 12(E). 8"
Thus the teasing question: Since both pre-rule motions to strike have
survived into the rules era, will the Ohio courts read Ohio Civil Rule
12(F) literally and follow the pre-rule Ohio tradition of distinguishing
between the motions to strike from a document and to strike a docu-
ment from the files, or will they read Ohio Civil Rule 12(F) loosely and
follow the federal practice of treating the Rule 12(F) motion to strike as
both a motion to strike from a document and a motion to strike the docu-
ment from the files?
8 7
Although not on point,88 Longstreth Co. v. Charles Vangrov & Son,
85 Compare OHIO R. Civ. P. 11 with
171 N.E.2d 191, 195 (6th Dist. 1960):
Ohio R. Civ. P. 11:
If a pleading is not signed or is
signed with intent to defeat the
purpose of this rule, it may be
stricken as sham and false and
the action may proceed as though
the pleading had not been
served.
88 Compare OHIO R. CIV. P. 12(E) wit,
171 N.E.2d 191, 194-95 (6th Dist. 1960):
Ohio R. Civ. P. 12(E):
If the motion is granted and the
order of the court is not obeyed
.... ,the court may strike the
pleading to which the motion was
directed or make such order as it
deems just.
Brown v. Lamb, 112 Ohio App. 116, 121,
Brown v. Lamb:
The office of the motion to
strike a pleading from the files
is to test . . . its form with
respect to verification; .... The
motion may also be employed to
strike sham or frivolous
pleadings.
& Brown v. Lamb, 116 Ohio App. 116, 121,
Brown v. Lamb:
[Tihis remedy is ordinarily em-
ployed to strike pleadings for
failure to comply with previous
orders of the court ..... The of-
fice of the motion to strike
a pleading from the files is to
test . . . for failure to comply
with previous orders of the
court.
87 See also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and 12(e), which suggest the existence of the mo-
tion to strike from the files. While there is little doubt that it does exist as a
viable method of invoking the court's inherent power to strike matters from the
files, the federal courts had no uniform pre-rule history of the motion's use to
draw upon, and they have therefore tended to limit its use to the functions sug-
gested in Rule 11'and 12(e). That being so, they have never considered it as an
alternative to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f), and since they saw no Rule-recognized alter-
native to Rule 12(f), they tended to bend Rule 12(f) to double duty: It became both
a motion to strike scurrilous matter from a document and also a motion to strike
the document from the files if it were so replete with scurrilous matter that strik-
ing from the files seemed a more appropriate disposition. See note 78 supra and
accompanying text.
88 At issue in Longstreth Co. v. Charles Vangrov & Son, Inc., 27 Ohio Misc. 15,
265 N.E.2d 843 (Dayton Mun. Ct. 1970), was the choice of motion to be used in
challenging a noncompliance with OHIO R. Civ. P. 10(D), which requires a copy of
an account or other written instrument to be attached to a pleading whenever a
claim or defense in that pleading is founded on an account or other written instru-
ment. In Longstreth, the Dayton Municipal Court concluded that the non-
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compliance with Civil Rule 10(D) rendered the complaint substantively insuffi-
cient, and opted for the OHIO R. Civ. P. 12(B) (6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted as the motion of choice.
The question next arose in Point Rental Co. v. Posani, 52 Ohio App. 2d 183,
368 N.E.2d 1267 (10th Dist. 1976). In this case, the Court of Appeals for Franklin
County drew a distinction between a noncompliance that rendered the pleading
substantively deficient and a noncompliance that left the pleading substantively
sufficient on its face. In the latter case, the noncompliance was a mere formal
defect, and the court of appeals concluded that the motion of choice for presen-
ting the challenge was an OHIO R. CIV. P. 12(E) motion for a definite statement:
The proper procedure in attacking the failure of a plaintiff to attach a
copy of a written instrument or to state a valid reason for his failure to
attach same is to serve a motion for a definite statement, pursuant to
Civ. R. 12(E). Had that motion been granted, as would have been proper
in this case, plaintiff could properly have been required to amend his
complaint within 14 days after notice of the order sustaining the motion
for a definite statement, and ordered to attach a copy of the written in-
strument or state a valid reason for the failure to attach same. In the
event a party fails to obey the order of the court, the court may strike
the pleading to which the motion was directed, or make any other orders
as it deems just, which would include involuntary dismissal with pre-
judice pursuant to CIV. R. 41(B)(1).
Id. at 186, 368 N.E.2d at 1269.
While this may be a workable solution in the Posani situation, it smacks of an
attempt to artificially force the problem into a Rule-recognized solution, even
though the problem does not quite fit the Rule-recognized scheme of things. In
short, in its attempt to bring everything under the aegis of the Civil Rules, the
court overlooked the fact that there are a number of remedies which are either
not expressly mentioned in the Rules, or are mentioned only in passing. In any
event, there are at least two solid objections to the use of the motion for a
definite statement as the vehicle for challenging noncompliance with Rule 10(D).
To begin with, if the statement of claim is substantively sufficient without the at-
tached document, or without a valid explanation for its absence, then it is ques-
tionable whether one can honestly say that the absence of the document or an ex-
planation renders the pleading so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. But if the pleading is not
so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a
responsive pleading, the motion for a definite statement does not lie. See OHIO R.
CIV. P. 12(E). Therefore, if the pleading does not have the requisite vagueness
and ambiguity for a proper use of the motion for a definite statement, an at-
torney who signs, serves and files such a motion solely for the purpose of com-
pelling compliance with Civil Rule 10(D) violates the certification provisions of
OHIO R. CIV. P. 11, since he is certifying to a condition-vagueness or am-
biguity-which he knows does not exist. Secondly, a motion for a definite state-
ment under the provisions of OHIO R. Civ. P. 12(E) will lie only when the
vagueness or ambiguity appears in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
permitted. But an answer to a complaint, a reply to a counterclaim, an answer to
a cross-claim, and a third-party answer are pleadings to which no responsive
pleading is permitted, except in that rare instance when a court will order a rep-
ly to an answer or a third-party answer. See notes 66-67 supra. Under the provi-
sions of OHIO R. Civ. P. 12(B), the vast majority of defenses will appear in these
pleadings. Nevertheless, OHIO R. CIv. P. 10(D) asserts that whenever a defense is
founded on an account or other written instrument, a copy of that document must
be attached to the pleading containing the defense, or an explanation for its
[Vol. 30:385
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Inc., 9 appears to be the only reported post-rule opinion to wrestle with
the question. From what is said in the decision itself, the court seems to
retain the traditional distinction between the two motions:
Unlike the former Ohio Rules (R.C. 2309.70), there is no specific
provision in the new rules for a motion to strike from the files.
However, a court has an inherent right to strike pleadings from
a file in certain instances. Courts often, under the old rules,
would order the striking of an entire pleading when the rules of
pleading are violated in a gross manner....
Likewise, a motion to strike under Rule 12(F) would not be the
proper remedy to attack a claim which is insufficient in the man-
absence must be given in the pleading. Therefore, if there is noncompliance with
this aspect of Rule 10(D), the Posani remedy will not be available, since the mo-
tion for a definite statement cannot be directed to the responsive pleading to
which the document is not attached, or from which the explanation is absent. In
short, while the Rule 12(E) solution to the Rule 10(D) noncompliance problem may
have worked in the Posani situation, it is patently inadequate when one considers
the full scope of the Rule 10(D) requirement; and even in the Posani situation, it
may have worked only at the sacrifice of Rule 11, since it is difficult to see how
one can say that in the absence of the written document there is enough in the
pleading to say that it states a claim upon which relief can be granted, but not
enough to permit one to frame a responsive pleading.
The author's solution to the Rule 10(D) noncompliance problem is premised on
the theory that the motion to strike from the files is the vehicle of choice for
presenting challenges to defects of form whenever the Civil Rules or tradition do
not specify some other motion. The initial step is to determine whether the non-
compliance with Rule 10(D) leaves the claim or defense substantively insufficient.
If a claim is left substantively insufficient, the noncompliance with Rule 10(D)
ought to be challenged by a Rule 12 (B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or a Rule 12(F) motion to strike an insuffi-
cient claim from the pleading, whichever is more appropriate in the cir-
cumstances. For the correct use of the Rule 12(F) motion to strike an insufficient
claim from the pleading, see note 90 infra; Browne, The Finality of an Order
Granting a Rule 60(B) Motion for Relief From Judgment: Some Footnotes to
GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 13,
120-24 (1977); Browne, Ohio Rule 8(G) and Related Rules: Some Notes on the
Pleading of Affirmative Defenses, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 329, 369-70 (1978). If a
defense is left substantively insufficient, the noncompliance with Rule 10(D)
ought to be challenged by an OHIO R. CIV. P. 12(C) motion for judgment on the
pleadings, or a Rule 12(F) motion to strike an insufficient defense from the
pleading, whichever is the more appropriate in the circumstances. For the cor-
rect use of the Rule 12(F) motion to strike an insufficient defense from the
pleading, see Browne, Ohio Rule 8(C) and Related Rules: Some Notes on the
Pleading of Affirmative Defenses, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 329, 367-69 (1978). But if
either the claim or the defense remains substantively sufficient, then the non-
compliance with Rule 10(D) produces nothing more than an irregularity of form,
and since there is no specific motion more prescribed as the vehicle for presen-
ting a challenge to this irregularity of form, the noncompliance with Rule 10(D)
ought to be challenged by the motion to strike the pleading from the files.
89 27 Ohio Misc. 15, 265 N.E.2d 843 (Dayton Mun. Ct. 1970).
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ner stated by the defendant.... Although an insufficient claim
may be the subject of a motion to strike, the provisions should
not be interpreted as being a substitute for a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under which relief can be granted.
The [Rule 12(F)] motion to strike should be restricted only to a
claim which is completely redundant, immaterial, impertinent or
scandalous."
0 Id. at 16-17, 265 N.E.2d at 844-45. The last two sentences of the material
quoted in the text are a paraphrase of the following extract from J. MCCORMAC,
OHIO CIv. RULES PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 6.10 (1970):
The Ohio Rules Advisory Committee added the provision that an insuffi-
cient claim may be subject to a motion to strike. This provision should
not be interpreted as being a substitute for a motion to [dismiss for
failure to] state a claim under which relief can be granted or a motion for
summary judgment. It should be restricted only to a claim which is com-
pletely redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous.
Id. at 132. With all due respect to Judge McCormac, so narrow an interpretation
would render the provision all but meaningless. But cf. Berisford v. Sells, 43 Ohio
St. 2d 205, 331 N.E.2d 408 (1975) (an example of a claim that would qualify as one
of Judge McCormac's "completely redundant" claims). Rather, the key to the cor-
rect interpretation of the "insufficient claim" provision of Ohio Civil Rule 12(F) is
to be found in OHIO R. CIv. P. 12(F), 1971 STAFF NOTE:
Rule 12(F) authorizes the court to strike from any pleading "any insuf-
ficient claim or defense." The words "claim or" were added to the Ohio
rule. This provision explicitly permits an attack on one claim . . .in a
pleading containing more than one claim . . . paralleling the Ohio
statutes which permit a demurrer to one of several causes of action....
See, §§ 2309.12 .....
Id. But the OHIO R. CIv. P. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted is also a Rules equivalent of the old Code
demurrer. See Schulman v. City of Cleveland, 30 Ohio St. 2d 196, 283 N.E.2d 175
(1972); State, ex reL Brown v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 67 Ohio Op. 2d 239 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1974); OHIO R. CIv. P. 7(C), 1971 STAFF NOTE, which states in
pertinent part: "Rule 7(C) abolishes the demurrer, but the demurrer is
substituted for by the motion to dismiss discussed under Rule 12." Id. Thus, to
the extent that both are substitutes for the demurrer, they must share common
characteristics.
Accordingly, it may be said that in substance the Rule 12(F) motion to strike
an insufficient claim is identical to the Rule 12(B)6) motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. That is, both admit for pur-
pose of the motion the truth of all of the facts well-pleaded in the claim chal-
lenged; neither can be aided by evidence extrinsic to that claim; and neither can
be granted unless it appears beyond doubt from the face of the claim attacked
that the claimant can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery on that
claim. In other words, either motion can be granted only if the claim attacked: (1)
fails to allege sufficient operative facts to show the existence of a claim for relief;
(2) alleges a claim not cognizable under existing law; or (3) alleges operative facts
which, on their face, establish a defense which bars recovery on the claim. (This
third point is a bastard use of either motion sired by the Ohio Supreme Court in
a moment of carelessness. See Mills v. Whitehouse Trucking Co., 40 Ohio St. 2d
55, 320 N.E.2d 668 (1974), and the comment thereon in Browne, Ohio Rule 8(C)
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Unfortunately, the third paragraph of the Longstreth syllabus tends to
confuse the two motions, and this confusion results in an incorrect state-
ment of the law even under the federal interpretation. As the syllabus
provides: "3. A motion to strike a complaint from the files should be
restricted only to the claim which is completely redundant, immaterial,
impertinent or scandalous." 1
Accordingly, the only post-rule Ohio authority we have on the point is
at worst confusing and at best less than definitive. It does, however,
suggest that the pre-rule tradition ought to be followed; that is, a
distinction must be drawn between the motion to strike from a docu-
ment and the motion to strike a document from the files. If this is a cor-
rect reading, and if it is an accurate signpost to future practice, it may
be said that Ohio Civil Rule 12(F) cannot be used to strike an entire
document from the files if it contains scurrilous matter. Indeed, under
no circumstances will the inclusion of scurrilous matter warrant the
striking of the entire document from the files; rather, under the authori-
ty of Rule 12(F), the scurrilous matter may be stricken from the docu-
ment.
There remains the third question: If a document containing scurrilous
matter cannot be stricken from the files under the authority of Rule
and Related Rules: Some Notes on the Pleading of Affirmative Defenses, 27
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 329 (1978)).
It is in its employment that the motion to strike an insufficient claim from a
pleading differs from a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. If a pleading contains a single statement of claim and that
statement is legally insufficient, or if a pleading contains a number of statements
of claim and all such statements are legally insufficient, the proper motion to be
used in challenging the sufficiency of the pleading is the Rule 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
However, if a pleading contains more than one statement of claim and one or
more, but less than all, of such statements are legally insufficient, the proper mo-
tion to be used in challenging the insufficient claim or claims is the Rule 12(F) mo-
tion to strike from the pleading. Thus, this motion to strike is a motion to strike a
particular claim or claims from a multiclaim pleading on the ground that the
challenged claim does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For an
illustration of this use of the Rule 12(F) motion to strike an insufficient claim, see
Miles v. N.J. Motors, 32 Ohio App. 2d 350, 291 N.E.2d 758 (6th Dist. 1972).
Of course, as indicated in Berisford v. Sells, 43 Ohio St. 2d 205, 331 N.E.2d 408
(1975), Rule 12(F) may also be used to strike a "completely redundant" claim from
a pleading, but when it is used for this purpose, it is not being used under that
provision of the Rule which authorizes the striking of an "insufficient claim"; it is
being used under the provision which authorizes the striking of "redundant, im-
material, impertinent, or scandalous matter." These two authorizations are
separate and distinct, and ought to be kept so.
91 27 Ohio Misc. 15, 265 N.E.2d 843 (Dayton Mun. Ct. 1970) (the report of this
decision found at 265 N.E.2d 843 does not reproduce the syllabus that appears at
27 Ohio Misc. 15).
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12(F), may it be stricken from the files under the authority of Rule 11?
From what little authority there is on the point, one may gather that in
the federal system the answer is in the affirmative. Payne v. Howard92
is the leading case, and it puts the proposition this way:
The authority to strike pleadings stems from provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. F.R.Civ.P. 11 confers on the
Court the power to order pleadings stricken "if scandalous or in-
decent matter is inserted." Id. Similarily, F.R.Civ.P. 12(F) pro-
vides that upon motion by a party "the court may order stricken
from any pleading" any material that is "redundant, immaterial,
impertinent or scandalous." Id. Although rules 11 and 12(f) refer
to "pleadings," at least rule 11 affords a basis for striking
material other than formal "pleadings." See F.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(2);
Wright & Miller Federal Practice and Procedure § 1191 (1969);
Moore, Federal Practice 11.02 (1975). Whether that authority
is to be exercised is a matter commited to the discretion of the
Court.93
Spencer v. Dixon94 is the only other reported decision to cite Rule 11 as
authority for striking a document which contains scurrilous matter, but
it gives something of a mixed signal because it is not entirely clear
whether the court ultimately relied upon Federal Rule 12(f) to strike the
92 75 F.R.D. 465 (D.D.C. 1977).
" Id. at 467-68. The authorities cited for this proposition provide some sup-
port for the court's statement of what it perceives to be the rule. Professors
Wright and Miller tell us:
Rule 11 provides two sanctions for a failure to sign a pleading or for a
signature executed with an "intent to defeat the purpose" of the rule, or
"if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted." First, the pleading "may
be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the
pleading had not been served." Secondly, a willful violation of Rule 11
may subject an attorney to "appropriate disciplinary action."
5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1334
(1969).
It should be noted that the court cited § 1191 of C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER to
support the proposition that Rule 11 is made applicable to motions and other
papers through the operation of Rule 7(B)(2), and not for the proposition that Rule
11 authorizes the striking of a document from the files because it contains scur-
rilous matter.
Professor Moore is somewhat less forceful. He says: "A reputable attorney
cannot file sham or frivolous pleadings and motions, or insert scandalous or inde-
cent matter. An attorney who does resort to such tactics should be disciplined;
and the pleading or motion which violates the spirit of this rule should be
stricken." 2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.02 (2d ed. 1975).
" 290 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. La. 1968).
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document, or whether it relied upon Federal Rules 11 and 12(f) in
tandem."
One may question the accuracy of this affirmative answer, and sug-
gest that the correct answer is to be found in the last three sentences of
Rule 11. Numbered here for easier reference, those sentences read as
follows:
[1] If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat
the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and
false and the action may proceed as though the pleading
had not been served."
[2] For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be sub-
jected to appropriate [disciplinary] action. 7
[3] Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent mat-
ter is inserted.
The key to proper interpretation of those three sentences lies in the
words "similar action," which appear in the third sentence. If these two
words refer back to sentence [1], then there is little doubt that Rule 11
authorized the striking of a document because it contains scurrilous
matter. The same conclusion may be drawn if these two words refer
back to both sentences [1] and [2]. But if "similar action" refers to
sentence [2] only, then Rule 11 authorizes the imposition of sanctions on
the attorney who includes scurrilous matter in a document, but it does
not authorize the striking of the document itself from the files.
" The Spencer decision paraphrases the motion to strike in the following
terms:
The motion to strike was filed under Rules 11 and 12 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; the grounds of the motion, among others, being
that the pleading was filed with the intent to defeat the purposes of Rule
11 and that the pleading is replete with scandalous matter in violation of
Rule 11 and with redundant, immaterial, impertinent and scandalous
material in violation of Rule 12(f).
290 F. Supp. at 534. The Court did grant the motion to strike the pleading from
the files, but in doing so stated:
It is fair to comment that this pleading indeed is permeated with scan-
dalous material reprobated by Rule 11 and with redundant, immaterial,
impertinent matter forbidden to be contained in a pleading under Rule
12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.... Consequently, it is the
opinion of this court that, for these reasons, this Amended Complaint
should be stricken, and it is so ordered.
Id. at 535. This can be read as endorsing Rule 11 as the authority for striking the
pleading because it contained scandalous matter, and Rule 12(f) as the authority
for striking it because it contained redundant, immaterial and impertinent mat-
ter.
96 FED. R. Civ. P. 11; OHIO R. Civ. P. 11.
9 Id. (the word "disciplinary" appears in FED. R. Civ. P. 11, but not in OHIO R.
CIV. P. 11, but apart from this single difference, the text of the two Rules is the
same).
98 FED. R. CIV. P. 11; OHIO R. Civ. P. 11.
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The historical antecedents of Federal Rule 11 (and thus the grand-
parents of Ohio Rule 11) provide some support for the reading which has
"similar action" refer to the "striking" provision of sentence [1]. As the
1937 Committee Note to Federal Rule 11 indicates, the Rule "is substan-
tially the content of Equity Rules 24 (Signature of Counsel) and 21 (Scan-
dal and Impertinence) consolidated and unified."9 9 Federal Equity Rule
24 provided:
Every bill or other pleading shall be signed individually by
one or more solicitors of record, and such signature shall be con-
sidered as a certificate by each solicitor that he has read the
pleading so signed by him; that upon the instructions laid before
him regarding the case there is good ground for the same; that
no scandalous matter is inserted in the pleading; and that it is
not interposed for delay.'
Thus, the insertion of scandalous matter is put on the same level as a
groundless pleading, but no provision is made for punishing a violation
of the Rule. Here, Federal Equity Rule 21 lends its aid. As that Rule
once read: "The right to except to bills, answers, and other proceedings
for scandal or impertinence shall not obtain, but the court may, upon
motion or its own initiative, order any redundant, impertinent or scan-
dalous matter stricken out, upon such terms as the court shall think
fit.""'' Accordingly, if scandalous matter is inserted in a document, it
may be stricken out on such terms as the court shall think fit.
Based on these two equity rules, it can be argued that the "striking
out" provision of Equity Rule 21 has evolved into the "striking from the
file" provision of present Rule 11. Further, since the insertion of scan-
dalous matter is an offense of the same magnitude as the assertion of a
groundless claim of defense, the provision for striking the latter from
the file should apply also to the former, since the former was subject to
being stricken under that provision of Equity Rule 21 which has evolved
into the "striking" provision of present Rule 11. Therefore, in constru-
ing present Rule 11, one must read the words "similar action" as refer-
ring to the "striking" provision of sentence [1].
The difficulty with this argument is that the blood of Equity Rule 21
runs more strongly in the veins of present Rule 12(F) than it does in the
veins of present Federal Rule 11.12 Compare:
For the text of the Committee Note, see 2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
11.01[2] (2d ed. 1975).
1' FED. EQUITY R. 24 (the text is taken from B. BABBITT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CODE AND EQUITY RULES 274 (1925)).
"I FED. EQUITY R. 21 (the text is taken from B. BABBITT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CODE AND EQUITY RULES 273 (1925)).
" For the proposition that Equity Rule 21 is the principal parent of Federal
Rule 12(f), see 2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.01[19], [21], [22] (2d ed. 1968).
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EQUITY RULE 21: FEDERAL RULE 12(f): FEDERAL RULE 11:
[T]he court may, [T]he court may order If a pleading is
upon motion or its stricken from any not signed or is
own initiative, pleading any insuf- signed with intent to
order any redund- ficient defense or any defeat the purpose
ant, impertinent or redundant, immaterial, of this rule, it may be
scandalous matter impertinent, or scan- stricken as sham and
stricken out, upon dalous matter.' 4  false and the action
such terms as the may proceed as
court may think though the plead-
fit.10 3  ing had not been
served.'0 5
It is clear from this comparison that the "striking" provision of Equity Rule
21 descended intact to its progeny, Federal Rule 12(f), and did not evolve in-
to the "striking" provision of Federal Rule 11. At best, Rule 11 resembles a
niece or nephew of Equity Rule 21, and if it were not for the fact that the
1937 Committee Note stated that Equity Rule 21 had been mated with
Equity Rule 24 to produce present Federal Rule 11, we would not be able to
find any trace of Equity Rule 21 in Rule 11.0'
But if Equity Rule 21 did not provide the "striking" provision of Rule
11,' °0 where did that "striking" provision come from? From all that ap-
103 FED. EQUITY R. 21 (the text is taken from B. BABBITT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CODE AND EQUITY RULES 273 (1925)).
1'4 FED. R. CIv. P. 12(f).
105 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
0I Professor Risinger provides an explanation for this strange result:
This [1937 Committee] note is virtually unchanged from the note accom-
panying Rule 11 (then Rule 10) in the first preliminary draft, see AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT
OF RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20-21 (May 1936) ... and it seems inac-
curate as applied to the final draft. In the first preliminary draft of the
Federal Rules, there was no provision corresponding to Rule 12(f),
which, as originally promulgated in 1938, provided for a motion to strike
any "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" from a
pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), 308 U.S. 679 (1939). In the preliminary
draft the only section arguably authorizing a motion to strike for scandal
was the "similar action" clause of Rule 11 (then Rule 10): "Similar action
may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter . . .[is] inserted." . ..
Thus, the allegation that the Rule embodied the content of Equity Rule
21 was arguably justified at least in part, since Equity Rule 21 provided
for a motion to strike for scandal or impertinence, a common practice
both at law and in equity for generations ....
In the final draft of the Federal Rules the precise office of Equity
Rule 21 was provided for in Rule 12(f) .... Thus, despite what the Ad-
visory Committee note says, Equity Rule 21 has nothing to do with Rule
11 as finally promulgated.
Risinger, supra note 2, at 8-9 n.20.
"I "The phrase providing that a pleading 'may be stricken as sham and false'
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pears, it evolved from the traditional motion to strike a sham pleading;
that is, a pleading "good in form but false in fact and dishonestly pleaded
for some unworthy purpose."'' s It is this bit of historical evidence that
provides the clue to the correct interpretation of Rule 11.
Again, given our three-sentence universe, it is clear that sentence [1)
authorizes the striking of a pleading from the files only if it is found to
be sham and false. But in the three sentences, there are only three
possible bases for concluding that a pleading is sham and false: (a) the
pleading is not signed; (b) the pleading is signed with intent to defeat
the purpose of Rule 11; and (c) scurrilous matter is inserted in the
pleading. If "sham and false" is a conclusion which may logically be
drawn from the existence of each of these premises, then we may con-
clude that "similar action" refers to the "striking" provision of sentence
[1], but if that is not a logical conclusion which may be drawn from
premise (c), then we ought to conclude that "similar action" in sentence
[3] does not refer to the "striking" provision of sentence [1].
As noted above, an attorney's signature is, in effect, an affidavit that
he has read the document, that to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief, there is good ground to support that which is said in the
document, and that the document is not interposed for the purpose of
delay. But if a document is interposed only for delay, that is tantamount
to saying that "good ground" to support that document does not exist."9
Therefore, in substance, the attorney's signature on a document is his
affidavit that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there
is good ground to support the content of the document. If a document is
not signed, it is either because the attorney forgot to sign it, or because
he could not, in good faith, swear that there are good grounds to sup-
did not come from equity practice, but the Advisory Committee note is silent
both as to the antecedents of this phrase, and how it is intended to operate." Ris-
inger, supra note 2, at 9 n.20.
' Risinger, supra note 2, at 18. See also Risinger's history of the motion to
strike a sham pleading in Risinger, supra note 2, at 17-34.
The pre-rule Ohio tradition is in accord with Risinger's conclusions. See Brown
v. Lamb, 112 Ohio App. 116, 171 N.E.2d 191 (1960), where the court stated: "The
motion [to strike a pleading from the files] may also be employed to strike sham
or frivolous pleadings. White v. Calhoun, 83 Ohio St., 401, 94 N.E., 743. And the
exercise of the power to strike a sham pleading necessarily imports the taking of
evidence at the hearing thereon." Id at 121, 171 N.E.2d at 195.
' This is basically Professor Risinger's position. As he puts it:
The insertion of the certification that the pleading has not been inter-
posed for delay seems logically redundant, since a pleading interposed
only for delay could not have "good ground" no matter how that term is
ultimately defined, and a pleading with independent "good ground" is
not likely to be rendered improper because tactical considerations of
delay entered into the ultimate decision of whether or not to file an
otherwise honest, meritorious, and proper pleading.
Risinger, supra note 2, at 8.
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port it. But if the attorney refuses to swear that good grounds for the
document exist, then it may be inferred that the document is sham and
false. Therefore, the absence of the attorney's signature raises the
rebuttable presumption that the document is sham and false because
there are not good grounds to support it."0 Accordingly, the conclusion
that the document is sham and false follows logically (if somewhat
uncertainly) from the existence of premise (a), the absence of the at-
torney's signature.
An attorney signs a document with the intent to defeat the purpose of
Rule 11 if he knows that good ground to support it does not exist, or if
he neither knows nor cares whether good ground to support it exists."'
If a good ground to support the document does not exist, then the con-
tent of the document must be false. But if the content of the document
is false, then the document is a sham. Therefore, the conclusion that the
document is a sham and false follows logically from the existence of the
"knowing" variant of premise (b). On the other hand, if the attorney
neither knows nor cares whether good ground for the document exists,
he cannot have a bona fide belief that there is good ground to support
the document. The absence of the attorney's bona fide belief that good
ground exists raises the rebuttable"2 presumption that the content of
the document is false. But if the content of the document is false, then it
"' Obviously, the presumption is only a rebuttable one, since the failure to
sign may be attributable solely to oversight or carelessness. It can be rebutted
by the attorney's offer to sign the document when the absence of the signature is
drawn to his attention. As Professor Risinger notes: "Every court that has ever
faced the issue has luckily had the good sense to find an implied power both to
order and to allow the technically offending pleading to be corrected." Risinger,
supra note 2, at 15 (footnote omitted).
On the other hand, Risinger also points out: "Presumably, a refusal to correct
such a technical error would be ground to infer some sort of improper motive and
wilfulness in the original error, and perhaps justify 'striking' the pleading, but
such a case would obviously be very rare." Id. (footnote omitted).
' One might also add that an attorney signs a document with the intent to
defeat the purpose of Rule 11 if he interposes the document solely for the pur-
pose of delay. But if we accept Professor Risinger's theory, as set out in note 109
supra, "delay" is simply an aspect of the absence of "good ground," and is sub-
sumed under the broader heading. Thus, for brevity's sake we can limit our com-
ment to the absence of good ground.
1' Here we must again acknowledge Professor Risinger's contribution by
subscribing to his distinction between honesty and truth. See Risinger, supra
note 2, at 3-4. An attorney who signs a document without knowing or caring
whether there are good grounds to support it is acting dishonestly, but it does
not necessarily follow that the document is a sham. The attorney is dishonest and
the document is a sham only if the contents of the document are untrue.
However, in the absence of the attorney's bona fide belief that good grounds ex-
ist, one may reasonably presume that the content of the document is false, and
the document may be stricken as sham and false unless the attorney can rebut
the presumption by demonstrating the truth of the document's content.
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is a sham. Therefore, the conclusion that the document is sham and false
also follows logically (if not absolutely) from the existence of the
"careless" variant of premise (b).
Obviously, this process of reasoning from premise (b) to the conclusion
that the document is sham and false is somewhat artificial. It is hardly
likely that the attorney's intent in signing the document would be
drawn in question in the absence of a previous finding that the content
of the document is sham and false. Thus, in real life, the process would
go something like this: The court finds that the content of the document
is false; it also finds that the content of the document is so obviously
false that no honest, reasonably competent attorney could form a bona
fide belief that there was good ground to support the position taken in
the document. From these two findings the court concludes that the at-
torney in question did not have such a bona fide belief, and therefore he
must have signed the document with intent to defeat the purpose of
Rule 11. Although this reverses the process, and makes premise (b) the
conclusion, and "sham and false" the major premise, it demonstrates
even more emphatically the logical connection between premise (b) and
the conclusion that the document is sham and false.
But no such logical or necessary connection can be drawn when we
consider premise (c)-the insertion of scurrilous matter. The
demonstrable absence of truth compels the conclusion that a document
is sham and false. The refusal to certify that the content of a document
is true, or the manifest indifference to the truth or falsity of that con-
tent, give rise to the presumption that a document is sham and false.
But no such conclusion or presumption follows from the mere existence
of scandalous or indecent matter. Indeed, the particular vice of scur-
rilous matter is that it may be true -true but irrelevant allegations set
out in a document with the intent of arousing the passion and prejudice
of the reader. Thus, in Payne v. Howard,113 for example, there is little
doubt that the material about Dr. Nork, that master of medical malprac-
tice, was true. It was scurrilous, however, because it had no relevance to
the allegations made against Dr. Howard, the defendant, and because it
was intended to prejudice the court against him by tarring him with the
brush of innuendo.
Of course, scurrilous matter may be false. However, falsity is not in-
herent in scurrility; if it exists at all, it exists as an accident. Therefore,
because falsity is not an inherent aspect of scurrility, it does not follow
that the mere presence of scurrilous matter renders a document sham
and false. But if a document is not sham and false, or is not presumed to
be sham and false, it cannot be stricken under the authority of Rule 11.
Accordingly, the mere presence of scurrilous matter does not invoke the
"striking" provision of Rule 11, and contrary to some of the federal
113 75 F.R.D. 465 (D.D.C. 1977).
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authority on the point, a document cannot be stricken from the files
under the provisions of Rule 11 simply because it is replete with scur-
rilous matter. In short, since "sham and false" is not a conclusion that
may logically be drawn from the mere existence of premise (c), we must
conclude that the words "similar action" in sentence [3] of Rule 11 do not
refer to the "striking" provision of sentence [1]. Rather, they refer only
to sentence [21, which mandates that an attorney may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action if he is guilty of a willful violation of
Rule 11. The insertion of scurrilous matter is not the same as a willful
violation of the signature/certification provisions of Rule 11, but it is a
separate and independent offense of the same magnitude as the willful
violation of those signature/certification provisions, and thereby war-
rants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against the scandal-
mongering attorney which are similar to the disciplinary sanctions
which may be imposed against the attorney who willfully violates the
signature/certification provisions of the Rule.
In a word, then, the answer to the third question is in the negative: A
document containing scurrilous matter cannot be stricken from the files
under the authority of Rule 11.
At first blush, this hair-splitting over the proper scope of Rule 11 may
seem to be much ado about nothing. Does it really make a difference if a
document containing scurrilous matter is stricken from the file under
the provisions of Rule 11 as opposed to the provisions of Rule 12(F)? In a
word, yes! Rule 12(F) is remedial in nature; the offender is normally
given leave to amend,"4 and the action proceeds on the basis of the
114 See, e.g., Theriault v. Silbert, 574 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1978), where the court
explained that:
We have examined the notice of appeal and agree that it contains
disrespectful and impertinent references to the trial judge. See Rule
12(f), F.R.Civ.P. Such documents are beneath the dignity of this court.
Nothing in our liberal pro se practice dictates that this court receive
abusive documents. The appellee's motion to strike the notice of appeal
and dismiss the appeal are therefore GRANTED. Appellant has ten days
from the issuance of this Order to file a proper notice of appeal. If he
does so, his appeal and motion to appoint counsel will be reinstated.
Md Actually, if Rule 12(F) is properly employed, leave to amend is unnecessary.
If one compares the provisions of OHIO R. CIV. P. 12(E) with 12(F), one finds the
amendment procedure outlined in Rule 12(E) wholly absent from 12(F). The
reason for this is quite simple: Rule 12(F) is designed to strike offensive material
from the pleading. Thus, when the court journalizes its order granting the 12(F)
motion to strike, the offensive material is either deemed to be stricken from the
document through the operation of the order, or it may be physically obliterated.
In either event, the original document itself remains, and the action proceeds on
the basis of that document less the material ordered stricken. No amended docu-
ment need be served, and therefore there is no express provision made for the
service of an amended document.
Technically, obliteration is a form of amendment. For example, certain local
rules of court provide that: "Pleadings and motions may be amended as provided
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amended document. On the other hand, Rule 11 is punitive in nature. As
the Rule puts it: "[The document] may be stricken as sham and false and
the action may proceed as though the [document] . . . had not been
served.""11 Thus, as a punitive measure, the court may prohibit the ser-
vice and filing of a substitute for the stricken document. If the court
does so prohibit the filing of a substitute, the consequence to the offen-
ding party may be fatal. If the stricken document contained a statement
of claim, its absence from the file may result either in a failure to com-
mence the action within the meaning of Ohio Civil Rule 3(A),' or in the
dismissal of the action (or the particular claim stated in the stricken
document) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 7
Alternatively, if the stricken document contained a statement of
defense, its absence from the file would result in a failure to plead and,
under the terms of Ohio Civil Rules 8(D)"' and 55(A),'19 this would result
in a default judgment against the offending party. Thus, the choice of
Rule may be determinative of the action itself.
That brings us to the fourth and last question: Given the presence of
scurrilous matter in a document, what is the proper function of Rules 11
and 12(F) in the elimination of that scurrilous matter? To some extent,
the answer depends upon whether one chooses to follow the federal
decisions cited above, or whether one elects the pre-rule Ohio tradition
coupled with a strict reading of the two rules.
As we have seen above, the federal decisions do not limit themselves
to a literal interpretation of the two Rules, but have found within their
in Civil Rule 15, but no pleading or motion shall be amended by interlineation or
obliteration except upon leave of court first obtained .... CUYAHOGA COUNTY CT.
C.P.R. 8(F) and STARK COUTY CT. C.P.R. 9.04. However, it is a form of amendment
which does not require the service of a new document; the offending part of the
original document is simply blacked out, and the balance of the original document
then stands as written. But if the court prefers, it may grant the motion to strike
from the original document, and then require the service and filing of a new docu-
ment which does not contain the stricken material. This is a somewhat tidier pro-
cess of striking out offensive material, and if it is employed, the amendment pro-
cedure of Rule 12(E) may be applied by analogy.
... OHIO R. Civ. P. 11.
11 If, for example, a complaint is stricken without leave to substitute an
amended complaint, and the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant at the time the complaint is stricken, there is no complaint
before the court, and the first requisite of commencement-the filing of a com-
plaint-has not been met. As a consequence, the action must fail for want of com-
mencement.
17 If a complaint is stricken after the action had been commenced, and no
substitute permitted, there would be no statement of claim before the court, and
the court would have little choice but to dismiss the action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Quite obviously, no relief can be
granted in the total absence of a statement of claim.
118 OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(D).
119 OHIO R. Civ. P. 55(A).
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spirit the authority to strike an entire document from the files if it con-
tains scurrilous matter. If this incorrect interpretation is followed, there
must still be some reason for choosing one rule over the other. The
motive of the document's author provides a sound basis for choice. If the
scurrilous matter is inserted through an excess of zeal, or because the
author is caught up in a fit of righteous indignation, the motive is
relatively benign, and the document may be striken under the provi-
sions of Rule 12(F), with leave to serve and file an amended document
which is devoid of scurrility. But if the scurrilous matter is inserted
with the intent of arousing the passion or prejudice of the reader, the
motion is malignant, and the document may be stricken under the provi-
sions of Rule 11, without leave to serve and file an amended document.
The difficulty with this latter choice, however, is that the motivation in
question is generally that of the attorney rather than the client. Thus, if
the document is stricken under the provisions of Rule 11 without leave
to amend, an innocent client may be punished for the attorney's
misfeasance, and this is a result which at least one federal court has
eschewed."0 Be that as it may, when the federal interpretation of the
two rules is followed, Rule 12(F) should be chosen when the court's ob-
jective is purely remedial, and Rule 11 when the court intends punitive
action because of the improper motive behind the insertion of the scur-
rilous matter.
On the other hand, the pre-rule Ohio tradition combined with a literal
reading of the two Rules produces a procedure which does not punish an
innocent client but can punish the attorney who strays beyond the pale.
The first step in the procedure is the striking of the scurrilous material
from the document under the provisions of Rule 12(F). Depending upon
the nature and extent of scurrility, this can be accomplished in one of
three ways: (1) Since the court's order to strike from the document is
self-executing, the court and the parties may simply deem the offensive
material to have been excised and may proceed as if it were not in the
document. This method is the most convenient when the scurrilous
material is not particularly atrocious. (2) After the order to strike from
the document has been journalized, the court or the offending attorney
can physically obliterate the scurrilous material. This may be done in a
number of ways, including cutting the matter out of the document, or
blacking it out so that it cannot be read. This method can be used when
the scurrilous material is so offensive that it should be physically
removed from sight. The drawback, however, is that it destroys the
record, and should not be used if any party contemplates a later appeal
from the court's order to strike.'2' (3) As part of its order to strike from
11 See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 603 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979),
as quoted in note 4 supra.
"' This is technically an amendment to the document, but it has the advantage
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the document, the court may order the offending attorney to serve and
file a substitute document which does not contain the scurrilous
material. This method is particularly useful when the scurrilous matter
is so reprehensible that it should be removed from public view. Contem-
poraneously with the entry of the court's order to strike the document,
the original document may be removed from the files and sealed, or it
may be removed from the files and physically destroyed,'22 as the court
may direct. But if any party indicates a possible appeal from the court's
grant of the motion to strike the scurrilous material from the document,
the removal and physical destruction option should not be employed
since it would also destroy the record basis for the appeal.'23
of not delaying the action pending the service and filing of a new document. See
note 114 supra and accompanying text.
" It is a well-settled general rule that an amended version of a document com-
pletely supersedes and replaces the original version of that document, and the
original is deemed abandoned. As it is said in Bullen v. DeBretteville, 239 F.2d
824 (9th Cir. 1956): "It is hornbook law that an amended pleading supersedes the
original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent." Id. at 833. The Ohio
authorities to the same effect are collected in 43 0. JuR. 2d Pleading § 366 (1973).
If, after amendment, the original document is deemed non-existent, it may be
physically removed from the files of the court. But certain local rules of court pro-
vide that "upon the filing of an amended pleading or motion the original or any
prior amendment thereof shall not be withdrawn from the files except upon leave
of the court." CUYAHOGA COUNTY CT. C.P.R. 8(E); STARK COUNTY CT. C.P.R. 9.04.
1" In paragraph one of the syllabus of Fout v. Secrets, 114 Ohio App. 107, 180
N.E.2d 628 (2d Dist. 1960), it is said: "Where a plaintiff elects to file an amended
petition, he thereby abandons the original petition and waives any right to appeal
from rulings sustaining motions to strike allegations there from." Id. at 107, 180
N.E.2d at 629. If this is still sound law, it must necessarily affect the timing of the
removal and destruction of the original document. In effect, Fout tells us that the
party against whom a motion to strike has been entered must either stand on his
original document, or amend. If he stands on the original, an appeal may be taken
when a final judgment is entered, but if he amends, the amendment waives any
error the court may have made in granting the motion to strike, and the appeal is
effectively lost. Accordingly, when granting a motion to strike from the docu-
ment with leave to serve and file an amended document, the court should not
order the physical removal and destruction of the original until after the offend-
ing party has made an election to stand or amend, or until after reasonable time
for making such an election has passed. If the offending party elects to amend,
then under the Fout rule, the right to appeal is lost with the service and filing of
the amended document, and after those events have occured, the court may safely
order the destruction of the original document.
But the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision in Balson v. Dodds, 62 Ohio St.
2d 287, 405 N.E.2d 293 (1980), casts some doubt on the present validity of the
Fout rule. In Balson, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. After that motion
was denied, the case proceeded to trial, and plaintiff ultimately appealed from an
adverse judgment following trial. On appeal, she alleged error in the overruling
of the motion for summary judgment, but the court of appeals refused to review
that decision. In effect, the court of appeals held that she had waived any error in
the denial of the motion for summary judgment by not standing on that motion,
and by proceeding to trial. See Advocate's Research, Ohio Courts of Appeals Opi-
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One might well ask whether there is any real difference between
striking the entire document from the file (something which the court
cannot do under the provisions of Rule 12(F)) and this third method of
striking material from the document. There is, and the difference lies in
the text of the replacement document. Technically, under this third
method of striking from the document the offensive material is removed
from the document, and the original document remains in the files. But
the extensive deletions required make it impracticable to leave the
original document in the files. Therefore, the courts permit a replace-
ment document, and by the use of a legal fiction, treat this document as
if it were the original. To carry this off, however, the text of the replace-
ment document must be limited to an exact reproduction of the original,
less the offensive material which the court has ordered stricken. Thus,
from a textual point of view, the text of the replacement document can-
nion Summaries, 52 OHIO BAR 1978 (1979), where this portion of the appellate
court's decision is abstracted: "The syllabus of the court is as follows: 1. Alleged
error in the overruling of a motion for summary judgment is waived by the mo-
vant by proceeding to trial and is not reviewable on an appeal from a final judg-
ment rendered against the movant pursuant to such trial ... ' " Id at 1988.
But the Ohio Supreme Court did not agree. In pertinent part, it said:
The trial court's denying appellant's motion for summary judgment is
not a final appealable order. ... Immediate review of this order was im-
possible, therefore, unless appellant elected to forego trial on the merits
by standing on her motion, and by permitting the trial court to enter
final judgment in the form of an involuntary dismissal for failure to pro-
secute. Civ. R. 41(B).
If we were to sustain the Court of Appeals' ruling that the above
order is non-reviewable on appeal from a subsequent adverse final judg-
ment, appellant would be required to choose either trial on the merits
without preserving for appellate review the trial court's alleged error on
summary judgment, or immediate appellate review of the trial court's
alleged error on summary judgment without preserving her right to
trial on the merits. Thus, the conjunction of the above rules would un-
fairly present appellant with a Hobson's choice. Moreover, such a
scheme would inhibit effective and consistent appellate court scrutiny of
trial court compliance with pre-trial procedure. To avoid such dif-
ficulties, appellant should be permitted to try her case on the merits and
still preserve for appellate review the trial court's alleged error on sum-
mary judgment. Thus, we hold that a trial court's denial of a motion for
summary judgment is reviewable on appeal by the movant from a subse-
quent adverse final judgment.
62 Ohio St. 2d at 289, 405 N.E.2d at 295 (emphasis added).
Obviously a motion to strike from a document is not the same as a motion for
summary judgment, but neither are they that different. A motion to strike an in-
sufficient claim or defense from a pleading, for example, is, in substance, an un-
supported motion for partial summary adjudication with respect to that claim or
defense. Thus, what the Supreme Court says here of the motion for summary
judgment may be translated into a principle that applies to all "pre-trial pro-
cedure." That being so, the Fout rule must give way, and a court granting a mo-
tion to strike should not order the destruction of the original document unless all
parties clearly indicate that no appeal will be taken from the order to strike.
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not vary from the text of the original except with respect to the
stricken material. On the other hand, when the court exercises its in-
herent power to strike a document from the files with leave to
substitute a new document, the text of the new document is limited only
by the scope of the court's order striking the original, or by the provi-
sions of such Civil Rules as Rule 15(C).124 If the court's order does not
specify the content of the replacement document, and if there are no
statutes of limitations or other problems of like nature, the text of the
replacement document can differ radically from the text of the original
which the court ordered stricken from the files.
The second step in the procedure under discussion is the imposition of
sanctions on the attorney. The authority for this procedure is found in
sentences [2) and [3] of Rule 11. When properly integrated, they read:
"Appropriate [disciplinary] action may be taken against an attorney if
scandalous or indecent matter is inserted [in a document subject to the
signature requirement of Rule 11]." '125 While it is sometimes said that the
attorney who inserts scurrilous matter in a document should be
disciplined,' the language of the Rule'27 makes it clear that the imposi-
tion of disciplinary sanctions is discretionary with the court. The exer-
cise of that discretion, however, is not dependent upon a finding that
the scurrilous material was inserted intentionally, or with an evil
motive; as far as the language of the Rule is concerned, the mere
presence of scurrilous material in a document is the occasion for
disciplinary action; the motive underlying its insertion is immaterial.'28
124 OHIo R. Civ. P. 15(C) discusses those situations in which an amendment may
relate back to the date of the original in order to avoid the bar of the statute of
limitations.
12 See notes 87-98 supra and accompanying text.
.. See, e.g., Lowenschuss v. C.G. Bluhdorn, 78 F.R.D. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
which quotes Professor Moore to the following effect:
Lowenschuss and Levin contend that the affidavits of Messrs. Dennis
Jacobs and Barry Ostrager, which accompanied the motion to disqualify
them, contain false and slanderous statements. They further claim that
the motion was brought for improper purposes. They therefore move
pursuant to FED.R.CIv.P. 11 to strike the motion to disqualify them and
request the imposition of disciplinary sanctions upon Ostrager and
Jacobs.
"A reputable attorney cannot file sham or frivolous pleadings and mo-
tions, or insert scandalous or indecent matter. An attorney who does
resort to such tactics should be disciplined; and the pleading or motion
which violates the spirit of this rule [11] should be stricken." 2A Moore's
Federal Practice 11.02 at 11-6-7 (2d ed. 1975).
Id at 678-79.
12 OHIO R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part that "action may be
taken .... " Id (emphasis added).
12 Id Rule 11 provides in pertinent part that "action may be taken if scan-
dalous or indecent matter is inserted."
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Motive, of course, may be considered both with respect to whether
disciplinary action will be taken, and if so, the severity of that action. In
any event, if disciplinary action is to be taken, it is to be taken against
the attorney personally, and not the client.1 29 Thus, the proper use of
Rules 11 and 12(F) in tandem will result in the removal of the scurrilous
material with a minimum of fuss; the punishment of the offending
lawyer (when the court deems punishment in order); and the protection
of the rights of the innocent client.
Before we took up the question of scurrilous matter, our inquiry into
motive was limited to the motive of the client. Scurrility, however, brings
into play the motive of the attorney, since scurrilous matter cannot be
inserted in a document without the attorney's consent, connivance or
cooperation. Accordingly, the motivation of the client is not the only
relevant motivational consideration; the attorney making a Rule 11 in-
vestigation must not only inquire into the motivation of the client, but
must also subject himself to a continuing examination of conscience.
Even when the client's motivation is of the purest, the attorney may not
take any action which is motivated by the attorney's desire to harass or
injure opposing attorneys or adverse parties.'30
(2) Evaluation-As to Theory
A client has the right to seek any lawful objective through legally
permissible means, and to present for adjudication any lawful claim,
issue or defense. 3' But the emphasis is on "lawful;" an attorney may only
129 From what has been said above, it is clear that the "similar action"
authorized by sentence 13] of Rule 11 refers to the phrase "an attorney may be
subjected to appropriate [disciplinary] action," which appears in sentence [2]. See
notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 603 F.2d 100, 103 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979), in which the court points out that
sanctions are to be imposed on the attorney, and not on the client.
"0 For example, EC 7-10 provides that: "The duty of a lawyer to represent his
client with zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with
consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction
of needless harm." ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10.
Also, EC 7-37 states: "In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though
ill feeling may exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer
in his conduct, attitude, and demeanor towards opposing lawyers." Id. at EC 7-37.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, states it this way: "A lawyer shall be fair to
other parties and their counsel, accord them their procedural rights, and fulfill
obligations under the procedural law and established practices of the tribunal."
Id. at rule 3.2(a). And in addition: "(a) In preparing and presenting a cause, a
lawyer shall respect the interests of third persons, including witnesses, jurors,
and persons incidentally concerned with the proceeding. (b) A lawyer shall not:
... (2) use a procedure having no substantial purpose other than to embarass,
delay, or burden a third person." Id. at rule 3.4. See also Annot., 87 A.L.R. 3d 351
(1978), which discusses an attorney's verbal abuse of another attorney as the
basis for disciplinary action.
"'. As it is said in ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1:
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represent a client within the bounds of the law."' Thus, an attorney may
not accept employment if it is obvious, or may withdraw from employ-
ment if it becomes obvious, that the client wishes to present, or insists
upon presenting, a claim or defense which is not warranted under ex-
isting law.'33 Likewise, an attorney may not knowingly advance a claim
"In our government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is en-
titled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law; to
seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to present for
adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense." Id. A somewhat similar senti-
ment is found in the comment to rule 1.3 of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, DISCUSSION DRAFT:
The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be
served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the
lawyer's professional obligations. Within those same limits, a client also
has a right to consult on the means to be used in pursuing those objec-
tives. At the same time, a lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or
employ means simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do so.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at comment to rule 1.3.
132 Again, ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 speaks
to the point: "The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is
to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes
Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations." Id. Compare rule
1.3(b) of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, DISCUSSION DRAFT,
which states: "A lawyer shall not pursue a course of action on behalf of a client in
violation of law or the rules of professional conduct." DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra
note 38, at rule 1.3(b).
"I Thus, ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109 pro-
vides:
(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if he
knows or it is obvious that such person wishes to:...
(2) Present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted
under existing law, unless it can be supported by good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
Id And ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 states:
(C) Permissive withdrawal.
If DR 2-110(B) [mandatory withdrawal from employment] is not ap-
plicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in matters
pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters,
unless such request or such withdrawal is because: (1) His client: (a) In-
sists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under
existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument for an ex-
tension, modification, or reversal of existing law. (b) Personally seeks to
pursue an illegal course of conduct. (c) Insists that the lawyer pursue a
course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under the
Disciplinary Rules.
Id. Rule 1.16 of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. DISCUSSION
DRAFT, puts it this way:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall withdraw from
representing a client if: (1) continuing the representation will result in a
course of conduct by the lawyer that is illegal or inconsistent with the
rules of professional conduct; .... (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if:... (2) the client per-
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or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. ' It follows,
therefore, that the attorney may not sign a document unless he believes
that its contents are in compliance with applicable law and rules."5 In
other words, an attorney may not sign, serve or file a document that is
frivolous in nature.
136
sists in a course of conduct that is illegal or unjust.... (c) A lawyer shall
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the
representation when ordered to do so by a tribunal.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at rule 1.16.
'1 This is, in part, the burden of ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY DR 7-102, which states:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: ... (2) Knowingly
advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law,
except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported
by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law .... (8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct
contrary to a Disciplinary Rule.
Id. The ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, DISCUSSION DRAFT
counterpart to this Disciplinary Rule is found in rule 1.3(b), note 132 supra and ac-
companying text, and in rule 3.1, which reads in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not: (1) file a complaint, motion, or pleading other than
one that puts the prosecution to its proof in a criminal case, unless
according to the lawyer's belief there is good ground to support it; ... (4)
make a representation about existing legal authority that the lawyer
knows to be inaccurate or so incomplete as to be substantially
misleading.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at rule 3.1.
135 See, e.g., ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-25,
where it is said:
Rules of evidence and procedure are designed to lead to just decisions
and are part of the framework of the law. Thus while a lawyer may take
steps in good faith and within the framework of the law to test the
validity of rules, he is not justified in consciously violating such rules
and he should be diligent in his efforts to guard against his unintentional
violation of them. As examples, a lawyer should subscribe to or verify
only those pleadings that he believes are in compliance with applicable
law and rules....
136 Thus ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 tells us:
The advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law
favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to
the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail. His conduct
is within the bounds of the law, and therefore permissible, if the position
taken is supported by the law or is supportable by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of the law. However, a lawyer
is not justified in asserting a position in litigation that is frivolous.
The comment to rule 3.3 of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT, DISCUSSION DRAFT, states that:
A claim or defense having little or no authority in existing precedent
may have great potential for inviting a change in the law. A factually im-
plausible claim or defense may nevertheless be sustainable. It is not im-
proper to assert a claim or defense that can be supported by good faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Ac-
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At the common law, a pleading was deemed "frivolous" if, from the
face of the pleading, it was obviously false in fact. 137 In the Ohio system,
however, a "frivolous" pleading is one that is insufficient as a matter of
law; a pleading that is false in fact is a "sham" pleading.M Thus, if the
position taken in a document is not within the bounds of the well-settled
law, or if it is not within those bounds and cannot be supported by a
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of the ex-
isting law, both the position and the document advocating it are
frivolous.
139
count has to be taken of the potential for the law's development, the ex-
igencies of proof, and other variables that go into the assessment of a
cause. Nevertheless, there is a limit beyond which legal inventiveness
becomes frivolity, and the propriety of a lawyer's conduct in supporting
a cause cannot depend simply on personal good faith. The essential ques-
tion is whether reasonably competent counsel could conclude in good
faith that the claim or defense in question has substantial basis. The
same principle applies to issues within a case.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at comment to rule 3.3.
137 See Risinger, supra note 2, at 18, where he notes: "Frivolous, on the other
hand, meant obviously false upon the face of a pleading, as when something was
pleaded that conflicted with a judicially noticeable fact or was logically impos-
sible, such as a plea of judgment recovered before the accrual of the cause of ac-
tion." Id.
13 Thus, in White v. Calhoun, 83 Ohio St. 401, 403, 94 N.E. 743, 744 (1911), the
Ohio Supreme Court noted: "A frivolous answer is one that contains no valid
defense, one which is insufficient on its face. A sham answer is one good in form,
but false in fact and not pleaded in good faith." Id. Risinger explains that "[diur-
ing the 19th century, both in England and America, the term sham meant good in
form but false in fact and dishonestly pleaded for some unworthy purpose." Ris-
inger, supra note 2, at 17-18.
139 This is the essential thrust of the comment to rule 3.1 of the ABA MODEL
RULES OF DISCIPLINARY CONDUCT, DISCUSSION DRAFT:
An argument is frivolous if a disinterested legal analyst could say it
lacks any basis in existing authority and could not be supported by good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
authority. Even an advocate for a criminal defendant, who is obliged to
state the best possible argument for the client, is not required to submit
a frivolous argument.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at comment to rule 3.1. See also Delgado v. de
Jesus, 440 F. Supp. 979 (D.P.R. 1976), where the court dismissed a complaint as
being frivolous with the following comment:
The federal claim for sanctions arises under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Lawyers have a responsibility before subscrib-
ing their names to complaints, to ascertain that a reasonable basis exists
for the allegations for jurisdiction and for relief requested. This suit is
frivolous and there was not the slightest basis for its assertion. Miller v.
Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
ORDERED, that defendant be, and hereby is, awarded attorney's fees
in the amount of $300.00 to be paid by plaintiff.
Id at 982. It is important to note that the court did not find the complaint to be
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The Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules, however, em-
phasize the attorney's state of mind; they speak of what the attorney
"knows," or does "knowingly," what is "obvious," or what he "believes."
But these words are swords, not shields; the attorney may not close his
eyes to that which may be discovered by diligent research, study and
reflection. 40 Within the narrow context of the immediate discussion,
before signing any document, the attorney must undertake research suf-
ficient to satisfy himself that the position taken in the document is war-
ranted by existing law, and in accord with all applicable rules of
evidence and procedure, Disciplinary Rules and other enforceable pro-
fessional regulations.' But the satisfaction produced by this research
must be a good faith satisfaction:' satisfaction beyond a professional
doubt,' and not simply a conscience-soothing gloss. The attorney's
false in fact; rather, it found that there was no legal basis for bringing the com-
plaint. Accordingly, it found that a complaint is frivolous when no reasonable
legal basis exists for filing it, and that the filing of such a complaint is punishable
under the provisions of Rule 11.
'" The court declared in Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), that:
In the language of the rule, "The signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him ... that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief there is good ground to support [the pleading] .. " An affirmative
obligation is thus cast upon the attorney signatory to a pleading that to
be satisfied, in good faith, that there is good ground to support the claim
asserted therein. See Rosen v. Texas Company, 161 F. Supp. 55, 57
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Id. at 397.
'.' See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 and rule 1.3(b) of
the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, DISCUSSION DRAFT, quoted in
note 132 supra; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-25, quoted in
note 135 supra and accompanying text; and Delgado v. de Jesus, 440 F. Supp. 979
(D.P.R. 1976).
'42 See Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), as quoted in note 140
supra.
M Thus, in Crimmins v. American Stock Exchange, 368 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), it was said:
We consider it the responsibility of an attorney to bring suits of this
nature in the spirit of Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, only if
he is convinced beyond professional doubt that his client has been denied
the relevant elements of fairness embodied in the noble concept of due
process.
Id. at 281.
Also, the comment to rule 3.3 of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, DISCUSSION DRAFT, states that:
A claim or defense having little or no authority in existing precedent
may have great potential for inviting a change in the law. A factually im-
plausible claim or defense may nevertheless be sustainable. It is not im-
proper to assert a claim or defense that can be supported by good faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Ac-
count has to be taken of the potential for the law's development, the ex-
igencies of proof, and other variables that go into the assessment of a
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signature constitutes an affidavit that he has acted with professional in-
tegrity in looking into the legal merits of the matter presented in the
document."'
cause. Nevertheless, there is a limit beyond which legal inventiveness
becomes frivolity, and the propriety of a lawyer's conduct in supporting
a cause cannot depend simply on personal good faith. The essential ques-
tion is whether reasonably competent counsel could conclude in good
faith that the claim or defense in question has a substantial basis. The
same principle applies to issues within a case.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, comment to rule 3.3. See also note 139 supra
and accompanying text.
1" That the attorney's signature is an affidavit of merit, see Russo v. Sofia
Bros., 2 F.R.D. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), where it is said:
As to the defendant's plea that the plaintiff show a meritorious case
as a condition to permitting the amendment, I think that the proposed
pleading, as verified, is sufficient. When filed, the signature of plaintiff's
attorney thereon, pursuant to Rule 11, F.R.C.P., will be the equivalent of
an affidavit of merit.
Id. at 82.
The same conclusion may be garnered from Judge Charles E. Clark's remarks
on Rule 11 made at the various Institutes on the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. At the Institute held in Washington D.C. in 1938, he said:
Rule 11 deals with signing of pleadings. Here we follow the equity rule
that the signature of the lawyer, carrying with it certain respon-
sibilities, is much more important and worth while than an oath or
verification attached to the complaint. It is really an easy way of
evading responsibility to draw a formal sounding document with long
legal allegations and then get your client, who, thank God, can't under-
stand them, to swear that they are all true. Then everybody has fulfilled
his or her obligation. But after all, it doesn't amount to anything. In
general the oath has been more defiled than honored by applying it to a
situation of that kind. So here, instead of taking this course, we say that
a lawyer is held to these certain obligations when he signs a pleading:
"The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not inter-
posed for delay." Then certain penalties are stated, including
disciplinary action against the attorney for violation of the rule.
ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE AT WASHINGTON, D.C., 1938, at 52 (1939). And again, at the 1938 Institute
held in Cleveland, Ohio, he said:
Rule 11 deals with the Signing of Pleadings. There, if you read down
through it, you will see that, in general, verification, or taking of oath, is
not required, but, on the other hand, the signing by the attorney is a cer-
tificate of substantially the same effect, perhaps a little stronger than
any mere formal oath would be.
We attempted, in Rule 11, to add certain penalties for signing im-
properly, and whether they are effective or not remains to be seen, but
the idea was that the signature of an attorney alone ought to carry with
it a certificate that he had read the pleading and to the best of his
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Where the bounds of the law are made certain by well-settled rules
and precedents, such satisfaction readily occurs, but where those
bounds are uncertain because of a lack of precedent, or because of
conflicting authority,'45 the outcome is otherwise. In this latter situation
the attorney must take the facts as he finds them, and should resolve
doubts as to the bounds of the law in favor of the client.'46 The attorney
may urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to the client
without regard to the attorney's professional opinion as to the likelihood
that the construction will ultimately prevail, provided that the position
taken is supportable by a good faith argument for an extension or
modification of the well-settled law.'
47
Does this mean that an attorney may not sign a document which takes
a position that is contrary to the well-settled law? As a general rule, the
answer is in the affirmative."18 But there are exceptions. The attorney
knowledge there was good ground to support it, and it was not inter-
posed for delay.
ABA PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AT CLEVELAND, OHIO, 1938, at 236-37 (1938).
"I The ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY clearly recognizes
this difficulty. As it is said in Canon 7:
The bounds of the law in a given case are often difficult to ascertain. The
language of legislative enactments and judicial opinions may be uncer-
tain as applied to varying factual situations. The limits and specific
meaning of apparently relevant law may be made doubtful by changing
or developing constitutional interpretations, inadequately expressed
statutes or judicial opinions, and changing public and judicial attitudes.
Certainty of law ranges from well-settled rules through areas of conflict-
ing authority to areas without precedent.
ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-2.
16 This is the burden of ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-3, where it is said:
Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer may de-
pend on whether he is serving as advocate or adviser.... In asserting a
position on behalf of his client, an advocate for the most part deals with
past conduct and must take the facts as he finds them.... While serving
as advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to
the bounds of the law.
,47 See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4, quoted in
note 136 supra and accompanying text. Rule 3.3(b) of the ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, DISCUSSION DRAFT, puts it this way: "Except as stated
in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or con-
trovert an issue therein, only when a lawyer acting in good faith would conclude
that there is a reasonable basis for doing so." DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38,
at rule 3.3(b). As to the "good faith" required, see that portion of the comment to
rule 3.3 of the DISCUSSION DRAFT, quoted in note 139 supra and note 149 infra and
accompanying text.
"I6 See notes 132 and 134 supra and note 149 infra and accompanying text.
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may sign a document if the position taken is supportable by good faith
argument for an extention, modification or reversal of the existing
law.'49 The Ohio "guest statute"'5 ° furnishes an apt example. Suppose
that prior to Primes v. Tyler' an attorney represented a client who
was injured while clearly a guest in another's automobile, and there was
absolutely no evidence to support a charge of wilful or wanton miscon-
duct against the driver. Under such circumstances, the well-settled law
of Ohio barred any action against the driver. But at the same time the
constitutionality of such guest statutes was challenged nationwide, and
the supreme courts of a number of states were sustaining such
challenges. Given that climate, the attorney for the guest could make a
good faith argument that the Ohio guest statute was also unconstitu-
tional, and could ethically sign a complaint in an action against the
driver if there is evidence that the guest's injury had been caused by
"' In addition to ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4,
see ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109, which states
in pertinent part:
(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if he
knows or it is obvious that such person wishes to: ... (2) Present a claim
or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless
it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law.
Id. And ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110, which
gives the second step:
(C) Permissive withdrawal. If DR 2-110(B) [covering the mandatory
withdrawal from employment] is not applicable, a lawyer may not re-
quest permission to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and
may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such
withdrawal is because: (1) His client: (a) Insists upon presenting a claim
or defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be sup-
ported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law.
Id. Finally, note ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102,
where it is said:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: ... (2) Knowingly
advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, ex-
cept that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law.
Id.
15o See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Page 1973), which reads as follows:
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor
vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or
death of a guest, resulting from the operation of said motor vehicle,
while such guest is being transported without payment therefor in or
upon said motor vehicle, unless such injuries or death are caused by the
willful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner, or person respon-
sible for the operation of said motor vehicle.
' ' 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
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the driver's negligence. It would not be ethical, however, for the at-
torney to sign such a complaint if it alleged that the client was a paying
passenger, or that the driver was guilty of wilful or wanton misconduct,
since the example stipulated that there was no factual basis for such
allegations. Neither would it be ethical for an attorney to attempt a
change in the law by concealing pertinent facts which, if known, would
bring the proceeding within a well-settled doctrine that is adverse to
the attorney's position." 2 Although a complaint containing
misstatements of fact, or omissions of essential operative fact, might not
be "frivolous," it would be a "sham," and as such, it would fall under the
ban of Rule 11."53 Consequently, an attorney seeking to change the well-
settled law must not only have a good faith belief that there is a
reasonable basis for his position, but must also act in good faith by
being candid with the court."4 With respect to the legal theory upon
152 See, e.g., Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Fell, 51 Ohio St. 2d 33, 364 N.E.2d 872 (1977),
in which the Ohio Supreme Court noted:
The [Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the
Supreme Court of Ohio] found that Fell (a specialist in the field of
Workmen's Compensation law), having understood that it had been the
long established practice of the Industrial Commission to deny any claim
for permanent-total disability benefits upon notice of the death of the
claimant, deliberately withheld information concerning his client's death
prior to the hearing on the motion concerning the claim. The board con-
cluded that Fell's primary motive in withholding such information was
to gain for himself a fee to which he was not entitled, but yet received.
Id. at 34, 364 N.E.2d at 873. After concurring in the Board's findings of fact and
conclusion the court found that, among other disciplinary rules, Fell had violated
ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3), which reads:
"(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: ... (3) Conceal or know-
ingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal." Id.
But see Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975), in which the
plaintiff put the need to change the law squarely before the court by pleading a
case that was beyond the pale of the well-settled law. As the Ohio Supreme Court
noted:
Upon this record, we agree with the determination of the Court of
Appeals that plaintiff was a guest transported without payment, and not
a "passenger." Plaintiff's allegation of negligence, rather than willful
and wanton misconduct, on the part of the defendant, squarely places
defendant within the class of persons which the guest statute absolves of
liability. Plaintiff may not recover for his injuries unless that statute
contravenes the organic law of this state or nation .... Therefore, the
question presented is whether the guest statute contravenes the con-
stitutions of Ohio or the United States.
Id. at 196, 331 N.E.2d at 725.
153 As it is noted in ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
7-25: "[A] lawyer should subscribe to or verify only those pleadings that he
believes are in compliance with applicable law and rules; .... Id.
154 See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3),
quoted in note 152 supra, as well as the authorites cited in note 155 infra and ac-
companying text.
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which an action or proceeding is premised, this duty of candor is three-
fold: (1) the attorney may not knowingly misrepresent the applicable
law; (2) under some circumstances the attorney may have to disclose ap-
plicable law that is contrary to the position which he advocates; and (3)
the attorney may not make a frivolous legal argument.'55 The attorney's
"I The candor which Rule 11 and the Code of Professional Responsibility re-
quires is candor with respect to both the law and the facts. Candor with respect
to the law is mandated by ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-23, which states:
The complexity of law often makes it difficult for a tribunal to be fully
informed unless the pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the
cause. A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better
able to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before it.
The adversary system contemplates that each lawyer will present and
argue the existing law in the light most favorable to his client. Where a
lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly
adverse to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal of its
existence unless his adversary has done so; but, having made such
disclosure, he may challenge its soundness in whole or in part.
Id. Rule 3.1 of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, DISCUSSION
DRAFT, says much the same thing, but in a slightly different way:
A lawyer shall be candid toward a tribunal .... (c) If a lawyer discovers
that the tribunal has not been apprised of legal authority known to the
lawyer that would probably have a substantial effect on the determina-
tion of a material issue, the lawyer shall advise the tribunal of that
authority.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at rule 3.1. And in the comment supporting
this rule, we find:
Legal argument based on misrepresentation of law constitutes
dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a
disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize that the ex-
istence of pertinent legal authorities is as much a matter of fact as the
existence of evidentiary documents. An assertion about the state of law
that an advocate knows to be false is a misrepresentation of fact.
With regard to matters of law, it has long been recognized that an ad-
vocate has a duty to disclose to the tribunal important authority of
which the advocate is aware but which has not been disclosed by an op-
posing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discus-
sion among the advocates and the tribunal, seeking to determine the
legal premises properly applicable to the case. The extent of disclosure
is at times a matter of judgment. An advocate is not required to present
the full array of opposing authority. Where the lawyer knows of authori-
ty that the court clearly ought to consider, the court should be advised
of its existence if the opposing party has not done so.
A legal argument may be so baseless as to amount to a misleading
argument. An argument is frivolous if a disinterested legal analyst could
say it lacks any basis in existing authority and could not be supported by
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting authority.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38 at comment to rule 3.1. Accordingly, the duty of
candor not only prohibits the misrepresentation of the existing law, and the mak-
ing of frivolous legal arguments, but also mandates the disclosure of applicable
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signature under the provisions of Rule 11 is, in effect, his affidavit that
the document upon which that signature appears complies with all three
branches of this duty of candor.
But what of the case when the attorney for the claimant knows that
the defender has a valid defense to the claim which, if asserted, will bar
recovery on the claim? May the attorney sign the document asserting
such a claim? Risinger takes the position that the attorney may "rely
upon the rules regarding the burden of pleading," and may sign such a
pleading without violating Rule 11."' He also notes, however, that a
distinction may be drawn between defenses to a claim which are "ex-
trinsic" (such as the statute of limitations), and defenses which are "in-
trinsic" to that claim. Risinger explains that:
If such a distinction is accepted, then one could rely on the
assignment of burden of pleading in regard to "extrinsic"
defenses, but if there were sure knowledge of the existence of
fraud or other "intrinsic" defenses, there would not be good
ground for a claim, even when there was no actual untruth in
the pleading itself.'57
To date, the courts have not given this question the attention which it
deserves, and a definitive answer must await further developments.
(3) Evaluation-As to Fact
A "sham" document is one that is false in fact although good in
form.'58 An attorney may not ethically sign a document which he knows
to be a sham. But Ethical Consideration 7-3 mandates that "in asserting
a position on behalf of his client, an advocate for the most part deals
with past conduct and must take the facts as he finds them. 159
Therefore, before signing a document, an attorney must make a good
faith effort to ascertain the factual basis for the position taken in that
document."' The Staff Note to Rule 11 provides that "Itihe rule places
law, even if that law is against the position taken by the attorney. Under the pro-
visions of OHIO R. Civ. P. 11, an attorney's signature on a document is, in effect,
the attorney's affidavit that he has complied with this three-fold duty of candor
with respect to the applicable law.
' See Risinger, supra note 2, at 59.
157 Id. Of course, this rule would not apply in the Primes situation if the
attorney believed that he had a good faith argument for an extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of the existing law which would invalidate or neutralize the "in-
trinsic" defense. Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
' ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3.
'5 See White v. Calhoun, 83 Ohio St. 401, 94 N.E. 743 (1911).
'® See Miller v. Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), which states:
Lawyers have a responsibility before subscribing their names to com-
plaints which contain serious charges to ascertain that a reasonable
basis exists for the allegations, even if they are made upon information
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the burden for the truthfulness of the pleadings on the attorney- where
the responsibility belongs. In effect, his signature, he being an officer of
the court, is the verification.''. And Risinger states:
Rule 11 seeks to obtain honesty in pleadings and other papers
by requiring the signature of an attorney, and by requiring that
and belief. That is one of the purposes of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Unverified hearsay based on rumor is not sufficient
upon which to subject one to the burdens of complex litigation and
heavy legal costs -at least not in this case. The claim that was advanced
against Josephthal not only bordered on the frivolous, but there was not
the slightest basis for its assertion.
Id. at 1061-62. This passage has become the authoritative statement of the at-
torney's minimum responsibility under the provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Delgado v. de Jesus,
440 F. Supp. 979 (D.P.R. 1976). In addition, at least one state court has, in part,
relied upon this passage in supporting its disbarment of an attorney who violated
the state equivalent of FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See State v. Phelps, 226 Kan. 371, 598
P.2d 180 (1979).
As ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 puts it: "(A)
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:... (5) Knowingly make a false
statement of law or fact." Id. See also rule 3.1 of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT, DISCUSSION DRAFT, to the effect that:
A lawyer shall be candid toward a tribunal.
(a) A lawyer shall not:
(1) file a complaint, motion, or other pleading other than one that puts
the prosecution to its proof in a criminal case, unless according to the
lawyer's belief there is good ground to support it;
(2) make a knowing misrepresentation of fact; ...
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at rule 3.1. The comment to the above rule ex-
pands on the rule itself:
There are several important aspects of the duty of candor. First, a
contention in a pleading or other court document should have good
ground to support it. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11. Second, a
representation made by a lawyer should be true according to the
lawyer's own knowledge, unless the representation is indicated to be
otherwise. Thus, when a lawyer asserts that an event occurred, or did
not occur, or that a document does or does not exist, the assertion must
be based on such knowledge. ...
An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents
prepared for litigation and for statements made to the tribunal. A
lawyer is not required to have personal knowledge of the matters
asserted, for litigation documents ordinarily purport to be assertions
made by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not asser-
tions by the lawyer. However, a lawyer must refrain from making con-
tentions the lawyer knows lack a factual basis.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at comment to rule 3.1.
16' Or, as it is suggested in United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.
1975), the attorney's signature on a document is the equivalent of a formal af-
fidavit to the effect that the content of the document is factually true to the best
of the attorney's knowledge, information and belief. See also note 128 supra and
accompanying text.
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there be good ground to support the document signed. Good
ground cannot exist as to any alleged proposition known to be
false, including a denial; further, an attorney must engage in
reasonable investigation to determine the probability of any
proposition he proposes to allege in a pleading or other docu-
ment."'
Obviously, the attorney cannot sign a document which asserts a posi-
tion which the attorney knows to be false."' Thus, if a statement of
claim contains some allegations that are known to be true, the attorney
representing the defender may not sign a document which asserts a
general denial of that statement of claim, since the position taken by the
general denial is known to be a false position. ' As the Civil Rules state:
162 See Risinger, supra note 2, at 61. See also State v. Phelps, 226 Kan. 371, 598
P.2d 180 (1979).
,63 Id. See also American Automobile Ass'n v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655
(E.D.N.Y. 1952), where the court stated:
One of the obvious purposes of Rule 11 is to keep out of a case issues
that are known to be false by the attorney who signs a given pleading,
and the violation of the Rule in this case is clear and unmistakable; this
opinion should be filed separately in the office of the Clerk of this Court,
and indexed against the name of the defendant's attorney, so that, in the
event that his professional conduct in any other connection shall become
a subject of inquiry, this case and this record can be referred to for such
instruction as it may yield.
Id. at 656.
' See, e.g., Tiktin v. Brown, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 284 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct. 1980):
This matter comes on for decision on defendants' motion to reinstate
their amended answer and counterclaim. By a previous order dated
April 28, 1980, this Court denied defendants leave to serve and file their
amended answer because it was apparent from the fact [sic] of the record
that the amended answer was sham and false, and signed in violation of
Civ. R. 11, at least to the extent that it contained a general denial. ...
[A] pleader may use a general denial only when he or she believes in
good faith that all of the allegations in the preceding pleading are false,
and he or she intends to deny all of them.
It is impossible for this Court to believe that defendants' amended
answer is made in good faith when it denies that the plaintiff was a ten-
ant of theirs in property located at 2588 Mayfield Road, Cleveland
Heights, Ohio, and it is equally impossible for this Court to believe that
defendants' attorney is in compliance with the certification provisions of
Civ. R. 11 when he denies on the one hand that the address of the
premises owned by the defendants is 2588 Mayfield Road, Cleveland
Heights, Ohio, and on the other, avers that defendants own an apart-
ment building at [that same address].
A closer scrutiny of the pleadings will no doubt reveal other
averments which cannot be denied in good faith, but from what has been
said above, it is patent from the face of the record that the general
denial in defendants' tendered amended answer is sham and false, and
that the pleading was signed with the intent to defeat the purpose of
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OHIO CIVIL RULE 8(B): FEDERAL CIVIL RULE
8(b):
[If] the pleader intends in [If] the pleader intends in
good faith to controvert all good faith to controvert all
the averments of the preced- the averments of the
ing pleading, . .. including preceding pleading . .. in-
averments of the grounds cluding averments of the
upon which the court's juris- grounds upon which the
diction depends, he may do so court's jurisdiction depends,
by general denial subject to be may do so by general
the obligations set forth in denial subject to the obliga-
Rule 11. tions set forth in Rule 11.
Since statements of claim are seldom wholly false, it may be said as a
practical matter that "general denials or the equivalent are no longer
permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'' 5 Because the
Ohio Rule is identical to the Federal Rule, the same practical result ob-
tains in the Ohio system.'
Civ. R. 8(B) and 11. For these reasons the Court must overrule defen-
dants' motion to reinstate the amended answer.
Id at 285-86. Or, as Professor Risinger provides: "Good ground cannot exist as to
any alleged proposition known to be false, including a denial; ..... Risinger,
supra note 2, at 61.
1"5 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bill's Farm Center, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 114, 118-19 (W.D. Mo.
1970). But this is true only as a general rule; there may be rare cases in which a
general denial will lie. As it is noted in United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443 (D.
Neb. 1950):
It can not be said that Rule 8(b) forbids, in all circumstances, the
employment of a general denial in the making of an answer. Quite the
contrary, the rule expressly permits such a denial, but it also prescribes
the sole condition under which it may be tendered. That condition is pre-
sent when, but only when, the pleader intends in good faith to con-
trovert "all the averments of the preceding pleading."
Id at 444-45. However, in a subsequent paragraph on page 445 of the report, the
Long court also notes that when an attorney does file a general denial, his
signature on that pleading is an assurance to the court that "upon his honor as a
member of the bar of this court" his client intends to controvert every allegation
in the preceding pleading.
"' In addition to Tiktin v. Brown, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 284 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct.
1980), see OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(B), 1971 STAFF NOTE, where it is said: "[A] defendant
is seldom in a position to deny in good faith all allegations in a plaintiff's
pleading." Id.
Under pre-rule Ohio practice, the general denial was not taken literally; it was
simply a pleading fiction-like the plea of "not guilty" in a criminal ac-
tion- which had the effect of requiring the claimant to assume the full burden of
proof with respect to each allegation in the statement of claim. Under rules prac-
tice, this function of the general denial has been abolished:
In this court a defendant has no right categorically to deny an allegation
which he knows or believes to be true, solely to the end that he may
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An attorney, however, may not sign a document controverting a posi-
tion taken by another party solely on the ground that he does not know
that position to be true."' With respect to each and every allegation of
compel his adversary to bear the burden and cost of its proof. One objec-
tive of the quoted portions of [Rules 8(b) and 11] is the elimination of that
discreditable anachronism in pleading.
United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443, 445 (D. Neb. 1950). See also Risinger, supra
note 2 at 2:
[A] civil defendant has no constitutional right to put a plaintiff to his
proof. Therefore, it can quite properly be demanded of a defending par-
ty, and his attorney, that all allegations and denials be honest, even if
this means admitting liability in some cases.
Id Thus, according to Long, the general denial must now be made-and taken
-literally, on the attorney-signatory's honor as a member of the bar that he in-
tends to controvert all the averments to which the general denial is directed.
But as Tiktin indicates, the general denial dies hard, even after ten years of
practice under the Rules. A computer search of the Ohio decisions reported since
the effective date of the OHIO R. CIv. P. reveals at least fourteen cases in which a
general denial has been asserted in a responsive pleading. One may speculate
that the general denial has been used at least ten times as often in the
unreported cases. It is difficult to believe that there was a good faith intent to
controvert all of the averments of the complaint in every one of these cases. In-
deed, as Tiktin would suggest by the defendant's attempt to reinstate the amend-
ed answer after it had been rejected by the court on the ground that it contained
a general denial, the practicing bar is not conscious of any wrongdoing in the use
of the general denial; the practicing bar still adheres to the prerule practice of us-
ing it as a device to "put the plaintiff to his proof."
167 As it is said in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bill's Farm Center, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 114 (W.D.
Mo. 1970):
As shown by the answers to the complaints, the purported answers of
defendants to written interrogatories, the transcripts of pretrial con-
ferences and the transcripts of hearings, the counsel for defendants
refused to make discovery of much factual information available to
defendants and persistently took the position in respect to many items
of account that no admission of receipt of goods or of liability therefor
would be made in the absence of unilateral conclusive proof by plaintiff.
This conduct of defendants violates the rules of discovery and pleading
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed to narrow the
issues and eliminate proof of allegations of facts not controverted in
good faith. Rule 11, F.R.Civ.P. See Freeman v. Kirby (S.D. N.Y. [19611)
27 F.R.D. 395. General denials or the equivalent are no longer permitted
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11, supra; Freeman v.
Kirby, supra. Parties are under the obligation under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to discover the information available to them. See
Criterion Music Corp. v. Tucker (D. Ga. [1968]) 45 F.R.D. 534.
Id. at 118-19.
In pertinent part, Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) states:
Plaintiff urges that Rule 11 interdicts the filing of a pleading known
to be false, and no more. Such narrow construction of the rule finds no
support either in the rule itself, The Advisory Committee Note, or deci-
sional law .... An affirmative obligation is thus cast upon the attorney
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the opponent's position, the attorney must make such investigation as
to satisfy himself that it is either false, true or so clearly immaterial
that the attorney can safely fail to deny it and thus admit it to be true.'68
Likewise, an attorney may not sign a document which asserts a position
solely on the ground that he does not know that position to be false; the
attorney is under the affirmative obligation of conducting an investiga-
tion sufficient to produce a good faith satisfaction that the position
taken is true. '69 In sum, an attorney may not premise his signature on an
absence of certain knowledge or information; rather, the attorney has
an affirmative duty to seek out the knowledge or information necessary
to the formation of a good faith belief in the merits of the position
signatory to a pleading that he be satisfied, in good faith, that there is
good ground to support the claim asserted therein.
Id. at 397. See also Criterion Music Corp. v. Tucker, 45 F.R.D. 534 (S.D. Ga.
1968), which notes: "A good faith effort to ascertain the existence of the fact or
geniuneness of the document is required on a litigant's part where sources of cor-
roboration are at hand." Id. at 536. Although this latter point is made with
respect to answers to requests for admissions, Gulf Oil Corp. makes it equally ap-
plicable to pleadings, motions, and other papers. In sum, the rule is that an
attorney-signatory cannot hide behind personal ignorance if the means of cor-
roboration are at hand.
8 Rosen v. Texas Co., 161 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1958):
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure however, denials are not
perfunctory. Rule 11 requires that a pleading must be signed by counsel
and counsel's signature constitutes a certificate "that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it".
Thus an answering pleader must satisfy himself as to every allegation
that is either false, true or so clearly immaterial that he can safely fail to
deny it and thus admit it.
Id. at 58.
189 See notes 160 and 167 supra and accompanying text. See also Neveroff v.
Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980), where it is said: "Rule 11 speaks in plainly
subjective terms: the attorney's certification of a pleading is an assertion that 'to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is a good ground to sup-
port it. . . .' The standard under Rule 11, therefore is bad faith." Id. at 350. The
court further declared:
Finally, there is the exceptional power to shift [the payment of
attorney's fees] where an action has been commenced or conducted "in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons." . -
Browning Debenture Holders' [Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d
1078 (2d Cir. 1977) J clarified the requirements for a finding of bad faith
in this Circuit. We held that there must be "clear evidence" that the
claims are entirely without color and made for reasons of harassment or
delay or for other improper purposes. 560 F.2dat 1088 (emphasis added)....
A claim is colorable, for the purpose of bad faith exception, when it
has some legal and factual support, considered in light of the reasonable
beliefs of the individual making the claim. The question is whether a
reasonable attorney could have concluded that facts supporting the
claim might be established, not whether such facts actually had been
established.
Id. at 348 (emphasis in original).
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asserted in the document. Before an attorney may sign a document, he
must have probable cause to believe that the position taken in that
document is a meritorious one17
170 As to probable cause, see Burkons v. Rogoff, No. 953,503 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
Cuyahoga County, filed Dec. 16, 1976), reprinted in 48 CLEV. B.J. 167 (1977),
where it is said:
Probable cause to institute the action is certainly not equivalent to an
ability to prove the case on its merits; otherwise an action for malicious
prosecution would be available for every criminal case where the accus-
ed was ultimately found not guilty.
In civil cases, particularly civil cases with the complexity of profes-
sional liability actions, the ultimate merits of the claim may not be
understood until a lengthy discovery program has been completed, long
after suit is filed. And the final merits of the claim may only be deter-
mined by a trial or equivalent procedure.
A probable cause to institute an action of this nature is often shown
where there is reasonable basis to believe that a very unusual medical
result has occurred and reasonable basis to believe that the named
defendant was involved in the care which lead to that very unusual
medical result.
A more restrictive definition of probable cause for this type litiga-
tion, which demanded a higher degree of assurance as to the ultimate
result on the merits of the claim would force a claimant to make an
unreasonable choice. He would often be forced to risk liability for
malicious prosecution because there are real doubts as to his ultimate
success, or to risk losing substatively [sic] meritorious rights because he
failed to name the defendant ultimately found to be responsible. Since
Ohio has the shortest statute of limitations in the nation for malpractice
cases, he may well be forced to make that choice when totally inade-
quate information is available for a good decision. Having commenced an
action with reasonable cause, a plaintiff might still be liable in a later
malicious prosecution suit (or equivalent) if he pursues that action after
learning that there is no longer any reasonable basis to believe that the
named defendant is liable for any damages. As the discovery process
progresses the knowledge of the parties increases. And probable cause
to continue proceedings can dissipate with that increased knowledge.
Id at 167-68. But see Dakters v. Shane, 64 Ohio App. 2d 196, 412 N.E.2d 399 (9th
Dist. 1978). In an earlier action, a complaint prepared by attorney Shane alleged
that Valerie Jean Hime underwent surgery on March 5, 1973, and that due to the
negligence of Dr. Dakters and others, Valerie received bodily injury while on the
operating table. It would appear, however, that Dr. Dakters had not been present
in the operating room when the surgery was performed, and Valerie Jean Hime
had not been his patient on the date of the surgery; rather, as a specialist in
neurosurgery, Dr. Dakters had been called by Valerie's surgeon to examine
Valerie on a consultant basis after the surgery had been performed. Dr. Datkers
did examine Valerie, but did not otherwise treat her at any time.
After he had been dismissed from the malpractice action, Dr. Dakters brought
suit against the plaintiffs and their attorney, Shane. The claim against Shane
alleged that he was guilty of professional malpractice in failing to properly ex-
amine the hospital records to determine the nature and extent of the professional
services rendered by Dr. Dakters to Valerie Jean Hime. Shane prevailed on a mo-
tion for summary judgment, and Dr. Dakters appealed, presenting the following
single question on appeal:
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The next problem lies in Rule 8(E)(2). In substance that rule provides:
OHIO CIVIL RULE 8(E)(2): FEDERAL CIVIL RULE
8(e)(2):
A party A party
1. may set forth two or 1. may set forth two or
more statements of a more statements of a
a. claim, or a. claim, or
b. defense b. defense
either either
a. alternately, or a. alternately, or
b. hypothetically; and b. hypothetically; and
2. may also state as many 2. may also state as many
separate separate
a. claims, or a. claims, or
b. defenses b. defenses
as he has regardless of as he has regardless of
consistency and whether consistency and whether
based on based on
Can an attorney and his client be liable for the malicious institution of
civil proceedings when they bring suit on the theory of negligence and
medical malpractice against a doctor who had nothing to do with the opera-
tion and which fact was readily discovered upon proper investigation?
Id. at 197, 412 N.E.2d at 400.
Although the court of appeals assumed arguendo that the action filed by the
Himes and attorney Shane against Dr. Dakters was instituted maliciously, it af-
firmed the summary judgment in Shane's favor because Dr. Dakters had suffered
neither attachment of his property nor the restraint of his person.
Since an appellate decision seldom gives all the facts in a particular case it is
impossible to know what information was available to attorney Shane at the time
he drafted the complaint against Dr. Dakters. Therefore, it is equally impossible
to comment fairly upon this particular case. But if we place a hypothetical plain-
tiffs attorney in the limited fact pattern outlined by Dakters, and if we assume
the truth of Dr. Dakters' allegations with respect to the contents of the medical
records and their availability to the plaintiff's attorney before he drafted the
complaint, then we could fairly conclude that the plaintiffs attorney did not have
probable cause to bring an action against Dr. Dakters for negligence in the course
of the operation. But if a reasonable attorney wbuld not have probable cause to
bring such an action, then we must also conclude that the action was brought in
bad faith, and that the complaint was signed by the hypothetical attorney "with
the intent to defeat the purpose" of Rule 11. Accordingly, a defendant in the posi-
tion of Dr. Dakters might at least have recovered his expenses and attorneys fees
had he rested his case on a violation of Rule 11, and moved to strike the com-
plaint "as sham and false." It must be conceded, however, that this is speculation
since a violation of Rule 11 as the basis for recovery in this type of case does not
appear to have been tried in this state. See Kent, The Retaliatory Lawsuit, 52
CLEV. B.J. 92 (1981).
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OHIO CIVIL RULE 8(E)(2): FEDERAL CIVIL RULE
8(e)(2):
a. legal, or a. legal,
b. equitable b. equitable, or
c. maritime
grounds. grounds.
All statements shall be made All statements shall be made
subject to the obligations set subject to the obligations set
forth in Rule 11. forth in Rule 11.
If a pleading contains alternative hypothetical or inconsistent claims or
defenses, how can the requirement of Rule 11 be met? How can an attorney
certify that he believes there is good factual ground to support such
statements? Inconsistent statements of a claim are an example. By defini-
tion, they are "inconsistent" statements because both cannot be factually
true; of necessity, one or the other must be false.'71 How, then, can the
pleader certify that he has probable cause for urging them both?
Note that Rule 11 provides that the signature is a certificate that the
signatory has good ground to support the pleading; it does not amount
to a certification that he has good ground to prove the position taken in
the document.17 1 Probable cause is neither the equivalent of certainty
nor the equivalent of an ability to prove the position taken on the
merits; it is simply a reasonable basis for believing that the position
17 Thus, in commenting on the pre-rule practice with respect to the pleading
of inconsistent claims, the Ohio Supreme Court has said:
A plaintiff may, under our system of pleading, allege as many causes
of action as he may have within the scope of the applicable statute. Sec-
tion 2309.05, Revised Code. However, this statutory authority is subject
to the condition, implied from the requirement in regard to verification,
that such causes shall not be so repugnant that, if one be true, the other
must be false. The pleading before us appears to be incapable of over-
coming this condition. If the second cause of action is true, the third is
false, and vice versa. The two are mutually destructive. Any attempt to
prove one would disprove the other.
In Pavey v. Pavey, 30 Ohio St. 600, the syllabus states that "a defen-
dant can be required to elect between which of several defenses he will
proceed to trial, only where the facts stated therein are so inconsistent
that, if the truth of one defense be admitted, it will necessarily disprove
another."...
Although pleadings are ordinarily construed liberally in favor of the
pleader as against demurrer, it is likewise fundamental that a pleading
containing inconsistent allegations or causes of action must be construed
against the pleader. 43 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 64, Section 58.
Fuller v. Drenberg, 3 Ohio St. 2d 109, 114, 209 N.E.2d 417, 421 (1965).
172 See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980), discussed in note 169
supra and accompanying text.
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taken in a document is meritorious."3 The ultimate merits of a position
may not be known or understood until a lengthy discovery program has
been completed,"" and discovery is generally not available to an at-
torney until after suit has been commenced. 7 ' Thus, an attorney may
not be certain of the merits of-his position until long after that position
has been asserted, and in some cases, will not be certain until the final
merits have been determined by a trial or equivalent procedure.176 At
the pleading stage of an action, an attorney may have sufficient
knowledge or information to warrant a bona fide belief that he has a
good claim or defense under one or more consistent or inconsistent legal
theories, but not enough knowledge or information to warrant making
an irrevocable choice between those legal theories. The attorney may
have to obtain further information by way of discovery, or he may simp-
ly have to wait and see how the evidence "goes in" at the trial before he
will be in a position to say that it is this particular legal theory on which
he will prevail, as opposed to some other legal theory. Civil Rules 8(E)(2)
and 11 recognize that at the pleading stage of an action there may well
be such a paucity of reliable information that an attorney cannot make
an irrevocable choice of the legal theory upon which he is to proceed.
Accordingly, that attorney may state his claim or defense alternatively,
hypothetically or even inconsistently; all that is required is that the at-
torney have a reasonable basis (a bona fide belief) that at the trial he
will be able to prove enough facts to establish the claim or defense
under one or the other of his statements. In other words, inconsistency
at the pleading stage does not run afoul of the signature requirement of
Rule 11 if the attorney has an honest belief, from the knowledge or in-
formation then available, '77 that the facts will develop in such a way that
173 See Burkons v. Rogoff, No. 953,503 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga County, filed
Dec. 16, 1976), reprinted in 48 CLEV. B.J. 167 (1967), discussed in note 170 supra
and accompanying text.
174 Id But see note 176 infra and accompanying text.
171 Prior to the commencement of an action, the opportunities for discovery
are extremely limited. Essentially, there are only two proceedings which permit
such discovery: the OHIO R. CIv. P. 27(A) proceeding for the perpetuation of
testimony, and the statutory proceeding for discovery of fact outlined in OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.48 (Page 1981).
76 Burkons v. Rogoff, No. 953,503 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga County, filed Dec.
16, 1976). But as Burkons cautions:
Having commenced an action with reasonable-cause, a plaintiff might
still be liable in a later malicious prosecution suit (or equivalent) if he
pursues that action after learning that there is no longer any reasonable
basis to believe that the named defendant is liable for any damage. As
the discovery process progresses the knowledge of the parties increases.
And probable cause to continue proceedings can dissipate with that in-
creased knowledge.
48 CLEV. B.J. 167, 168 (1977).
177 See note 167 supra and accompanying text, with respect to the attorney's
[Vol. 30:385
68https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss3/6
CIVIL RULE 11
he will be able to prove at least one of the alternative, hypothetical or
inconsistent statements on some legal theory.
The attorney, however, does not have carte blanche in the use of
these alternative pleading devices. They may only be used when there
is paucity of established fact; they may not be used when the attorney
has knowledge or information sufficient to permit the selection of a
specific claim or defense. If, at the pleading stage, the attorney clearly
knows that all of the facts he will be able to prove will support only a
single claim or defense, the attorney would not be warranted in
pleading two or more claims or defenses alternatively, hypothetically or
inconsistently, since he knows that he does not have good ground to sup-
port the alternative, hypothetical or inconsistent claim or defense."'
Likewise, while these pleading devices may be used when there is a
lack of complete information, they cannot be used when there is a total
absence of all knowledge or information which would support a claim or
defense;. 9 they cannot be based on the mere hope that something will
turn up by the time of trial to sustain the claim or defense pleaded.18
When an attorney pleads alternative or inconsistent claims or defenses,
he must have knowledge or information sufficient to lead to the good
faith belief that he can prove one or the other, but not enough
knowledge or information to warrant a committed choice between the
obligation to seek out as much knowledge and information as is reasonably
available.
178 Just as the verification of pleadings requirement prohibited this form of
pleading in pre-rule practice, so too does the Rule 11 signature requirement pro-
hibit it in Rules practice when the attorney's knowledge or information is equal
to the occasion. Compare Fuller v. Drenberg, 3 Ohio St. 2d 109, 209 N.E.2d 417
(1965) with note 144 supra and accompanying text.
179 This may be inferred from what is said in Giannone v. United States Steel
Corp., 238 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1956):
Rule 8(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . allows inconsis-
tent, alternative and hypothetical pleading. The rules encourage parties
to plead not only what they know is factually true, but also any fact if
they believe "there is good ground to support it."
Id. at 548.
I" In Vocke v. Dayton, 36 Ohio App. 2d 139, 303 N.E.2d 892 (2d Dist. 1973), it is
said:
If the present plaintiff were to prevail in her contention, any claimant
could, within the period of limitation, file a petition [sic] without designa-
tion or description of any defendant, and without service upon anyone, in
the mere hope that within a year thereafter he might discover a missing
party to designate.
Id. at 143, 303 N.E.2d at 895.
This comment with respect to the application of OHIO R. Civ. P. 15(D) applies
equally well to the assertion of claims or defenses under OHIO R. Civ. P. 8; an at-
torney may not assert a claim or defense on the "mere hope" that he will
thereafter discover facts to support it.
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two;18 ' and when an attorney pleads hypothetically, he must have suffi-
cient knowledge or information to warrant a good faith belief in the ex-
istence of the contingency upon which the hypothetical is premised.'82
The ability to plead alternatively, hypothetically and inconsistently,
therefore, is not a substitute for a factual investigation of the client's
claims or defenses; rather, these devices may be used only when a
factual investigation fails to produce a reasonable basis for a more
specific election of claims or defenses, but does produce probable cause
to believe that one or the other alternative or inconsistent claim or
defense exists, or probable cause to believe in the existence of the con-
tingency upon which the hypothetical claim or defense is based.
But what is the scope of the factual investigation which the attorney
must make before signing? Where must the attorney's investigation
begin and end? Obviously, the answer to these questions is controlled by
the time, means and circumstances of a particular case. If an attorney is
approached late in the day, the statute of limitations may impose severe
time limitations on the investigation which may be made prior to the
commencement of the action, just as the court's reluctance to grant ex-
tensions of time in which to move or plead may curtail the investigation
which a defense attorney can make prior to answer. But subject to the
constraints of time, means and circumstances uniquely applicable to
each case, there are some general guidelines which may be followed.
... As it is said in Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Summit Construction Co., 422 F.2d
242 (8th Cir. 1969):
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e)(2) clearly permits setting forth
two or more statements of a claim alternately or hypothetically and
stating as many separate claims as may exist regardless of consistency,
subject of course to the qualification that the plaintiffs attorney must
sign the complaint, his signature constituting a certificate that he has
read the pleading and to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support it and it is not interposed for
delay. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(2), 11, 18(a)....
Id. at 271.
182 See, e.g., Rosen v. Texas Company, 161 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where
it is said:
Defendant complains of the omission of any allegation as to the time
when the acts complained of occurred. . . . [Ilt is said that defendant
needs to know the dates on which the wrongs are claimed to have been
committed in order to decide whether to plead the statute of limitations.
It will do no harm to have pleaded the statute of limitations even if it
turns out that the claimed wrongs were committed within the unaffected
period. No ethical problem will be presented by the requirement of
counsel's signing the answer since counsel can avail himself of the
hypothetical allegations permitted by the Rules. See Rule 8(e)(2). The
lack of dates does not prejudice defendant.
Id. at 58-59. In other words, if defense counsel had a good faith belief that all or
part of plaintiffs claim was, or might be, barred by the statute of limitations
defense even though he could not be certain that it applied because the dates of
the underlying occurrences were not given in the complaint.
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The attorney's search for the facts begins with the client's story, but
as Milligan notes, clients can be notoriously unworthy of trust, ' and the
83 Milligan, Rules of Civil Procedure in Domestic Relations Practice, 39 U.
CIN. L. REV. 524 (1970):
The rule allowing an attorney to sign nonverified complaints con-
stitutes a significant break with the past practice. Some attorneys may
view this change with alarm since the emotional domestic relations
client is notoriously unworthy of trust. Others may view the change as a
device to save time which will not endanger the attorney since the rule
only requires that he plead the facts to the best of his knowledge.
Id. at 529. Milligan's comment should not be limited to domestic relations clients,
nor should the last sentence of this quote be read as exonerating the attorney
from the duty of independently investigating the client's story.
This duty to independently investigate was best stated by the Supreme Court
of Kansas in Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980):
We further reject the statement in Maechtlen [v. Clapp, 121 Kan. 777,
250 P. 303 (1926)] that an attorney may act on the assumption that the
facts related by his client are honestly given and are substantially cor-
rect and that it is not his duty to go elsewhere for information respec-
ting the honesty of the claim or the good faith of his client. Such a rule is
degrading to the legal profession and not acceptable in these times. This
court in the Code of Professional Responsibility . . . has established
general standards of behavior required of the Kansas legal profession.
Canon 7 of the Code requires a lawyer to represent his client zealously
within the bounds of the law. DR 7-102 specifically states that in his
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not file a suit, assert a position,
conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his
client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another. Under DR 6-101, a
lawyer is required to represent a client competently and is directed to
not handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the cir-
cumstances. As noted above, the rule is well established in Kansas that
the advice of counsel as to the institution of a civil action, acted upon in
good faith, will absolve the client from liability for malicious prosecution
only where the facts known to the informant and all which can be found
by a diligent effort to acquire information, have been presented to the
attorney. Carnegie v. Cage Furniture, Inc., 217 Kan. at 569, 538 P.2d
659. In most cases, the clients of attorneys are not knowledgeable in the
law, nor do they know how or where further information about the case
may be acquired. It is obvious that the client must rely upon his lawyer
to make a reasonable investigation of his case. Likewise, the attorney
must accept the obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation in an at-
tempt to find what the true facts are before filing a civil action on behalf
of his client. In determining probable cause in a malicious prosecution ac-
tion brought against an attorney, a jury may properly consider not only
those facts disclosed to counsel by the client but also those facts which
could have been learned by a diligent effort on the attorney's part. In
determining the purpose of the attorney in filing a civil action, a jury
may properly consider as evidence of good faith or absence of malice the
fact that the attorney, before filing an action, made a demand upon his
client's adversary and extended to him the opportunity to respond with
his version of the facts. This should be the standard procedure unless an
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search may seldom stop with the information supplied by the client. '
This is especially so when the client simply believes that a certain fact
exists; if the client cannot supply a factual basis for that belief, then it is
equally probable that the fact does not exist,' s5 and the client's belief is
tantamount to hearsay or rumor. Unverified hearsay or rumor is not a
sufficient basis upon which to subject others to the burden of litigation
and heavy legal costs, and the attorney has the responsibility of ascer-
taining that a reasonable basis exists for the client's belief before the at-
torney may subscribe his signature to a document based on that belief."'
If a reasonably prudent attorney, cognizant of the obligation imposed
by Rule 11, would be satisfied with the information provided by the
client, then that client's actual attorney need go no further in his in-
vestigation; but if that reasonably prudent attorney would be put on
notice that further investigation is required, then the actual attorney
must also conduct a further investigation. That investigation must be
more than perfunctory; it must be conducted with diligence, and must
be reasonable in scope. At the very least, the attorney conducting the
investigation must discover matters of public record,"' as well as mat-
immediate filing of an action is required by the imminent running of the
statute of limitations or some other good reason.
Id. at 284, 607 P.2d at 448-49 (emphasis in original). See also Board of Educ. v.
Marting, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 475, 185 N.E.2d 597 (Fayette Cty. C.P. 1962). But see
Dakters v. Shane, 64 Ohio App. 2d 196, 412 N.E.2d 399 (9th Dist. 1978) (with
respect to the availability of a malicious prosecution action in Ohio).
184 But see Fuerst, Municipal Court Practice Under the New Civil Rules, 39 U.
CIN. L. REV. 535 (1970):
The pleadings need not be verified by the party and the signature of the
attorney is sufficient. This should prove to be a savings in time to the at-
torney who can take the information necessary for a claim on the client's
first visit, obtain his retainer, and immediately file the claim.
Id. at 537. It must be assumed that Fuerst is speaking of the ideal situation, and
not the average situation.
115 See Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where it is said:
The admission that the plaintiff has no information "as to the truth" of
the defendant's statement implies as well that she has no information as
to its falsity. In short she has no information sufficient to form a belief
that Seaton actually had "inside information" at the time of the transaction.
Rule 11 requires an attorney who signs a pleading to represent his
honest belief that there is good ground to support the claims asserted in
the pleading. This merely adds an ethical responsibility to the concep-
tion that a claim that is baseless should not survive.
Id. at 6.
"' Miller v. Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also note 160
supra and accompanying text.
"I7 Thus, in Porto Transport, Inc. v. Consolidated Diesel Electric Corp., 20
F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), it is said:
Paragraph 1 of the amended answer insofar as it denies knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief with respect to plaintiffs allega-
tion in paragraph 2 of the complaint that "plaintiff was a common carrier
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ters of general public notice."'8 But these are minimal; it is more ac-
curate to say that the attorney will be held to have that information and
by motor vehicle engaged in the transportation of property for hire
under authority of Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No.
MC-74120" is stricken. A defendant may not assert lack of knowledge or
information as to matters of public record since an inspection of the
record would reveal whether or not plaintiff was a qualified interstate
carrier by motor vehicle. 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 8.22, P. 1677.
Defendant shall serve an amended answer in which the aforesaid allega-
tion is either denied or admitted.
Id. at 6.
In Nieman v. Bethlehem Nat. Bank, 32 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1939), we find:
[T]he defendant has apparently been rather careful not to draw his
denials exactly in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8(b)....
That rule provides that if the pleader is "without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment," he shall
so state and this has the effect of a denial. The denials in the answer now
before the Court simply aver that the defendant has no knowledge and
therefore deny the averment, and, if material, demand proof. The defen-
dant can say, with perhaps a semblance of truth, that he has no
knowledge, meaning no direct, first hand knowledge, but he certainly
could not say as to these matters of public record that he is without in-
formation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averment
relating to them. It may seem like a fine distinction, but it just enables
the defendant and his attorney to avoid filing a patently false answer,
and hence the propriety of a strict application of the rule. The answers
are held to be sufficient denials. If they were substantially in compliance
with Rule 8(b), which they are not, I should be compelled to say that they
contained palpably untrue statements and were not filed in good faith,
and the ruling would still be that the answer is not effective to raise any
genuine issue of fact. See Nieman v. Long, D.C., 31 F. Supp. 30.
Id at 436-37.
188 See Squire v. Levan, 32 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1940), where it is noted:
The affidavit of defense consists of a number of sham denials. If at-
torneys were more mindful of their obligation to the court in respect of
honesty in pleading, a situation of this kind would not arise. To draw and
file a pleading which states that a reasonable investigation was made
without being able to obtain knowledge whether the plaintiff, who sues
as Superintendent of Banks of The State of Ohio, is in fact the
Superintendent as averred, is plainly in total disregard of this obliga-
tion. The same may be said of a similar denial by a stockholder of a bank
of such matters of public record and general knowledge as the facts that
the bank was a corporation organized under the banking laws of the
State of Ohio, and had its principal place of business in Cleveland, Ohio,
and that the Superintendent of Banks took possession of the bank after
the closing of the bank and has been liquidating it.
On the whole I feel fully justified in applying the strict letter of the
rules against a party who has seen fit to take the position which this
defendant has ....
The averments of the affidavit of defense are therefore all held to be
insufficient denials of the facts stated in the statement of claim, and
those facts, for the purpose of this motion, are taken as admitted.
Id. at 438.
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knowledge which a reasonable and diligent investigation would have
produced.
Subject to the constraints of time, means and circumstances, a
"reasonable and diligent investigation" contemplates the use of all
discovery devices then available to the attorney, including the pre-
commencement discovery of fact from the adverse party provided for in
section 2317.48 of the Ohio Revised Code.'89 The prompt and proper use
of this latter discovery device may assist the plaintiff's attorney in iden-
tifying the proper defendant, and may prevent the assertion of a
baseless claim against an innocent person. 9 '
In summary, then, an attorney may properly sign a document if his
reasonable and diligent investigation produces a good faith belief that
the position taken in the document is properly motivated, supported by
known facts or reasonable inferences which may be drawn from known
facts, and either within the bounds of the well-settled law or supported
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
the well-settled law. Or in the more familiar pre-rule language, an at-
torney may not sign a document which he knows to be vexatious,
frivolous and/or a sham. In forming this belief, the attorney must take
the facts as he finds them, but reasonable doubts with respect to the
client's intent, motive or desires, or with respect to the bounds of the
law, should be resolved in favor of the client. But the attorney's acquisi-
tion of knowledge or information is a continuing process, and con-
comitantly, the attorney's obligation under Civil Rule 11 is a continuing
obligation. If, subsequent to the service and filing of a document to
which his signature is appended, the attorney discovers that there is no
good ground to support the position taken in that document, he must
take prompt action to withdraw the document or otherwise mitigate its
effect. A failure to do so will subject the attorney to the same sanctions
'e OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.48 (Page 1981), reads as follows:
When a person claiming to have cause of action or a defense to an ac-
tion commenced against him, without a discovery of the fact from the
adverse party, is unable to file his petition or answer, he may bring an
action for discovery, setting forth in his petition the necessity therefor
and the grounds thereof, with such interrogatories relating to the sub-
ject matter of the discovery as are necessary to procure the discovery
sought. If such petition is not demurred to, it must be fully and directly
answered under oath by the defendant. Upon the final disposition of the
action, the costs thereof shall be taxed in such manner as the court
deems equitable.
19 See, e.g., Dakters v. Shane, 64 Ohio App. 2d 196, 412 N.E.2d 399 (1978);
Burkons v. Rogoff, No. 953,503 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga Cty., filed Dec. 16, 1976),
reprinted in 48 CLEV. B.J. 167 (1977). See note 170 supra and accompanying text;
see also Kent, The Retaliatory Lawsuit, 52 CLEV. B.J. 92 (1981).
Bell v. Coen, 48 Ohio App. 2d 325, 357 N.E.2d 392 (lst Dist. 1975), is another
example of the untoward result which might be prevented by the use of this pre-
commencement discovery device.
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that could be imposed if the document had been without support in the
first instance.' 91
3. That the Document is not Interposed for Delay
The third and last obligation imposed on the attorney by Rule 11 is
that the document not be interposed for the purpose of delay; the at-
torney's signature on a document is in substance an affidavit to the ef-
fect that the document "is not interposed for delay."'9 2
,' See quote from Burkons v. Rogoff, No. 953,503 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga
Cty., filed Dec. 16, 1976), at note 176 supra. See also American Automobile Ass'n v.
Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1952), where it is said:
The second objection has to do with the counterclaim according to the
terms of which the defendant asserted the existence of a written con-
tract between the plaintiff and herself which it was thought her lawyer
knew was not in existence.
As a result of the statements made at the hearing, there can be no
doubt that from and after August 6, 1951, the defendant's attorney knew
that there was no such contract....
The counterclaim was not withdrawn and it was sought to be upheld
on the motion for summary judgment, both orally and in the defendant's
brief.
The result is that the counterclaim was allowed to stand and the
Court was called upon to adjudicate the issue, although the defendant's
attorney knew that there was no good ground to support it.
One of the obvious purposes of Rule 11 is to keep out of a case issues
that are known to be false by the attorney who signs a given pleading,
and the violation of the Rule in this case is clear and unmistakeable; this
opinion should be filed separately in the office of the Clerk of Court, and
indexed against the name of the defendant's attorney, so that, in the
event that his professional conduct in any other connection shall become
a subject of inquiry, this case and this record can be referred to for such
instruction as it may yield.
The foregoing has been submitted to the other Judges of this Court,
and they have approved of it.
Id. at 656.
9 As it is said in Overmeyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 554 F.2d
539 (2d Cir. 1977):
It has not escaped our attention that appellants were assisted by
counsel before both the district court and this court in bringing this
sham suit and appeal. We have warned counsel in immigration matters
about abusing the process in this court to gain delays in deportation.
Hibbert v. I.N.S., 554 F.2d 17, at 19 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977); Acevedo v. I.N.S.,
538 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1976). The use of this court solely as a dilatory tac-
tic to avoid paying a judgment is a serious breach of professional ethics.
Cf. Hibbert v. I.N.S., supra, at 19 n.1; In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319 (1st
Cir. 1973). See also Edelstein, the Ethics of Dilatory Motion Practice:
Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 (1976). We remind the Bar
that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 the signature of an attorney on a pleading
"constitutes a certificate by him ... that it is not interposed for delay."
We will not countenance attempts to pervert the federal judicial process
into a Dickensian court where lawsuits never end.
Id. at 543 n.4.
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Among other things, this third obligation is a specific implementation
of those Disciplinary Rules which prohibit an attorney from asserting a
position which delays the trial of a case; 3 a reaffirmation of Ohio Civil
Rule 1(B) which mandates an application of the Civil Rules which
eliminates delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the
expeditious administration of justice;"' the premise underlying those
provisions of Ohio Civil Rule 37 which authorize the award of expenses
and attorney's fees against the attorney who needlessly invokes the
court's jurisdiction in discovery matters; 195 and the basis for those local
193 Thus, in ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 it is
said:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit,
assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on
behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
Id Rule 3.3(a) of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, DISCUSSION
DRAFT, is somewhat more specific. It provides:
A lawyer shall make every effort consistent with the legitimate in-
terests of the client to expedite litigation. Realizing financial or other
benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate in-
terest of the client. A lawyer shall not engage in any procedure or tactic
having no substantial purpose other than delay or increasing the cost of
litigation to another party.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at rule 3.3(a). And in the comment to that rule
it is said:
A lawyer has a duty not merely to avoid frivolous or dilatory pro-
ceedings but also to expedite the progress of litigation. The critical pro-
blem is to define the standard by which to appraise a lawyer's failure to
keep litigation moving forward. The standard must require more than
nominal observance, for otherwise all but the most flagrant abuses of
procedure can become commonplace....
Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Delay should not be indulged for the convenience of the advocates, nor
for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain
rightful redress or repose. It is not enough that a lawyer's procedural
act, or refusal to act, is in personal good faith, or that similar conduct is
often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a compe-
tent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the act or refusal to act as
having some substantial purpose other than delay.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at comment to rule 3.3(a). Accordingly, there is
ample Canonical authority for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' conclusion
that dilatory tactics are a serious breach of professional ethics. See Overmeyer v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 554 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1977).
'94 OHIO R. CIv. P. 1(B) provides: "These rules shall be construed and applied to
effect just results by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other im-
pediments to the expeditious administration of justice." Id.
19I As OHIO R. CIV. P. 37(A)(4) provides:
Award of expenses of motion. If the motion [to compel discovery] is
granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party
or deponent who opposed the motion or the party or attorney advising
such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable
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rules of court which stipulate that "[tihe presentation to the court of un-
necessary motions, and the unwarranted opposition of motions, which in
either case unduly delay the course of an action through the courts, sub-
ject an offender to appropriate discipline including the imposition of
costs."' '
As a general rule, it may be said that a document is interposed for
delay if it is either frivolous or a sham; that is, there is neither good
legal nor factual ground to support the position taken in the document.
As Risinger describes:
The insertion of the certification that the pleading has not been
interposed for delay seems logically redundant, since a pleading
interposed only for delay could not have "good ground" no mat-
ter how that term is ultimately defined, and a pleading with in-
dependent "good ground" is not likely to be rendered improper
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees,
unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expense unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the
reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including at-
torney's fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of ex-
pense unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may ap-
portion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner.
Id. The substance of this Rule is repeated, or incorporated by reference, in OHIO
R. Civ. P. 26(C), 37(B)(2) and 37(D).
This same basic philosophy is expressed in a slightly different context in OHIO
R. Civ. P. 37(C):
If a party, after being served with a request for admission under Rule
36, fails to admit the genuineness of any documents or the truth of any
matter as requested, and if the party requesting the admissions
thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the
matter, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party
to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, in-
cluding reasonable attorney's fees. Unless the request had been objec-
tionable under Rule 36(A) or the court finds that there was good reason
for the failure to admit or that the admission sought was of no substan-
tial importance, the order shall be made.
Id
These Rules are not so much grants of power to the trial court as they are
specific implementations of the general power granted the trial court under that
provision of OHIO R. Civ. P. 11 which states: "For a willful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate action." Id. In other words, the trial
court is obliged to punish vexatious, frivolous or sham discovery proceedings.
See text accompanying note 252 infra.
196 See Rule 11(G) of the CUY. COUNTY CT. C.P.R. and Rule 10.05 of the STARK
COUNTY CT. C.P.R.
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because tactical considerations of delay entered into the
ultimate decision of whether or not to file an otherwise honest,
meritorious, and proper pleading.'97
The relevant Ohio authorities are in basic accord with this position.'98
But the concepts of "frivolous" and "sham" do not exhaust the ap-
plicable criteria in testing for delay. It may be said that "delay" is a
specification under the general charge of "vexatiousness," and a docu-
ment is "vexatious" when its interposition "is not calculated to lead to
any practical result."'99 Or, as it appears in the comment to rule 3.3 of
the Discussion Draft of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
No precise definition can be given of a dilatory or baseless pro-
ceeding.... [Tihe propriety of a lawyer's conduct in supporting a
cause cannot depend simply on personal good faith. The essen-
tial question is whether reasonably competent counsel could con-
clude in good faith that the claim or defense in question has a
substantial basis. The same principle applies to issues within a
case.... The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in
good faith would regard the act or refusal to act as having some
substantial purpose other than delay.
2 00
Thus, a document which is neither frivolous nor a sham may be vex-
atious-and thus interposed for delay-if the position taken in that
document, though sound in law and fact, would not objectively achieve
any meaningful result or would not have some substantial purpose other
than delay."0 ' Suppose, for example, that one's opponent serves and files
"9 Risinger, supra note 2, at 8.
"' See, e.g., Black v. Goodman, 12 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 287 (1909), where it is said:
If the answer and cross-petition is frivolous and was filed for the pur-
pose of delay merely, as stated in the motion [to strike it from the files],
and all this appears from the pleading itself, the motion was properly
sustained; but if the answer contains a good defense, or the cross-
petition of a good cause of action, it is immaterial whether filed in good
faith or for purposes of delay only, and the motion should have been
overruled.
Id. at 288.
... See Brown v. Lamb, 112 Ohio App. 116, 171 N.E.2d 191 (1st Dist. 1960).
20 DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at comment to rule 3.3.
" This was not always the rule in this state. In addition to Black v. Goodman,
12 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 287 (1909), see Hamilton Glendale & Cincinnati Traction Co. v.
Parish, 67 Ohio St. 181, 65 N.E. 1011 (1902), where it is said:
The contention in the pleadings and finding of facts as to whether Mr.
Parish brought and prosecuted the action in good faith, is of no impor-
tance, because if he had a legal right which he sought to protect by an
action in a court of justice, the motive which induced him to bring the ac-
tion cannot be inquired into. To sustain his action, if brought in good
faith, and defeat it if brought in bad faith, would be to control his morals
by means of a law suit. That cannot be done. Unless restrained by
statute, a man may direct his moral conduct as he pleases.
Id. at 189, 65 N.E. at 1013. Now, while it may be true that the motive of the
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a perfectly comprehensible and otherwise proper document in which the
paragraphs are not numbered as required by Ohio Civil Rule 10(B). It is
well-settled that such a document may be challenged by a motion to
state and number separately. 02 If the failure to number the paragraphs
was the only defect in the document, however, such a motion would not
achieve any meaningful result other than harassment and delay (a result
which is not in itself legitimate),"' and the making of such a motion
would be vexatious. Obviously, the attorney signing and making such a
motion in these circumstances would violate Rule 11.204
But what happens when a document which must inevitably produce
delay also has a chance, albeit slim, of producing a useful result? A mo-
tion to quash on the grounds of insufficiency of process or insufficiency
of service of process, for example, may have only a slim chance of pro-
ducing a useful result since the plaintiff has a year in which to perfect
service, 2" and defects in the summons or the service of summons are
almost always readily correctible by amendment. 6 or by the service of
litigant should not determine the decision in an otherwise meritorious case, the
motive of the litigant does have a bearing on whether or not an attorney should
undertake to represent the litigant in that case. See notes 38 and 39 supra and ac-
companying text. These authorities-the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary
Rules that are essential elements of the Code of Professional Responsibility-are
the equivalent of a "statute" which "restrains" the moral conduct of the litigant.
202 Browne, Civil Rule 10B) and the Three Basic Rules of Form Applicable to
the Drafting of Documents Used in Civil Litigation, 8 CAP. U.L. REv. 199, 204-05
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Drafting of Documents].
m DisCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at rule 3.3(a).
' See Drafting of Documents, supra note 202, which states in pertinent part:
Obviously, very few documents will meet the "vague or ambiguous"
standard simply because the author has failed to paragraph them, and it
will be a rare case in which a motion to separately state and number will
be justified. If the motion is made without proper justification, or if the
movant does not meet the requirements stated above with respect to
the content of the motion, the court may treat the motion as a delaying
tactic, and impose sanctions on the movant.
Id. at 205. See also Rule 11(G) of the Rules of the Court of Common Pleas, CuY.
COUNTY CT. C.P.R. and Rule 10.05 of the Rules of the STARK COUNTY CT. C.P.R.
quoted in pertinent part at note 196 supra.
I See, e.g., Yancey v. Pyles, 44 Ohio App. 2d 410, 339 N.E.2d 835 (1st Dist.
1975), and Hayden v. Ours, 44 Ohio Misc. 62, 337 N.E.2d 183 (C.P. Paulding County
1975), both of which interpret the following language in OHIO R. CIv. P. 3(A): "A
civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, if service is obtained
within one year from such filing." Id It must be noted, however, that the prin-
cipal holding in Hayden v. Ours has been substantively overruled by Barnhart v.
Schultz, 53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589 (1978), but the subsidiary holding-that
a plaintiff has a year in which to perfect service- has been affirmed by the Barn-
hart opinion. Id.
2 OHIO R. CIv. P. 4.6(B): "The court within its discretion and upon such terms
as are just, may at any time allow the amendment of any process or proof of ser-
vice thereof, unless the amendment would cause material prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party against whom the process was issued." Id.
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an alias summons.07 Such a motion must delay the case, and at best,
there is only a small possibility that the plaintiff's attorney will fail to
take the necessary corrective action. But since that possibility exists, a
possibility which may, in the right circumstances, result in a complete
victory for the defense,0 8 the motion cannot be judged on its delay pro-
ducing qualities alone."' Rather, such a motion must be judged by the
principle of the two-fold effect. If the primary and intended result of the
motion is the possible defeat of the adverse party, and if the delay pro-
duced by the motion is a secondary and unintended result-that is, the
delay is not a result desired for its own sake-the motion is proper; but
if the delay is the primary result intended, or if the delay is as much
desired as the possible victory over the adverse party, the motion is at
least suspect, and may fall afoul of the third obligation imposed by Rule
11.20
207 OHIO R. Civ. P. 4(A): "Upon request of the plaintiff separate or additional
summons shall issue at any time against any defendant." Id.
208 If the challenges to the summons or the service of summons are sustained,
and valid and effective service is not obtained within a year following the filing of
the complaint, no action will have been commenced. Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d
63, 362 N.E.2d 642 (1977). A failure for want of commencement is not a "failure
otherwise than on the merits" for the purpose of the Savings Statute, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1981). Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d
213 (1966). Therefore, if the statute of limitations has expired subsequent to the
filing of the complaint, and the action fails of commencement because proper ser-
vice was not obtained within a year of that filing, the plaintiff's claim will be
time-barred, and a new action cannot be commenced within a year after the
failure of the original action.
It is interesting to contrast the motion to transfer for improper venue with
the motions to quash discussed in the text. The motion to transfer for improper
venue must inevitably produce a delay. Yei, if the motion is well-taken, and the
case transferred from an improper venue to a proper venue, it is the party
against whom the motion was made, and not the movant, who must bear the con-
sequences. OHIO R. CIV. P. 3(C)(2) directs: "When an action is transferred to a
county which is proper, the court may assess costs, including reasonable attorney
fees, to the time of transfer against the party who commenced the action in a
county other than stated to be proper in subdivision (B) of this rule." Id With this
in mind, note should be taken of OHIO R. Civ. P. 4.6(E), which states:
The attorney of record or the serving party shall be responsible for
determining if service has been made and shall timely file written in-
structions with the clerk regarding completion of service notwithstand-
ing the provisions in Rules 4.1 through 4.6 which instruct a clerk to notify
the attorney of record or the serving party of failure of service of process.
Id Perhaps this provision would provide the underlying basis for the payment of
the movant's expenses and attorney's fees whenever a motion to quash or a mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person is granted. One could argue
that the basic philosophy expressed in OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(C)(2) should apply by
analogy to proceedings challenging service or process.
210 It does not follow, however, that the defenses of insufficiency of process or
insufficiency of service of process need be sacrificed because a motion raising
them would be suspect or improper under the principle of the two-fold effect;
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But such a motion is not necessarily improper if the primary object of
the motion is delay, or if the delay produced by the motion is as much
desired as any other product. The production of delay is not solely a
violation of Rule 11; it is the intent behind the delay which controls.21 '
To state it somewhat simplistically, there are good delays and there are
bad delays. A Rule 6(B) motion for an extension of time, for example,
deliberately seeks a delay, and is interposed for that very purpose. But
if that delay is sought for the purpose of more adequately preparing the
client's case, or for some other good cause, it is a good delay, and the at-
torney may properly sign such a motion. On the other hand, if the delay
is sought to harass the adverse party or the opposing attorney, or to put
economic pressure on the adverse party in the hope of forcing a more
favorable settlement of the case, 12 it is a bad delay, and the attorney
they may be included in any other proper motion served prior to the service of
the responsive pleading, or if no other such motion lies or is made, they may be
included in the responsive pleading, if one is required, or asserted at the time of
trial if no responsive pleading is required. OHIO R. CIv. P. 12(B).
21 Black v. Goodman, 12 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 287 (1909), appears to take a contrary
position. In substance, it holds that if a document is not sham, frivolous or vex-
atious on its face, it is immaterial whether or not it was filed in good faith or for
the purpose of delay only. See note 198 supra and accompanying text. If that
were once the law, it is the law no longer. OHIO R. CIv. P. 11 clearly makes the in-
tent of the signatory a material factor. Not only does it speak of a document
"signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule," but also stipulates that
"for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subject to appropriate
sanctions." See note 201 supra and accompanying text.
212 See DIscuSSION DRAFT, supra note 38, at rule 3.3(a) and comment thereto.
Marino v. Morenz, 18 Ohio Op. 3d 205 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct. 1980), suggests how
a proper procedure might be used to produce a delay that puts economic pressure
on the adverse party. In that case, plaintiff sued for forcible entry and detainer
and for damages in the total amount of $297 for unpaid rent and yardwork. Defen-
dant counterclaimed for trespass and constructive eviction. Total damages in the
amount of $33,000 was demanded in this two-count counterclaim. After the
counterclaim was at issue, defendant moved to certify the action to the common
pleas court pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 13(J). The municipal court ordered the
parties to submit briefs on the motion. The plaintiffs brief in opposition to the
motion was improperly supported by documentary evidence in testimonial form.
The defendant's brief in support of the motion was not supported by evidence.
The court held that the plaintiffs evidence, taken alone, satisfied the court that
there was no basis in fact for the counterclaim. It further held, however, that it
could not properly consider that evidence and, since the counterclaim was other-
wise proper on its face, it had to certify the entire action to the common
pleas court. Since the court did not have the defendant's evidence before it, we
cannot say that the counterclaim was sham or frivolous. But if we suppose that it
was, for example, that the plaintiffs evidence was conclusive as to the merits of
the counterclaim, then we must conclude that the counterclaim was interposed
for the purpose of delay. Such a delay would produce two unwarranted results: (1)
it would unduly delay plaintiff's recovery on his $297 claim; and (2) it would make
pursuit of that claim in the common pleas court more expensive than the
recovery would warrant.
On the other hand, the defendant did not support her brief in support of the
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could not properly sign the motion. In summary, it is the attorney-
signatory's motivation and intent which control, and since these are in-
terior matters, the principle of the two-fold effect, or other tests for pro-
priety, cannot be applied by an exterior source except in the most bla-
tant of cases. 3 But motivation and intent are principally a burden of
conscience which must be borne by the attorney signing the document,
and even in a case which has the appearance of a blatant violation of
Rule 11, an exterior source such as the court may feel compelled to ac-
cept the assurance of the attorney-signatory that such is not the case. "
In sum, then, the third obligation of Rule 11 prohibits an attorney
from signing a document if the interposition of the document is intended
to produce a bad delay; that is, a delay for which there is no sound legal,
moral or ethical warrant or justification.
4. The "Estoppel Effect"
Thus far the ethical and moral significance of the attorney's signature
has been considered, but an examination of the effect of that signature
motion to certify with documentary evidence because the Rules do not provide
for such a procedure. Thus, the court had only the plaintiffs evidence before it,
and that was improperly before it. Accordingly, if the defendant would have had
a proper opportunity to present her evidence, and if that evidence would have
suggested a meritorious counterclaim, then the counterclaim would have been
proper even though it produced the two results outlined above.
But, as a caveat, note that even a meritorious counterclaim might become im-
proper if the amount demanded as judgment was exaggerated solely for the pur-
pose of requiring the certification of the entire action to the common pleas courts.
213 See, e.g., American Automobile Ass'n, Inc. v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp 655
(E.D.N.Y. 1953).
21, An excellent illustration of this point is found in United States v. Long, 10
F.R.D. 443 (D. Neb. 1950). The question arose on the plaintiffs motion to strike
the defendant's answer which consisted of a one sentence general denial. The
court noted:
When one examines that complaint he encounters difficulty in supposing
that a general denial in good faith of its averments under the admoni-
tions of Rule 8(b) and Rule 11 and the latter's sanctions, is reasonably
possible unless the defendant actually intends to deny that he had any
relation whatsoever to the plaintiffs designated agency in the matter
declared upon. The improbability of such a supposition is at once ap-
parent.
However, upon his honor as a member of the bar of this court and in
the face of the quoted language of Rule 11, counsel for the defendant, by
signing and filing the answer-and now by the express statement of his
brief-assures this court that his client intends to controvert "every
allegation of the plaintiffs complaint", to borrow his own language. The
court is compelled to accept those assurances as being tendered in good
faith. And in that situation the motion must be and is being denied and
overruled. The integrity of the answer will be made to appear, or be
repelled, by the events of the trial.
Id at 445.
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cannot stop with those considerations alone since the signature may
produce other effects as well. For want of a better term one of the most
recently developed of these effects may be described as the "estoppel
effect" of the attorney's signature when that signature is subscribed to
a document pursuant to the requirements of Rule 11. This effect may be
illustrated by Brown v. Anderson.'1 5 In substance, plaintiffs brought an
action against the United States alleging that they were injured by the
negligence of Anderson in operating a Postal Service mail truck while in
the course and scope of his employment for the United States Postal
Service. At the same time, the plaintiffs brought an action against
Anderson individually. In this second action, the United States At-
torney representing Anderson moved to dismiss on the ground that the
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because of the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b),"' which made an action against the United States
the exclusive remedy in such cases. This motion was supported by an af-
fidavit in which the United States Attorney stated that to the best of
his knowledge and belief Anderson was acting in the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident in question. In their response to
this motion the plaintiffs took the position that the question of scope of
employment was a fact question which could not be determined on the
basis of an affidavit. The court held:
Considering [plaintiffs'] position in light of the fact that the same
Attorney represents Plaintiffs in both actions, and that pur-
430 F. Supp. 337 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
216 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1976) provides as follows:
The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and
2672 of this title for injury or loss of property or personal injury or
death, resulting from the operation by any employee of the Government
of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, shall hereafter be exclusive of any other civil action or pro-
ceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or
his estate whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.
MdL Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1980), which reads
in pertinent part as follows:
Except in the case of a civil action filed by the state, filing a civil ac-
tion in the court of claims results in a complete waiver of any cause of ac-
tion, based on the same act or omission, which the filing party has
against any state officer or employee. The waiver shall be void if the
court determines that the act or omission was manifestly outside the
scope of the officer's or employee's office or employment or that the of-
ficer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wan-
ton or reckless manner.
Id Effective December 31, 1985, the second sentence of the above quote will read
as follows unless prior to that date the. General Assembly reenacts the above
language: "The waiver shall be void if the court determines that the act or omis-
sion was not within the scope of the officer's or employee's office or
employment." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A) (Page Supp. 1980) (effective Dec.
31, 1985).
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suant to Rule 11, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. the affirmation made in
[Brown v. United States] that Defendant Anderson was acting in
the scope of his employment with the United States Postal Ser-
vice constitutes a certificate by counsel that to the best of his
knowledge and belief there are good grounds to support such af-
firmation, the Court finds for the purposes of this Motion that
Defendant Anderson was acting in the scope of his employment
with the United States Postal Service at the time of the accident
giving rise to this litigation.217
In other words, the plaintiffs were estopped from questioning that
which their attorney had, by his signature, certified to be true in a
separate, albeit closely related, action.218
In effect, the court is saying that an assertion made under the obliga-
tion of Civil Rule 11 is a conclusive judicial admission. This concept of
judicial admission is not new; it has long been held that the unqualified
assertion of a material and competent fact in a pleading constitutes a
conclusive judicial admission of that fact in that particular case.219 What
217 Brown v. Anderson, 430 F. Supp. 337, 338 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
218 But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (Page Supp. 1980); compare Smith v.
Stempel, 65 Ohio App. 2d 36, 414 N.E.2d 445 (10th Dist. 1979).
219 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1064 (Chadbourn
rev. 1972). See also Gerrick v. Gorsuch, 172 Ohio. St. 417, 178 N.E.2d 40 (1961);
Faxon Hills Constr. Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, 168 Ohio St. 8, 151 N.E.2d 12 (1958); Peckham Iron Co. v. Harper, 41
Ohio St. 100 (1884). The Ohio Supreme Court, however, may have abandoned the
concept of conclusiveness. In its somewhat ambiguous opinion in Jones &
Laughlin Steel v. Bd. of Revision, 40 Ohio St. 2d 61, 320 N.E.2d 658 (1974), it said:
[Tihe Court of Appeals "deemed" the taxpayer's complaint to the board
a "pleading in the case," and stated further that "any admission of fact
against interest in a pleading is conclusive upon the pleader and he is
bound by such admission, and the Court of Appeals is bound to accept as
true such admissions in the pleadings." Although we need not question
the validity of this conclusion, we can not concur in the court's premise
that the "complaint" herein, filed with an administrative body prior to
the institution of this judicial proceeding, is a pleading. See Civ. R. 7(A).
Finally, even if the "complaint" were a pleading, the averments con-
tained therein would lack conclusive effect .... Civ. R. 15 allows amend-
ments to pleadings when justice requires or when necessary to conform
to the evidence .... No objection was made that such evidence was not
in conformity with the pleadings, and, had an objection been entered,
Civ. R. 15(B) provides for amendment at that time.
Id. at 63-64, 320 N.E.2d at 660. In other words, at the trial the court may permit
the introduction of evidence that is inconsistent with a prior admission made in
the pleadings, and the party introducing that inconsistent evidence may then
amend his pleadings to conform to that evidence. The court also implies that an
ordinary amendment made under the provisions of OHIO R. CIV. P. 15(A) may
withdraw a judicial admission made in the original pleading. This seems to be a
departure from the generally accepted rule that any admission against interest
made in the original pleading may later be used against the amending party.
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is new is the extension of the judicial admission concept to cover conclu-
sions of law or mixed assertions of law and fact,22 and the use of judicial
admissions in a different action. As a general rule, judicial admissions
were deemed conclusive only in the action in which they were made, and
could not be used as conclusive admissions in another action.22' Here, the
court not only permits the use of the judicial admission in the second ac-
tion, but also gives it the same conclusive effect that it would have in
the first action. Further, from all that appears in the case, the court did
so by taking judicial notice of the complaint filed in the first action,
since there is no indication that that complaint was put in evidence in
the second action.22
Most of the courts considering this aspect of Rule 11 would not go so
far. Most courts would probably agree that an unqualified assertion of
fact made under the obligation of Rule 11 is to be treated as a conclusive
judicial admission in the action in which it is made if it is not subse-
quently qualified, amended or withdrawn before trial,' but as for its
use in another action involving the same party asserting it, it is no more
than a nonbinding admission which may be introduced into evidence
against a party.
24
220 In other words, Anderson was acting within the course and scope of his
employment. Cf. Faxon Hills Constr. Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners of America, 168 Ohio St. 8, 151 N.E.2d 12 (1958)(the assertion that the
defendant's labor practices affect interstate commerce is a conclusion of law
rather than an assertion of fact, and thus not within the concept of judicial admis-
sion).
221 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1066 (Chadbourn
rev. 1972). But see paragraph 1 of the syllabus of Broadrup v. Woodman, 27 Ohio
St. 553 (1875), where it is said: "The answer of W. in a former suit, relating to the
same land and deed in controversy in this case, signed by him, is admissible to
prove that the deed was a deed of trust." Id-
The traditional Ohio rule would not permit the taking of judicial notice in
this instance. See Gerardot v. Parrish, 44 Ohio App. 2d 293, 298, 338 N.E.2d 531,
536 (3d Dist. 1975), where it is said: "A court may not take judicial notice of the
record of a case in another court and ordinarily may not even take judicial notice
of the record of another case in the same court." Id. Compare Holly v. Dayton
View Terrace Improvement Corp., 25 Ohio Misc. 57, 263 N.E.2d 337 (Montgomery
County C.P. 1970).
See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel v. Bd. of Revision, 40 Ohio St. 2d 61, 320
N.E.2d 658 (1974).
224 Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1956); Frank R. Jelleff,
Inc. v. Braden, 233 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Yaskin v. Allston, 179 F. Supp. 757
(E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 277 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1960). But see Giannone v. United
States Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1956), which notes the general rule, but
questions the soundness of it:
Most of the authorities considering admissions as evidence conclude
that pleadings today are supposed to be factual rather than fictional and
therefore should be regarded as probative and admissible. ...
Authorities rarely articulate what we believe to be a conflict between
19811
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Whether treated as a conclusive judicial admission or a non-binding
evidentiary admission, the unqualified assertion of fact made under the
obligation of Civil Rule 11 may have its principal thrust in malpractice
actions against the attorney-signatory. To date there does not appear to
have been any attempt to use such assertions as admissions against the
interest of the attorney signing them."5 Perhaps this is because of the
traditional rule which prohibits such use. As stated by Wigmore: "A
statement by a person as counsel in another's cause may of course not
be treated as his own admission usable against him personally."2 6 But
the cases cited for this rule were decided long before the advent of Rule
11, and they obviously do not take into consideration the fact that the
attorney's signature under that rule is his personal certification that the
facts stated without qualification in the document bearing that
attorney's signature are true to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief.' Thus, there is no reason in principle why the client-plaintiff
the admissions through pleading rule and rule 8(e)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., which allows inconsistent, alter-
native and hypothetical pleading. The rules encourage parties to plead
not only what they know is factually true, but also any fact if they
believe "there is good ground to support it." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. This
soundly based policy-see Clark, Code Pleading §§ 41, 42, 99 (2d ed.
1947)-would tend to be defeated if allegations in the pleadings are ad-
missible as evidence. Parties will hesitate to make notice-giving allega-
tions at the risk of their being used as evidence, especially considering
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 liberalizing amendments.
Id at 547-48.
Because of these objections it is said that pleadings which are couched in the
alternative, hypothetical or inconsistent mode do not rise to the status of con-
clusive judicial admissions in the action in which they are filed and may not
generally be introduced as evidentiary admissions against interest in another ac-
tion. See MCCORMICK'S EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 265 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). Accor-
dingly, the text emphasizes that the rule we are here discussing applies to un-
qualified assertions in the pleadings.
There does not appear to be any post-rule Ohio decision on point, but the an-
cient case of Broadrup v. Woodman, 27 Ohio St. 553 (1875), subscribes to the
general rule stated in the text. Indeed, it can be read as going further than the
general rule; it can be read as importing a conclusive effect to assertions verified
by the pleader. It must be noted, however, that the pleading involved in
Broadrup was an answer filed in a chancery case (the first action), and it has
always been held that an answer in chancery could be used in another action as
the admission of the party answering. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COM-
MON LAW § 1065 (Chadbourne rev. 1972).
225 R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 181, 421 (1977).
2-' 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON. LAW § 1066, at 80 (Chad-
bourne rev. 1972).
7 Ironically, many of the cases which do not permit the introduction of the
pleadings as evidentiary admissions against the interest of the party justify the
prohibition on the ground that the pleadings were signed by the attorney rather
than the party and are therefore the statements of the attorney. See Giannone v.
United States Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1956). As McCormick puts it:
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in a malpractice action against the attorney cannot use the attorney-
defendant's signed pleadings or other documents to establish the merits
of the action which would have been tried were it not for the attorney-
defendant's malpractice, or the amount of damages suffered because of
that malpractice. 28 They are, after all, that attorney's certified
statements with respect to the merit and value of the client's cause, and
to that extent are admissions by the attorney that his ertswhile client
had a meritorious cause of a stated value. While they may not be con-
clusive judicial admissions on these points they are at least evidentiary
admissions which may be considered by the trier of fact in the malprac-
tice action.
Somewhat akin to the malpractice situation described above are those
actions in which a successful defendant seeks to recover damages from
the attorney for the unsuccessful plaintiff. The theories of recovery
vary from case to case, and include malicious prosecution, libel and
defamation, abuse of process and related torts, invasion of privacy,
negligence, battery, prima facie tort' and breach of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.230 Although some of the decisions have noted that
the attorney-defendant knew or should have known that the original ac-
tion was baseless,23 ' the plaintiffs have, for the most part, been unsuc-
More often, however, the pleading is prepared and signed by counsel,
and the older view holds that it is not sufficient to show that the
pleading was filed or signed by the party's attorney of record, and that
the statements therein will be presumed to be merely "suggestions of
counsel" unless other evidence is produced that they were actually sanc-
tioned by the client.
MCCORMICK'S EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 265, at 636 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
28 If the client-plaintiff's original action was not tried because of the alleged
malpractice of the attorney-defendant, the client-plaintiff must ordinarily prove
that had the original action gone forward he would have been successful on the
merits and would have recovered damages or whatever other relief he sought. In
other words, in this type of malpractice action, the client-plaintiff has the burden
of proving the case within the case. See R. MALLIN & V. LEVIT, supra note 225, at
§§ 411, 416 (1977).
' Prima facie tort as a basis for recovery was attempted in Drago v.
Buonagurio, 89 Misc. 2d 171, 391 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1977), but was rejected for
want of an allegation of actual or special damages. For the status of prima facie
tort in Ohio, see Bajpayee v. Rothermich, 53 Ohio App. 2d 117, 372 N.E.2d 817
(10th Dist. 1977).
"I For a concise summary of most of the cases and the various theories of
recovery, as well as other relevant authorities, see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra
note 225, at §§ 41-60; Kent, The Retaliatory Lawsuit, 52 CLEV. B.J. 92 (1981);
Readey, Countersuing the Lawyer- The Case of the Sore Winner, 1 NEGLIGENCE
L. NEWSLETTER No. 4 (April 1978), published by the Negligence Law Committee
of the Ohio State Bar Association.
231 See, e.g., Dakters v. Shane, 64 Ohio App. 2d 196, 412 N.E.2d 399 (9th Dist.
1978), where it is said: "We shall assume, arguendo, that the action filed by the
Himes and attorney Shane against Dr. Dakters was instituted maliciously." Id. at
197, 412 N.E.2d at 401.
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cessful in the use of any of these theories; 32 and in Ohio they have rare-
ly been successful.233
It is against this background that Bickel v. Mackie23 becomes
noteworthy because, in that action, the liability of the attorney-
defendant was premised on a violation of Federal Civil Rule 11. Unfor-
tunately, the allegation alleging violation of Rule 11 was coupled with an
allegation that the attorney-defendant breached the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 3 ' and the court treated it as part and parcel of the
latter allegation rather than as a basis for recovery in its own right:
232 See note 230 supra and accompanying text.
' Dakters v. Shane, 64 Ohio App. 2d 196, 412 N.E.2d 399 (9th Dist. 1978);
W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397 (10tb Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Meyers v. Seinsheimer, 5 Ohio N.P. 281 (1898), Nader v. McBride, No. 39641
(Cuyahoga County App., filed June 19, 1980), reprinted in Kent, The Retaliatory
Lawsuit, 52 CLEV. B.J. 92 (1981); Burkons v. Rogoff, No. 953,503 (Cuyahoga County
C.P., filed Aug. 16, 1977); Marvin v. Cory, No. 77-CV-05-2169 (Franklin County
C.P., filed Mar. 7, 1978); Shook v. Stollings, No. 74-305 (Richland County C.P. [no
filing date available] ); Strong v. Roberts, No. 74-2476 (Lucas County C.P., filed
March, 1976), reprinted in 19 A.T.L.A. NEWSLETTER 171-72 (1976) ("Jury verdict
for defendant-attorney. Jury found that defendant-attorney had inadequate pro-
able cause to bring suit, and that his action caused some damage to plaintiff, but
failed to find that defendant-attorney had acted with malice in bringing suit.");
Van Dervort v. Cihla, No. 79905-75 (Lorain County C.P., filed 1976)(exact filing
date unavailable); Westphal v. Chastang, No. 76-CV-06-2265 (Franklin County
C.P., filed Nov. 16, 1976).
But see Board of Educ. v. Marting, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 475, 185 N.E.2d 597
(Fayette County C.P. 1962), where it is said:
The [demurring] defendants, Griffith and Malone, raise the additional
question whether a malicious prosecution action can or cannot be main-
tained against an attorney at law based upon his capacity as such in a
previous action. This Court concludes that an attorney has a respon-
sibility to his client to advise his client as to the merits of his cause. This
Court recognizes that "to err is human" but an attorney, due to his
background and education, is in much better position to minimize error.
An attorney is in good position "to know that the client is activated by
malice, and also knows that there is no cause for the prosecution; the dic-
tates of common honesty require that he also should be made account-
able."
Id. at 480, 185 N.E.2d at 600. See also Timson v. Weiner, 395 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.
Ohio 1975), which notes that an attorney may be held to respond in damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for invoking the subpoena power of the state if it is
shown that the purpose of the subpoena was not to require the presence of a
potential witness but to exclude the subpoenaed person from being present at a
public function or to harass or punish the person. Id.
447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd without opinion, 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.
1978).
2-3 The court summarized the allegations of the complaint as follows:
Count four of Division II complains that defendant Hibbits owed a duty
to plaintiff Bickel to comply with the rules of civil procedure relating to
certifying that a suit is brought in good faith (FRCP 11) and the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers prescribing adequate prepara-
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Violation of the Code of Professional Ethics is not tantamount to
a tortious act, particularly with regard to liability to a non-
client. Though Canon 7 does speak of a duty "to the legal
system" to stay within the bounds of the law when representing
clients, it does not create a private cause of action. Plaintiff cites
no cases to support his claim that it does create such a cause.
There are several cases from other jurisdictions which state
that it does not. San Drago v. Buonagurio [89 Misc. 2d 171, 391
N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1977)1; Spencer v. Burglass [337 So.2d 596
(La. 1976)]; Lyddon v. Shaw [56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 14 Ill. Dec. 489,
372 N.E.2d 685 (1978)]; Cf. Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 233 Pa.
Super. 153, 335 A.2d 751, 755 (1975). And even if it did establish
a minimal standard of conduct below which lies negligence per
se, it has already been noted that no action for negligence exists
in the case at bar.
tion and proscribing participation in suits to harass or maliciously injure
another. Plaintiff analogizes the rules and code to drivers rules of the
road which if violated constitute negligence per se.
Id. at 1383.
236 Id. "No action for negligence exists" because:
The attorney owes his primary and paramount duty to his client. The
very nature of the adversary process precludes reliance by opposing par-
ties. While it is true that the attorney owes a general duty to the
judicial system, it is not the type of duty which translates into liability
for negligence to an opposing party on the attorney's conduct.
447 F. Supp. at 1381. Accord, Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Nelson
v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 266 S.E.2d 108 (Va.
1980).
It is not entirely clear why it is not foreseeable that the original defen-
dant-the attorney's intended adversary-would not rely upon the attorney's
compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code of Professional
Responsibility especially in light of Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969),
which the federal court recognized as controlling and quoted as follows:
Thus, it was felt the test to be adopted is whether the third party to
whom the accountant owes a duty of care is actually foreseen and a
member of a limited class of persons contemplated. We agree, and in so
doing, recognize that the same rule may be applicable in other recognized
professions, such as abstractors and attorneys....
Id. at 402. But see Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978), in which the
Supreme Court of Iowa refused to extend the Ryan rule to the situation here
discussed. As the court put it:
It is clear, however, that the third party, in order to proceed suc-
cessfully in a legal malpractice action, must be a direct and intended
beneficiary of the lawyer's services .... Where this special relationship
between the lawyer and the third party is lacking, courts refuse to im-
pose liability based on legal malpractice.
Id.
It must be noted, however, that many of the courts which have rejected the
negligence theory do so because of the availability of an action for malicious pro-
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Thus, in the one case in which Rule 11 was ventured as the basis for im-
posing liability on an attorney who ignored its mandatory provisions, it
did not receive the independent consideration which it deserved.
It is questionable whether Rule 11 as a basis for liability would fare
any better in Ohio. ' The Court of Appeals for Franklin County has sug-
gested that the only remedy for an attorney's breach of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility is "disciplinary proceedings against the at-
torney, including suspension from the practice of law or permanent
disbarment."' Since Ohio Civil Rule 11 incorporates the relevant
Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules prescribed under Canon 7
of that code, the court would likely take the same position if liability
were premised on a violation of Ohio Civil Rule 11. However, the Court
of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County has recognized that a party plain-
tiff might be liable for malicious prosecution or its equivalent if he pur-
sues an action "after learning that there is no longer any reasonable
basis to believe that the named defendant is liable for any damage." '239
Whether such a rule would also apply to the plaintiff's attorney who in-
stitutes an action without any basis to believe that the named defendant
is liable for any damage is uncertain."' Given Ohio's adherence to the re-
quirement of privity in such matters, the answer is probably in the
negative." '
secution. As it is said in Weaver v. Steward, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr.
745 (1979):
We note further that appellate courts in other jurisdictions have
recently rejected the proposed extension of the duty as advanced by Dr.
Steward and the California Medical Association [Citations omitted.]
Each of those decisions viewed the public policy of freedom of access to
the courts as clearly outweighing any argument favoring creation of a
duty of care owed by attorneys to adverse third parties in litigation.
Moreover, each decision recognized as an adequate remedy, the right of
the adverse third party to sue the attorney for malicious prosecution.
We view those cases as analytically sound and clearly supportive of the
position we have taken with reference to what we see to be the California
law on the issue.
Id at 182-83, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
23" Dakters v. Shane, 64 Ohio App. 2d 196,412 N.E.2d 399 (9th Dist. 1978), would
have been a perfect test case for the Rule 11 theory of recovery, but it does not
appear that Rule 11 was argued in that case.
I W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397, 400 (10th Dist.
Ct. App. 1976).
Burkons v. Rogoff, No. 953, 503 (Cuyahoga County C.P., filed Dec. 16, 1976),
reprinted in 48 CLEV. B.J. 167 (1977).
240 It might in those states which do not require the attachment of the plain-
tiffs property or the restraint of his or her person as integral elements of a cause
of action for malicious prosecution. See explanation of the attorney's duty to in-
vestigate as detailed in Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
21 See W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397 (10th Dist.
Ct. App. 1976), where it said: "As a general rule, an attorney is immune from
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Nevertheless, it has been recognized that the victim of a sham,
frivolous or vexatious lawsuit should have some remedy against the at-
torney who institutes that suit, 4' especially in light of Article I, Section
16 of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that every person shall have
remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered
without denial or delay, for any injury suffered in his land, goods, per-
son or reputation."3 Illinois, which has a similar constitutional
liability to third persons arising from the performance of the attorney's profes-
sional activities as an attorney on behalf of, and with the knowledge of his client,
unless such third person is in privity with the client." Id at 400.
242 "In a society in which litigation has become a national pastime it may seem
obvious that there should be a remedy for the victim of frivolous litigation where
that defendant was neither seized, had his property seized or sustained special in-
juries." Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (N.D. Iowa 1978). See also
Ready, Countersuing the Lawyer- The Case of the Sore Winner, 1 NEGLIGENCE
L. NEWSLETTER No. 4, at 1, 4 (April, 1978), where it is said:
Because of Ohio's requirement of proof of arrest of the person or seizure
or [sic] property in order to maintain a malicious prosecution suit, in add-
ition to the other burdens of proof discussed earlier, the future of
countersuits in Ohio is extremely doubtful. It nevertheless must be re-
cognized, without judging those countersuits already reported, that there
is a point - short of arrest of the person or seizure of property - where an
attorney's conduct may cross the boundaries of propriety and where he
may do harm to a defendant totally without justification. The threat of
disciplinary action by the bar association does nothing to compensate
the hapless victim of an attorney's intentional malice or reckless aban-
don. No other profession enjoys a blanket immunity-nor should ours.
The Ohio Constitution provides that "(a)ll courts shall be open and
every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice ad-
ministered without denial or delay."
The Ohio courts should respond to the need for a remedy to the victim
where a lawyer clearly and outrageously abused his privileges in practic-
ing law, as long as the consequences of his behavior are foreseeable.
One way to provide that needed remedy is to modify Ohio's malicious
prosecution law to drop the necessity of proving arrest of the person or
seizure of property, which would only bring Ohio law into line with a
majority of jurisdictions in the United States. The majority's experience
tells us that the success of countersuits based upon the theory of
malicious prosecution would still be rare-as it should be-and reserved
for only extreme cases of attorney abuse. No profession uses balancing
tests more skillfully than ours, and there is no reason to believe that the
courts cannot find the proper balance between compensating those who
deserve it on the one hand and protecting the freedom of the attorney to
prosecute his client's case diligently, zealously, and effectively on the
other hand.
Id But see Kent, The Retaliatory Lawsuit, 52 CLEV. B.J. 92 (1981); Dakters v.
Shane, 64 Ohio App. 2d 196, 412 N.E.2d 399 (9th Dist. 1978). The Reporter's Note
to the decision indicates that the Ohio Supreme Court overruled a motion to cer-
tify the record on September 7, 1978, thereby passing up an opportunity to con-
sider the proposals made by Mr. Ready. Id.
A3 See Ready, Countersuing the Lawyer-The Case of the Sore Winner, 1
NEGLIGENCE L. NEWSLETTER No. 4 (April 1978), as quoted in note 242 supra.
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provision," ' has found that remedy in its code of civil procedure. Thus,
in Lyddon v. Shaw245 the court noted:
Finally, we reject the suggestion that the result which this
court has reached today deprives Dr. Lyddon of his right under
article 1, section 12 of the Illinois Constitution, to "a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs. . . ." This court
has held that this section "does not mandate a specific form of
remedy be provided plaintiff but only expresses the philosophy
that some remedy be provided". (Steffa v. Stanley (1976), 39 Ill.
App. 3d 915, 918, 350 N.E.2d 886, 888.) Here, apart from the
availability of an action for malicious prosecution or abuse of
process, a party who is put to the defense of a groundless
lawsuit has available the remedy of a motion in the original ac-
tion for an award of attorney fees under section 41 of the Civil
Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 41) and in an ap-
propriate case may be instrumental in the institution of
disciplinary proceedings against the offending attorney."'
Section 41 of the Civil Practice Act, to which the court makes reference,
states:
Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and
found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the
payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred by the other
party by reason of the untrue pleading, together with a
reasonable attorney's fee, to be summarily taxed by the court
upon motion made within 30 days of the judgment or
dismissal.""
Although neither the Ohio nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have a general provision similar to section 41 of the Illinois Civil Prac-
tice Act, it has been said that such a provision is inherent in that por-
tion of Civil Rule 11 which stipulates that "[flor a willful violation of this
rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate action."2 '8 Thus, while
a violation of Civil Rule 11 may not provide the basis for an independent
civil action against the offending attorney,4 9 it will provide the basis for
244 ILLINOIS CONST. art. 1, § 12, provides in material part that every person
shall have "a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he
receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation .. " Id.
u 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978).
248 Id at 822-23, 372 N.E.2d at 690-91.
247 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980).
248 Risinger, supra note 2, at 42-52.
49 But even this is not all that certain. As Risinger notes: "Today's frivolity
may be tomorrow's law, and the law often grows by an organic process in which a
concept is conceived, then derided as absurb (and clearly not the law), then ac-
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a summary application for expenses and attorney's fees against that at-
torney."'
The rules contain ample warrant for such a use of Rule 11. As Ris-
inger has noted, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide several
specific instances in which the court may punish a party or the party's
attorney for bringing a sham, frivolous or vexatious proceeding by
awarding the opposing party his expenses and attorney fees incurred in
resisting that proceeding.251 The Ohio Rules include a more thorough
cepted as theoretically tenable (though not the law), then accepted as the law."
Risinger, supra note 2, at 57.
1, As Risinger remarks:
[This] general approach for handling Rule 11 violations ... fastens upon
the offending attorney the obligation to fully compensate those who
have been put out of pocket by his misconduct. At the same time, it
creates no windfalls and eliminates the risk of penalizing an innocent
client by striking the complaint when the misconduct is solely the at-
torney's. Further, the penalty or deterrent value of such action is signifi-
cant, whether taken just after pleadings are filed, or after dismissal,
summary judgment, or trial. Therefore, this procedure could be used
even though inquiry into the question of pleading honesty is put off, as it
should be, until after the normal determination of falsity has been made,
or at least until it is certain that a normal determination of truth or falsity
will not be made. Finally and perhaps most importantly, this approach
ensures that no person will suffer financial loss because of demonstrable
attorney misconduct in the courts.
Risinger, supra note 2, at 43.
A "summary application," of course, is nothing more than a motion. OHIO R.
Civ. P. 7(B)(1). In the context of this discussion, the motion to be used is the OHIO
R. CIv. P. 11 motion to strike the offending document from the files as sham and
false. This motion should also contain a request for the imposition of sanctions in
the form of expenses and attorneys fees incurred by the movant in opposing the
offending document. This motion should be accompanied by an affidavit from the
movant's attorney which contains: (1) an itemized list of the legal services
rendered, the time expended in rendering the services, and the attorney's charge
for each separate service rendered; and (2) an itemized list of expenses incurred.
Sworn or certified statements or receipts in support of every item of expense
should be attached to the affidavit. If expenses were paid directly by the client,
the motion should be supported by the client's affidavit as well, and this affidavit
should also have attached to it sworn or certified copies of all pertinent
statements or receipts.
"' As Risinger states:
[The award of expenses and attorneys fees] affirms a general proposition
that when any person under the authority of the court takes a position
dishonestly or frivolously and expenses arise from that action, that per-
son should pay full compensation.
This, moreover, is basically the position adopted in several other
federal rules: Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g), relating to cost resulting from bad
faith affidavits in connection with summary judgment; Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(4), relating to costs resulting from failure to make discovery; Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(d), relating, inter alia to costs of failure to attend one's own
deposition. It should be noted that under both Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(4) and
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documentation. 2 These specific rules providing for the award of ex-
penses and attorney fees are not limitations on the court's power to use
37(d) an attorney can be made personally liable for such costs, including
attorney's fees, in order to fully compensate the party aggrieved by the
failure. Apropos of this, I find it difficult to believe that less could be in-
tended by way of awards of attorney's fees in compensation for expenses
incurred under Rule 11 than under Rule 37(c).
Risinger, supra note 2, at 51-52 (emphasis in original).
222 See OHIO R. CIv. P. 3(C)(2):
When [because of improper venue] action is transferred to a county
which is proper, the court may assess costs, including reasonable at-
torney fees, to the time of transfer against the party who commenced
the action in a county other than stated to be proper in subdivision (B) of
this rule.
I& OHIO R. CIv. P. 30(D):
Motion to terminate or limit examinations. At any time during the tak-
ing of the deposition, on motion of any party or of the deponent and upon
a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such
manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent
or party, the court in which the action is pending may order the officer
conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposi-
tion, or may limit the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition
as provided in Rule 26(C). . . . The provisions of Rule 37 apply to the
award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
Id. (For the applicable provisions of Rule 37, see OHIo R. Civ. P. 37(A)(4), as
quoted in note 195 supra.)
OHIO R. Civ. P. 30 (G):
(1) If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition fails to at-
tend and proceed therewith and another party attends in person or by at-
torney pursuant to the notice, the court may order the party giving the
notice to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred by him and his attorney in so attending, including reasonable
attorney's fees.
(2) If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition of a
witness fails to serve a subpoena upon him and the witness because of
such failure does not attend, and if another party attends in person or by
attorney because he expects the deposition of that witness to be taken,
the court may order the party giving the notice to pay to such other par-
ty the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred by him and his at-
torney in so attending, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Id.
OHIO R. Civ. P. 36(A):
The party who has requested the admissions may move for an order
with respect to the answers or objections. Unless the court determines
that an objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If
the court determines that an answer does not comply with the re-
quirements of this rule, it may order either that the matter is admitted
or that an amended answer be served.... [Tihe provisions of Rule 37(A)(4)
apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
Id- (For the text of OHIO R. Civ. P. 37(A)(4), see note 195 supra.)
OHIO R. Civ. P. 41(D):
If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences
an action based upon or including the same claim against the same defen-
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this monetary penalty as a sanction; rather, they are explicit illustra-
tions of the court's general power to sanction offending parties and at-
torneys who engage in sham, frivolous or vexatious proceedings.
Accordingly, since the general must necessarily include the specific, the
general power to sanction granted by Rule 11 must include the specific
power to award the prevailing party his expenses and attorney fees
when he has been agrieved by a sham, frivolous or vexatious pro-
ceeding. That this general power to sanction includes the power to
assess monetary penalties against an offending attorney is made
manifest not only by the express language of Rule 11-"[fjor a willful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate ac-
tion"-but also by the specific language of those rules which provide ex-
plicit illustrations of the court's general power to sanction. 53 Therefore,
one may conclude with some confidence that Ohio's Civil Rule 11 makes
available to an aggrieved party the same remedy that is expressly set
forth in section 41 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act; the language of the
two may differ but their purpose and application are identical.
III. CONCLUSION
Except with respect to an unrepresented party's signature on a proof
of service required by Ohio Civil Rule 5(B), and, possibly, except with
respect to an unrepresented party's signature on a responsive pleading
containing a general denial, an unrepresented party's signature is not
an attestation to the truth or merit of the material to which it is appended;
it is no more than an indication that the unrepresented party consents
dant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the ac-
tion previously dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the pro-
ceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
Id. OHIO R. Civ. P. 56(G):
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of
the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith
or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the
party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to in-
cur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or at-
torney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Id. OHIO R. App. P. 23:
If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may
require the appellant to pay reasonable expenses of the appellee in-
cluding attorney fees and costs.
Id. For cases interpreting this latter Rule, see Williamson v. Cook, No. 79 AP-184
(Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist., filed June 5, 1979), reprinted in 53 OHIo BAR 23 (1980);
Masheter v. Millis, No. E-78-56 (Ohio Ct. App. Erie County, filed May 11, 1979),
reprinted in 52 OHIO BAR 1403, 1404 (1979); and Kelly v. Kelly, No. 78 AP-247
(Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist., filed Aug. 7, 1978), reprinted in 51 OHIO BAR 1384 (1978).
23 See OHIO R. Civ. P. 37(A)(4).
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to the content of the document on which his signature appears, and to
the filing of the document with the court.
On the other hand, an attorney's signature on a document is the at-
torney's affidavit of merit. It imports, as a minimum, that the attorney
has read the document, or is otherwise fully conversant with its con-
tents; that he has made a reasonably diligent investigation of the facts
underlying the document and has evaluated the content and purpose of
the document; and that as a result of this investigation and evaluation,
the attorney certifies that the document is neither vexatious, frivolous
nor a sham. That is, the attorney's signature is the equivalent of the at-
torney's affidavit that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief: (1) the proffer of the document is not motivated merely by a
desire to harass or maliciously injure another; (2) the document does not
contain scandalous or indecent matter; (3) the position taken in the docu-
ment is either within the bounds of well-settled law or can be supported
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
the existing law; and (4) the position taken in the document is supported
by the known facts or reasonable inferences which may be drawn from
known facts; that is, there is probable cause to believe that the position
taken in the document is factually true. Finally, the attorney's signature
imports that the document is offered for the purpose of achieving some
objectively meaningful result and its proffer to the court has some
substantial purpose other than delay.
If the attorney's signature is knowingly false in any one of these
respects, that is, if the attorney willfully violates the provisions of Ohio
Civil Rule 11, he may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action
which includes, but is not limited to, the payment of the aggrieved par-
ty's expenses and attorney fees incurred in resisting a vexatious,
frivolous or sham document.
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APPENDIX
Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Signing of Pleadings; Sanctions*
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be sign-
ed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose ad-
dress shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses
or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief t
ne-4*terpese---fo--delay formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and
that it is not interposed primarily for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, to cause delay, or to increase the cost of litigation. If a pleading
is not signed, it shall not be accepted for filing. of-4s--signed-wirh-4ntent
tio --de~eat --the-.-"rpose..--af -- this -- r-le-,-it -- ay.--be..str4eken-.a- ba
&nd--fe-ls-ad-The-aet-ien--may--preeee4-as--t4beug4-4he--pteading--ha4-fe t
been-sered-FoF-a-wilf A-o ikaon-of-t-sf+ i e+ftaat-efey-may-be-sbjeeted
tO--ppfOi~rftte-diseipina-y--aet-Smi4a--aet4- y--ak i-ean-
dtia4e&-o4ndeeet--mat4ef-4&-4nser-te4 If a pleading is signed in violation
of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall im-
pose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred be-
cause of the filing of the pleading, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Since its original promulgation, Rule 11 has provided for the strik-
ing of pleadings and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to check
abuses in the signing of pleadings. Experience has shown the inefficacy
of the rule's language in serving this function. See 6 Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1334 (1969). See also the amend-
* Proposed Rule 11 was promulgated after this Article was written. It is set
forth herein for the reader's convenience.
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ment to Rule 7, which the revision of Rule 11 parallels, and the Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 7(b)(3), much of which is repeated below.
The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by building
upon and expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court to
award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose opponent
acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation. See, e.g., Road-
way Express Inc. v. Piper, __ U.S. __, 100 S.Ct. 2455 (1980); Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). Greater attention by the district courts to
pleading abuses and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate,
should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the
litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.
The expanded nature of the lawyer's certification in the fifth
sentence of amended Rule 11 recognizes that the litigation process may
be abused for purposes other than delay. See, e.g., Browning Debenture
Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
Because the former Rule 11 requirement that a pleading not be in-
terposed for delay has been interpreted to mean soley for delay, its ap-
plication was restricted. See Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motion
Practice: Time for a Change, 44 Fordham L.Rev. 1069 (1979). The new
language changes that standard. There is a violation of Rule 11 when
the primary motivation for the submission of any pleading is un-
justifiable delay. Thus, the rule applies even when there is some other
objective for the pleading, even a legitimate one.
The words "good ground to support" the pleading in the original
rule were interpreted to have both factual and legal elements. See, e.g.,
Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 15 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d 1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). They have been replaced by a stan-
dard of conduct that is much more focused. The Rule 11 formulation is
phrased somewhat differently from that in Rule 7 to reflect the dif-
ferent factors that are relevant to pleading and making a motion.
The new language stresses the need for some pre-filing inquiry into
both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by
the rule. The standard is one of reasonableness under the cir-
cumstances. See Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365
F.Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973). This standard is more stringent than the
original good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a greater range
of circumstances will trigger its violation. See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620
F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
However, the court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hind-
sight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was
reasonable to believe at the time the pleading was submitted. Thus,
what constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as
how much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he
had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the
pleading; whether the pleading was based on a plausible view of the law;
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or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or another member of
the bar.
Amended Rule 11 continues to apply to anyone who signs the
pleadings. Although the standard is the same for unrepresented parties,
who are obliged to sign the pleadings themselves, the court has suffi-
cient discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often
arise in pro se situations. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
The provision in the original rule for striking pleadings and motions
as sham and false has been deleted. The passage has rarely been utiliz-
ed, and decisions thereunder have tended to confuse the issue of at-
torney honesty with the merits of the action. See generally Risinger,
Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems
with Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, 61 Minn.L.Rev. 1 (1976). Motions under this provi-
sion generally present issues better dealt with under Rules 8, 12, or 56.
See Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 5 Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1334 (1969).
The former reference to the inclusion of scandalous or indecent mat-
ter, which is itself strong indication that an improper purpose underlies
the pleading, also has been deleted as unnecessary. Such matter may be
stricken under Rule 12(f) as well as dealt with under the more general
language of amended Rule 11.
The text of the amended rule seeks to dispel apprehensions that ef-
forts to obtain enforcement will be fruitless by insuring that the rule
will be applied when properly invoked. The word "sanctions" in the cap-
tion, for example, stresses a deterrent orientation in dealing with im-
proper pleading. This corresponds to the approach in imposing sanctions
for discovery abuses. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam). And the words "shall im-
pose" in the last sentence focuses the court's attention on the need to
impose sanctions for pleading abuses. The court, however, retains the
necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It
has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with
which it should be well acquainted.
The reference in the former text to willfulness as a prerequisite to
disciplinary action has been deleted. However, in considering the nature
and severity of the sanctions to be imposed, the court should take ac-
count of the state of the attorney's or party's actual or presumed
knowledge when the pleading or other paper was signed. Thus, for ex-
ample, when a party is not represented by counsel, the absence of legal
advice is an appropriate factor.
The court's authority to impose sanctions on its own motion has
been explicit in order to overcome the traditional reluctance of courts to
intervene unless requested by one of the parties. See the Advisory Com-
mittee Note to Rule 7(b)(3).
If the duty imposed by the rule is violated, the court should have
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discretion to impose sanctions on either the attorney, the party the sign-
ing attorney represents, or both, or on an unrepresented party who
signed the pleading, and the new rule so provides. Although Rule 11 has
been silent on the point, courts have claimed the power to impose sanc-
tions on an attorney personally, either by imposing costs or employing
the contempt technique. See 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil § 1334 (1969); 2A Moore Federal Practice 1 11.02, at
2104 n.8. This power has been used infrequently. The amended rule
should eliminate any doubt as to the propriety of assessing sanctions
against the attorney.
Even though it is the attorney whose signature violates the rule, it
may be appropriate under the circumstances of the case to impose a
sanction on the client. See Browning Debenture Holders' v. DASA
Corp., supra. This modification brings Rule 11 in line with practice
under Rule 37, which allows sanctions for abuses during discovery to be
imposed upon the party, the attorney, or both.
A party seeking sanctions should give notice to the court and the of-
fending party promptly upon discovering a basis for doing so. The time
when sanctions are to be imposed rests in the discretion of the trial
judge. However, it is anticipated that the sanctions issue under Rule 11
normally will be determined at the end of the litigation. The procedure
obviously must comport with due process requirements. The particular
format to be followed should depend on the circumstances of the situa-
tion and the severity of the sanction under consideration. In many situa-
tions the judge's participation in the proceedings provides him with full
knowledge of the relevant facts and little further inquiry will be
necessary.
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective
operation of the pleading regime will not be offset by the cost of
satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must limit
the scope of sanction proceedings. Thus, discovery should be conducted
only by leave of the court, and then only in extraordinary cir-
cumstances.
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